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Annexation of Tibet by China

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1950–1951 annexation in Asia

Annexation of Tibet by China

PLA marching into Kangding
Date6 October 1950 – 24 October 1951
Location
ResultChinese victory
Territorial
changes
Ü-Tsang andChamdo Region ofKham came under the control of China.
Belligerents
 TibetPeople's Republic of China
Commanders and leaders
Units involved
 Tibetan Army[3] People's Liberation Army[4][5]
Part ofa series on the
History ofTibet
Potala Palace
See also
iconAsia portalflagChina portal

Central Tibet[a] came under the control of thePeople's Republic of China (PRC) after thegovernment of Tibet signed theSeventeen Point Agreement which the14th Dalai Lama ratified on 24 October 1951.[6] This followed attempts by the Tibetan government to modernize itsmilitary, negotiate with the PRC, and theBattle of Chamdo in westernKham that resulted in several thousand casualties and captives.[7][8] The Chinese government calls the signing of the agreement the "Peaceful Liberation of Tibet".[9][10][11][12][13] The events are called the "Chinese invasion of Tibet" by theCentral Tibetan Administration[14] and theTibetan diaspora.[15]

The Tibetan government and local social structure remained in place under the authority of China until they were dissolved after the1959 Tibetan uprising, when the14th Dalai Lama fled into exile[16][17] and repudiated the Seventeen Point Agreement, saying that he had approved it under duress.[18]

Background

Further information:Political status of Tibet

Qing dyansty

Main article:Tibet under Qing rule

Tibet came under the rule of the Manchu-ledQing dynasty of China in 1720 after the Qingexpelled the forces of theDzungar Khanate from Tibet.[19]Emperor Kangxi then wrote an edict for theImperial Stele Inscriptions of the Pacification of Tibet.[20] His successorEmperor Yongzheng went on to establish new boundaries between what are now theTibet Autonomous Region (TAR),Qinghai,Sichuan andYunnan.[21]

Republic of China andde facto independence

Central Tibet remained under Qingsuzerainty until the1911 revolution.[22] The succeedingRepublic of China claimed inheritance of all Qing territories, including Tibet,[23] described in theImperial Edict of the Abdication of the Qing Emperor as an integral republic comprising different ethnic groups.[24][25][26] This is also reflected in theProvisional Constitution of the Republic of China adopted in 1912,[27] thoughethnic clashes occurred inLhasa following theWuchang Uprising.[citation needed]

By 1917 however the area comprising the present-day TAR eventually becameade facto independent polity.[28][29][30] Some border areas with high ethnic Tibetan populations (Amdo and EasternKham) remained under theChinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) or local warlord control.[31]

The TAR region is also known as "Political Tibet", while all areas with a high ethnic Tibetan population are collectively known as "Ethnic Tibet". Political Tibet refers to the polity ruled continuously by Tibetan governments since earliest times until 1951, whereas ethnic Tibet refers to regions north and east where Tibetans historically predominated but where, down to modern times, Tibetan jurisdiction was irregular and limited to just certain areas.[32]

At the time Political Tibet obtainedde facto independence, its socio-economic and political systems resembledMedieval Europe.[33] Attempts by the13th Dalai Lama between 1913 and 1933 to enlarge and modernize the Tibetan military had eventually failed, largely due to opposition from powerfularistocrats andmonks.[34][35] On 12 August 1927, the Republic of China mandated that before the publication of new laws, all laws in history regarding Tibetan Buddhism should continue unless there were conflicts with new doctrine or new laws of the Central Government.[36] The Tibetan government had little contact with other governments of the world during its period ofde facto independence,[35] with some exceptions; notably India, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[37][38] This left Tibet diplomatically isolated and cut off to the point where it could not make its positions on issues well known to the international community.[39]

People's Republic of China

In July 1949, in order to preventChinese Communist Party-sponsored agitation in political Tibet, the Tibetan government expelled the Nationalist delegation in Lhasa.[40] The (Nationalist) Chinese approved request to exempt Lhamo Dhondup from lot-drawing process usingGolden Urn to become the 14th Dalai Lama on 31 January 1940.[41][42][43] In November 1949, Tibetan government sent a letter to theU.S. State Department and a copy toMao Zedong, and a separate letter to the British government, declaring its intent to defend itself "by all possible means" against PRC troop incursions into Tibet.[44]

