 Japanese copy of the alliance treaty | |
| Type | Military alliance |
|---|---|
| Context | Anti-Russian Empire |
| Signed | 30 January 1902 (1902-01-30) |
| Location | London,United Kingdom |
| Effective | 31 January 1902 (1902-01-31) |
| Replaced by | Four-Power Pacific Treaty |
| Expiration | 17 August 1923 (1923-08-17) |
| Original signatories |
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| Parties | |
| Languages | |
TheAnglo-Japanese Alliance (日英同盟,Nichi-Ei Dōmei) was an alliance between theUnited Kingdom and theEmpire of Japan which was effective from 1902 to 1923. The treaty creating the alliance was signed atLansdowne House in London on 30 January 1902 by Britishforeign secretaryHenry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne and Japanese diplomatHayashi Tadasu. After the preceding era ofunequal treaties enforced on Asian countries including Japan,[1] the alliance was a military pact concluded on more equal terms between a Western power and non-Western nation. It reflected the success ofMeiji era reforms that modernized and industrialized Japan's economy, society and military, which enabled Japan to extract itself from the inferior position it had previously shared with other Asian countries like China, which had been subordinated to Western empires either through formal colonial acquisition or unequal treaties.[2]
One shared motivation for the agreement was that a diplomatic alliance might deter other world powers that might otherwise encroach on British and Japanese imperial interests in Asia.[3] For the British, the alliance marked the end of a period of "splendid isolation" while allowing for greater focus on protecting itsrule over India and competing in theAnglo-German naval arms race, as part of a larger strategy to reduce imperial overcommitment and recall theRoyal Navy to defend Britain. By contrast, it came at a time of Japan's ascendancy; Japan had not only successfully abrogated the unequal treaties it was previously subject to by the Western powers, but was now afledging empire in its own right: Japan had imposed its ownunequal treaty on Korea in 1876[4] and nowcontrolled Formosa (Taiwan) as a colony, as Taiwan been ceded byQing China to Japan in theTreaty of Shimonoseki, after theFirst Sino-Japanese War.[2] Consequently, Japan was now developing its own imperial sphere of influence, and felt that a conflict withRussia was imminent over rival ambitions inManchuria and Korea, especially after theTriple Intervention in 1895, in which Russia,France, andGermany coerced Japan into relinquishing its claim on theLiaodong Peninsula. Article 3 of the alliance promised support if either signatory became involved in war with more than one power, and thus deterred France from assisting its ally Russia in theRusso-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Instead, France concluded theEntente Cordiale with Britain and limited its support of Russia to providing loans.[5] Japan also gained international prestige from the alliance and used it as a foundation for their diplomacy for two decades, although the alliance angered the United States and some Britishdominions, whose opinion of Japan worsened and gradually became hostile.[6]
After Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war and the resulting treaty that granted the Japanesecontrol over Korea, the alliance was renewed in 1905 and 1911. In 1914, it enabled Japan's entry intoWorld War I and capture ofGerman-held territories in Asia. Britain grew increasingly distrustful of Japan over its Asian ambitions, and the alliance was ended with the signing of theFour-Power Treaty in 1921 and terminated upon its ratification in 1923.[7][8][9]
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The possibility of an alliance between Great Britain and Japan had been canvassed since 1895, when Britain refused to join theTriple Intervention of France, Germany and Russia against the Japanese occupation of theLiaodong Peninsula. While this single event was an unstable basis for an alliance, the case was strengthened by the support Britain had given Japan in its drive towards modernisation and their co-operative efforts to put down theBoxer Rebellion.[10] Newspapers of both countries voiced support for such an alliance; in Britain,Francis Brinkley ofThe Times andEdwin Arnold ofThe Daily Telegraph were the driving force behind such support, while in Japan the pro-alliance mood of politicianŌkuma Shigenobu stirred theMainichi andYomiuri newspapers into pro-alliance advocacy. The 1894Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation had also paved the way for equal relations and the possibility of an alliance.[11]
In the end, the common interest truly fuelling the alliance was opposition to Russian expansion, such asthe invasion of Manchuria continuing after the Boxer Rebellion.[12] This was made clear as early as the 1890s, when the British diplomatCecil Spring Rice identified that Britain and Japan working in concert was the only way to challenge Russian power in the region.[13] Negotiations began when Russia began to move intoChina. Nevertheless, both countries had their reservations. Britain was cautious about abandoning its policy of "splendid isolation", wary of antagonizing Russia, and unwilling to act on the treaty if Japan were to attack the United States. There were factions in the Japanese government that still hoped for a compromise with Russia, including the highly powerful political figureHirobumi Itō, who had served four terms asPrime Minister of Japan. It was thought that friendship within Asia would be more amenable to the US, which was uncomfortable with the rise of Japan as a power. Furthermore, Britain was unwilling to protect Japanese interests in Korea and likewise, the Japanese were unwilling to support Britain in India.