In the preceding three decades, the conservative Tibetan government had consciously de-emphasized its military and refrained from modernizing.[45] Hasty attempts at modernization and enlarging the military began in 1949,[46] but proved mostly unsuccessful on both counts.[47] By then, it was too late to raise and train an effective army.[48] India provided somesmall arms aid and military training.[49] However, thePeople's Liberation Army (PLA) was much larger, better trained, better led, better equipped, and more experienced than theTibetan Army.[50][51][52]

In 1950, the14th Dalai Lama was 15 years old and had not attained hismajority, soRegent Taktra was the actinghead of the Tibetan Government.[53] The period of the Dalai Lama'sminority is traditionally one of instability and division, exacerbated by the recentReting conspiracy[54] and a 1947 regency dispute.[38]

Approximate Line of Communist Advance (CIA, February 1950)
Map of the Far East from the Time magazine showing the situation of the Chinese Civil War in late 1948. Tibet is listed as part of China, while Outer Mongolia is listed outside of China since it was recognized as an independent country by that time, unlike Tibet.

Both the PRC and their predecessors the Kuomintang (ROC) had always maintained that Tibet was a part of China.[52] The PRC also proclaimed an ideological motivation to "liberate" the Tibetans from atheocraticfeudal system.[55] In September 1949, shortly before the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made it a top priority to incorporate Tibet,Taiwan Island,Hainan Island, and thePenghu Islands into the PRC,[56][57] peacefully or by force.[58] China viewed incorporating Tibet as important to consolidate its frontiers and address national defense concerns in the southwest.[59] Because Tibet was unlikely to voluntarily give up its de facto independence, Mao in December 1949 ordered that preparations be made to march into Tibet atQamdo (Chamdo), in order to induce the Tibetan Government to negotiate.[58] The PRC had over a million men under arms[58] and had extensive combat experience from the recently concludedChinese Civil War.[citation needed]

Negotiations between Tibet and the PRC

Talks between Tibet and China were mediated by thegovernments of Britain andIndia. On 7 March 1950, a Tibetan delegation arrived inKalimpong, India, to open a dialogue with thenewly declared People's Republic of China and to secure assurances that the Chinese would respect Tibetanterritorial integrity, among other things. The onset of talks was delayed by debate between the Tibetan, Indian, British, and Chinese delegations about the location of the talks. Tibet favoredSingapore orHong Kong (not Beijing; at the timeromanized as Peking); Britain favored India (not Hong Kong or Singapore); and India and the Chinese favored Beijing.[citation needed] The Tibetan delegation did eventually meet with the PRC's ambassador General Yuan Zhongxian inDelhi on 16 September 1950. Yuan communicated a 3-point proposal that Tibet be regarded as part of China, that China be responsible for Tibet's defense, and that China be responsible for Tibet's trade and foreign relations. Acceptance would lead to peaceful Chinese sovereignty, or otherwise war. The Tibetans undertook to maintain the relationship between China and Tibet as one ofpriest-patron:

"Tibet will remain independent as it is at present, and we will continue to have very close 'priest-patron' relations with China. Also, there is no need to liberate Tibet from imperialism, since there are no British, American or Guomindang imperialists in Tibet, and Tibet is ruled and protected by the Dalai Lama (not any foreign power)."

— Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa[60]: 46 

They and their head delegate Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, on 19 September, recommended cooperation, with some stipulations about implementation. Chinese troops need not be stationed in Tibet. It was argued that Tibet was under no threat, and if attacked by India or Nepal, could appeal to China for military assistance. While Lhasa deliberated, on 7 October 1950, Chinese troops advanced into eastern Tibet, crossing the border at five places.[61] The purpose was not to invade Tibetper se but to capture the Tibetan army inChamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and thus exert powerful pressure to send negotiators to Beijing to sign terms for a handover of Tibet.[62] On 21 October, Lhasa instructed its delegation to leave immediately for Beijing for consultations with the Communist government, and to accept the first provision, if the status of the Dalai Lama could be guaranteed, while rejecting the other two conditions. It later rescinded even acceptance of the first demand, after a divination before theSix-Armed Mahākāla deities indicated that the three points could not be accepted, since Tibet would fall under foreign domination.[63][64][65]

PLA capture of Chamdo

Main article:Battle of Chamdo

After months of failed negotiations,[66] attempts by Tibet to secure foreign support and assistance,[67] PRC and Tibetan troop buildups, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) crossed theJinsha River on 6 or 7 October 1950.[68][69] Two PLA units quickly surrounded the outnumbered Tibetan forces and captured the border town of Chamdo by 19 October, by which time 114 PLA[70] soldiers and 180 Tibetan[70][71][72] soldiers had been killed or wounded. Writing in 1962,Zhang Guohua claimed "over 5,700 enemy men were destroyed" and "more than 3,000" peacefully surrendered.[13] ThePeace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) estimated that 2,000 PLA and 2,000 Tibetans were killed including noncombatants.[73] Active hostilities were limited to a border area northeast of the Gyamo Ngul Chu River and east of the 96th meridian.[74] After capturing Chamdo, the PLA broke off hostilities,[71][75] sent a captured commander,Ngabo, toLhasa to reiterate terms of negotiation, and waited for Tibetan representatives to respond through delegates toBeijing.[76]

Further negotiations and annexation

PLA soldiers marching toward Tibet in 1950
PLA marching into Lhasa in October 1951

The PLA sent released prisoners (among them the governor-general of Kham, Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme), to Lhasa to negotiate with the Dalai Lama on the PLA's behalf. Chinese broadcasts promised that if Tibet was "peacefully liberated", the Tibetan elites could keep their positions and power.[77]

One month after China invaded Tibet,El Salvador sponsored a complaint by the Tibetan government at the UN, but India and the United Kingdom prevented it from being debated.[78]

Tibetan negotiators were sent to Beijing and presented with an already-finished document commonly referred to as theSeventeen Point Agreement. There was no negotiation offered by the Chinese delegation; although the PRC stated it would allow Tibet to reform at its own pace and in its own way, keep internal affairs self-governing and allow religious freedom; it would also have to agree to be part of China.[citation needed] The Tibetan negotiators were not allowed to communicate with their government on this key point, and pressured into signing the agreement on 23 May 1951, despite never having been given permission to sign anything in the name of the government. This was the first time in Tibetan history its government had accepted – albeit unwillingly – China's position on the two nations' shared history.[79]

Tibetan representatives in Beijing and the PRC Government signed the Seventeen Point Agreement on 23 May 1951, authorizing the PLA presence andCentral People's Government rule in Political Tibet.[80][81] The terms of the agreement had not been cleared with the Tibetan Government before signing and the Tibetan Government was divided about whether it was better to accept the document as written or to flee into exile. The Dalai Lama, who by this time had ascended to the throne, chose not to flee into exile, and formally accepted the 17 Point Agreement in October 1951.[82] According to Tibetan sources, on 24 October, on behalf of the Dalai Lama, general Zhang Jingwu sent a telegram to Mao Zedong with confirmation of the support of the Agreement, and there is evidence that Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme simply came to Zhang and said that the Tibetan Government agreed to send a telegram on 24 October, instead of the formal Dalai Lama's approval.[83] Shortly afterwards, the PLA entered Lhasa.[84] The subsequent annexation of Tibet is officially known in the People's Republic of China as the "Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" (Chinese:和平解放西藏地方Hépíng jiěfàng xīzàng dìfāng), as promoted by the state media.[85]

Aftermath

See also:Sinicization of Tibet
Chinese and Tibetan government officials at a banquet celebrating the 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet[86]

For several years, the Tibetan Government remained in place in the areas of Tibet where it had ruled prior to the outbreak of hostilities, except for the area surrounding Qamdo that was occupied by the PLA in 1950, which was placed under the authority of theQamdo Liberation Committee and outside the Tibetan Government's control.[87] During this time, areas under the Tibetan Government maintained a large degree of autonomy from the Central Government and were generally allowed to maintain their traditional social structure.[88]

In 1956, Tibetan militias in the ethnically Tibetan region of eastern Kham just outside the Tibet Autonomous Region, spurred by PRC government experiments inland reform, started fighting against the government.[89] The militias united to formChushi Gangdruk Volunteer Force. When the fightingspread to Lhasa inMarch 1959, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa on March 17 with an entourage of twenty, including six Cabinet ministers, and fled Tibet.[90]

Both the Dalai Lama and the PRC government in Tibet subsequently repudiated the17 Point Agreement, and the PRC government in Tibet dissolved the Tibetan Local Government.[17] The legacy of this action continues to the present day.[91][92]

Notes

  1. ^As well as the western part ofKham corresponding to theChamdo Region

See also

References

Citations

  1. ^Mackerras, Colin. Yorke, Amanda.The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China. [1991]. Cambridge University Press.ISBN 0-521-38755-8. p. 100.
  2. ^Goldstein, Melvyn C. (1991).A history of modern Tibet, 1913–1951, the demise of the lamaist state. University of California Press. p. 639.
  3. ^14th Dalai Lama (1990).Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama. London: Little, Brown and Co.ISBN 0-349-10462-X.
  4. ^Laird 2006 p. 301.
  5. ^Shakya 1999, p. 43
  6. ^A. Tom Grunfeld (30 July 1996).The Making of Modern Tibet. M.E. Sharpe. pp. 107–.ISBN 978-0-7656-3455-9.
  7. ^Anne-Marie Blondeau; Katia Buffetrille (2008).Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China's 100 Questions. University of California Press. p. 61.ISBN 978-0-520-24464-1.Archived from the original on 23 June 2016. Retrieved15 November 2015.It was evident that the Chinese were not prepared to accept any compromises and that the Tibetans were compelled, under the threat of immediate armed invasion, to sign the Chinese proposal.
  8. ^Tsepon Wangchuk Deden Shakabpa (October 2009).One Hundred Thousand Moons: An Advanced Political History of Tibet. BRILL. pp. 953, 955.ISBN 978-90-04-17732-1.
  9. ^"China confirms 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet – archive, 1951".The Guardian. May 1951.
  10. ^"Peaceful Liberation of Tibet".Xinhua News Agency.Archived from the original on 16 June 2017. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  11. ^Dawa Norbu (2001).China's Tibet Policy. Psychology Press. pp. 300–301.ISBN 978-0-7007-0474-3.
  12. ^Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, Vol. 1 (1989), pp. 679740
  13. ^abSurvey of China Mainland Press, no. 2854 p.5,6
  14. ^"China could not succeed in destroying Buddhism in Tibet: Sangay".Central Tibetan Administration. 25 May 2017. Archived fromthe original on 21 September 2018. Retrieved16 August 2017.
  15. ^Siling, Luo (14 August 2016)."A Writer's Quest to Unearth the Roots of Tibet's Unrest".The New York Times.ISSN 0362-4331.Archived from the original on 27 November 2018. Retrieved15 February 2020.
  16. ^Latson, Jennifer (17 March 2015)."How and Why the Dalai Lama Left Tibet". Time. Retrieved21 February 2021.
  17. ^abGoldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), pp. 54–55;Feigon (1996), pp. 160–161; Shakya 1999 p.208,240,241. (all sources: fled Tibet, repudiated agreement, dissolved local government).
  18. ^"The Dalai Lama's Press Statements - Statement issued at Tezpur"(PDF). 18 April 1959.Archived(PDF) from the original on 29 October 2022.
  19. ^Lin, Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier (2011), pp. 7–8.
  20. ^Yangang, S. H. I. (January 2015)."《御制平定西藏碑》The Imperial Stele Inscriptions of the Pacification of Tibet in Four Languages".西北民族论丛Northwest Ethnology Series.
  21. ^Kolmaš, Josef (1967)."Tibet and Imperial China: A Survey of Sino-Tibetan Relations Up to the End of the Manchu Dynasty in 1912".Occasional Paper (7). Centre of Oriental Studies, Australian National University, Canberra: 41.
  22. ^Lin, Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier (2011), p. 9.
  23. ^Tanner, Harold (2009).China: A History. Hackett. p. 419.ISBN 978-0872209152.
  24. ^Esherick, Joseph; Kayali, Hasan; Van Young, Eric (2006).Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 245.ISBN 9780742578159.
  25. ^Zhai, Zhiyong (2017).憲法何以中國. City University of HK Press. p. 190.ISBN 9789629373214.
  26. ^Gao, Quanxi (2016).政治憲法與未來憲制. City University of HK Press. p. 273.ISBN 9789629372910.
  27. ^Zhao, Suisheng (2004).A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford University Press. p. 68.ISBN 9780804750011.
  28. ^Shakya 1999 p. 4
  29. ^Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, Vol. 1 (1989), p. 815: "Tibet unquestionably controlled its own internal and external affairs during the period from 1913 to 1951 and repeatedly attempted to secure recognition and validation of its de facto autonomy/independence."
  30. ^Feigon 1996 p.119
  31. ^Shakya 1999 p.6,27. Feigon 1996 p.28
  32. ^The classic distinction drawn bySir Charles Bell andHugh Richardson. See Melvin C. Goldstein, 'Change, Conflict and Continuity among a community of Nomadic Pastoralists: A Case Study from Western Tibet, 1950–1990,' in Robert Barnett and Shirin Akiner, (eds.,)Resistance and Reform in Tibet, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994, pp. 76–90, pp.77–8.
  33. ^Shakya 1999 p.11
  34. ^Feigon 1996 p.119-122.Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), pp. 34–35
  35. ^abShakya 1999 p.5,11
  36. ^"【边疆时空】喜饶尼玛 李双|国民政府管理藏传佛教活佛措施评析".Sohu. 16 April 2021.Archived from the original on 1 October 2022. 南京国民政府成立之初,在处理藏传佛教问题上采取援引相关法规的原则。1927年8月12日,南京国民政府"援用以前法律之决议案",规定一切法律在未颁布以前,继续援引不与国民党党纲或主义,或与国民政府法令相抵触的法律。
  37. ^Shakya 1999 p.7,15,16
  38. ^abGoldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 37
  39. ^Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 36
  40. ^Shakya 1999 p.5,7,8
  41. ^Goldstein (1991), pp. 328–.
  42. ^"Report to Wu Zhongxin from the Regent Reting Rinpoche Regarding the Process of Searching and Recognizing the Thirteenth Dalai lama's Reincarnated Soul Boy as well as the Request for an Exemption to Drawing Lots".The Reincarnation of Living Buddhas. Museum of Tibetan Culture of China Tibetology Research Center. 1940. Archived fromthe original on 31 March 2019. Retrieved28 September 2022.
  43. ^"Executive Yuan's Report to the National Government Regarding the Request to Approve Lhamo Thondup to Succeed the Fourteenth Dalai lama and to Appropriate Expenditure for His Enthronement".The Reincarnation of Living Buddhas. Museum of Tibetan Culture of China Tibetology Research Center. 1940. Archived fromthe original on 30 September 2022. Retrieved28 September 2022.
  44. ^Shakya 1999 p.20;Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 42
  45. ^Melvin C. Goldstein,A History of Modern Tibet:The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955, University of California Press, 2009, Vol.2, p.51.
  46. ^Shakya 1999 p.12
  47. ^Shakya 1999 p.20,21;Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), pp. 37, 41–43
  48. ^Goldstein, 209 pp.51–2.
  49. ^Shakya 1999 p.26
  50. ^Shakya 1999 p.12 (Tibetan army poorly trained and equipped).
  51. ^Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), pp. 41, 45
  52. ^abFeigon 1996 p.142 (trained).
  53. ^Shakya 1999 p.5
  54. ^Shakya 1999 p.4,5
  55. ^Dawa Norbu,China's Tibet policy,Routledge, 2001, p.195
  56. ^Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 41
  57. ^Shakya 1999 p.3.
  58. ^abcGoldstein 1997 p.44
  59. ^Singh, Swaran (2016). "China Engaged its Southwest Frontiers".The new great game : China and South and Central Asia in the era of reform. Thomas Fingar. Stanford, California:Stanford University Press. p. 149.ISBN 978-0-8047-9764-1.OCLC 939553543.
  60. ^Goldstein, Melvyn C (2009).A History of Modern Tibet. Volume 2: The Calm Before the Storm, 1951–1955. Goldstein, Melvyn C.Berkeley, California: University of California Press.ISBN 9780520249417.OCLC 76167591.
  61. ^Melvin C. Goldstein,A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955, University of California Press, 2009, Vol.2, p.48.
  62. ^Melvin C. Goldstein,A History of Modern Tibet, vol.2, p.48-9.
  63. ^Shakya 1999 p.27-32 (entire paragraph).
  64. ^W. D. Shakabpa,One hundred thousand moons, BRILL, 2010 trans. Derek F. Maher, Vol.1, pp.916–917, and ch.20 pp.928–942, esp.pp.928–33.
  65. ^Melvin C. Goldstein,A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955, Vol.2, ibid.pp.41–57.
  66. ^Shakya 1999 p.28-32
  67. ^Shakya 1999 p.12,20,21
  68. ^Feigon 1996 p.142. Shakya 1999 p.37.
  69. ^Shakya 1999 p.32 (6 Oct);Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 45 (7 Oct).
  70. ^abJiawei Wang et Nima Gyaincain,The historical Status of China's TibetArchived 29 April 2016 at theWayback Machine, China Intercontinental Press, 1997, p. 209 (see alsoThe Local Government of Tibet Refused Peace Talks and the PLA Was Forced to Fight the Qamdo BattleArchived 18 March 2012 at theWayback Machine,china.com.cn): "The Quamdo battle thus came to a victorious end on October 24, with 114 PLA soldiers and 180 Tibetan troops killed or wounded."
  71. ^abShakya 1999, pg. 45.
  72. ^Feigon 1996, p.144.
  73. ^Lacina, Bethany (2009)."PRIO battle deaths dataset, 1946-2008, version 3.0: Documentation of coding decisions".Peace Research Institute Oslo. p. 129.
  74. ^Shakya 1999 map p.xiv
  75. ^Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 45
  76. ^Shakya 1999 p.49
  77. ^Laird, 2006 p. 306.
  78. ^Tibet: The Lost Frontier,Claude Arpi, Lancer Publishers, October 2008,ISBN 0-9815378-4-7;"UN General Assembly Resolutions".International Campaign for Tibet. Retrieved21 June 2021.; United States State Department, "Foreign Relations of the United States," seehttps://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/pg_577.
  79. ^'The political and religious institutions of Tibet would remain unchanged, and any social and economic reforms would be undertaken only by the Tibetans themselves at their own pace.' Thomas Laird,The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama,Grove Press, 2007, p.307.
  80. ^Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 47
  81. ^Shakya, Tsering (1999).The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947. Columbia University Press.ISBN 978-0-231-11814-9.
  82. ^Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 48 (had not been cleared) p.48,49 (government was divided), p.49 (chose not to flee), p.52 (accepted agreement).
  83. ^Kuzmin, S.L. Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011, p. 190 -Archived 30 October 2012 at theWayback MachineISBN 978-93-80359-47-2
  84. ^Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 51
  85. ^Yang Fan (10 April 2018)."西藏和平解放65周年:细数那些翻天覆地的变化" [The 65th anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet: Counting those earth-shaking changes].中国军网.Archived from the original on 9 February 2019. Retrieved2 February 2019.
  86. ^Goldstein, Melvyn C. (1 August 2007).A History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951–1955. University of California Press. p. 227.ISBN 978-0-520-93332-3.Chinese and Tibetan government officials at a banquet celebrating the 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet.
  87. ^Shakya 1999 p.96,97,128.
  88. ^Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), pp. 52–54; Feigon 1996 p.148,149,151
  89. ^Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (1997), p. 53
  90. ^"The Dalai Lama Escapes from the Chinese". Time. 20 April 1959. Retrieved21 February 2021.
  91. ^van Walt van Praag, Michael; Boltjes, Miek (13 February 2021)."Time To Break The Silence On Tibet". The Sunday Guardian. Retrieved21 February 2021.
  92. ^Avedon, John F. (23 June 1984)."China's Tibet Problem".The New York Times. Retrieved21 February 2021.

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