Hayashi and Lord Lansdowne began their discussions in July 1901, and disputes over Korea and India delayed them until November. At this point, Hirobumi Itō requested a delay in negotiations in order to attempt a reconciliation with Russia. He was mostly unsuccessful in his visit toSaint Petersburg, and Britain expressed concerns over duplicity on Japan's part, so Hayashi hurriedly re-entered negotiations in 1902. "Splendid isolation" was ended as for the first time Britain saw the need for a peace-time military alliance. It was the first alliance on equal terms between East and West.[14] For Britain, the revision of "Splendid isolation" spurred by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, culminated in theEntente Cordiale (1904) with France andAnglo-Russian Convention of 1907.
The treaty contained six articles:
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6
Articles 2 and 3 were most crucial concerning war and mutual defense.
The treaty laid out an acknowledgment of Japanese interests in Korea without obligating Britain to help if a conflict arose where Japan only had one adversary. Japan was likewise not obligated to defend British interests unless there were two adversaries.
Although written using careful and clear language, the two sides understood the treaty slightly differently. Britain saw it as a gentle warning to Russia, while Japan was emboldened by it. From that point on, even those of a moderate stance refused to accept a compromise over the issue of Korea. Extremists saw it as an open invitation for imperial expansion, many in Japan having long desired a showdown with Russia. The provision on the involvement of more than one power (article 3) recalled theTriple Intervention by the Russian-French-German coalition in 1895, and strengthened Japan's hand both diplomatically and militarily against a potential European coalition.[16]
This treaty was signed by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne, andCount Hayashi Tadasu[a] on 30 January, effective 31 January 1902 for five years.
In May 1902, Major GeneralFukushima Yasumasa, who was a senior intelligence officer of theArmy General Staff and the initial commander of the Japanese Army sent to China to stop theBoxer Rebellion in 1900, was sent to London to wrap up informal discussions on military intelligence cooperation.Director General of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence, SirWilliam Nicholson headed the British side of the negotiation, and various intelligence cooperation agreements were signed between the two in July. Fukushima representedEmperor Meiji at thecoronation of KingEdward VII on 9 August and stayed until September 1902 to work on the details. The existence and contents of the agreements were not made public.[17]
The alliance was renewed and expanded in 1905.[18] This was partly prompted by Japan's gains in theRusso-Japanese War, and by the British suspicion about Russian intentions in South Asia, leading to Britain considering asking Japan to help defend India.[12][19][20] This August 1905 revision additionally called for Japanese support of British interests in India (if Britain faced more than one adversary as stipulated in the original).
This revision was signed by Lords Lansdowne and Hayashi on 12 August 1905, effective 13 August for 10 years.
Within four months after the signing of this revision,Korea became a Japanese protectorate, and Itō Hirobumi was posted as the Resident-General toSeoul in February 1906.
Although the "second" alliance in 1905 was effective for a decade, the alliance was revised earlier in 1911.[21]
As a background,William McKinley won the1896 United States presidential election, succeedingGrover Cleveland, who was a friend of QueenLiliʻuokalani of Hawaii. ThisRepublican victory led toBritish-American rapprochement, and the annexation of theRepublic of Hawaiʻi by the US, giving impetus to expansionists in the US. As a result of 1898Spanish–American War, theMariana Islands (includingGuam) came under the United States control in December 1898. The Empire of Japan fought and lost against the US in 1899–1902, supporting the Philippines inPhilippine–American War, which resulted in establishingcontrol of the Philippine Islands by the US.[22] The expansionistic policy of the Republican US administration was carried over toTheodore Roosevelt in 1901.
Great power politics substantially changed following theAnglo-Russian entente of 1907, which settled the Russo-BritishGreat Game; continued Japanese negotiations in the wake of theRusso-Japanese War, including a 1907 partitioning of Manchuria with Russia; and theUK's growing rivalry with theGerman Empire.
With the increasing Japanese and the US influence not only in the Pacific but also in global politics in this context, Britain negotiated a "third" Anglo-Japanese alliance to carefully remove the United States from the possible 'adversary' in the agreement (ARTICLE 4[21]),[23] and Japan agreed in return for restoring Japan's tariff autonomy.[24]Komura Jutarō and later Prime MinisterKatō Takaaki were major negotiators during this 1911 revision.[25]
This revision was signed by Secretary of State for Foreign AffairsEdward Grey and Japanese Ambassador to London, CountKatō Takaaki[b] on 13 July, effective 14 July 1911, with a 10 year term until July 1921.
The first version of the alliance was announced on 12 February 1902.[26] In response, Russia sought to form alliances with France and Germany, which Germany declined. The French also were reluctant to become more deeply involved with Russia in east Asia. On 16 March 1902, a joint Franco-Russian declaration was issued responding to the alliance, reserving their right to intervene in and around China to defend their interests. The British and later historians found this declaration to be "anodyne", signaling that France was reconsidering its military obligations towards Russia.[16] China and the United States were strongly opposed to the alliance.
TheRusso-Japanese War broke out in 1904, as Japan sought to halt the expansion of the Russian Empire's colonies in China.[27] Britain did not officially join the Russo-Japanese War, but supported Japan in espionage,[28] ship design,[27] finance,[29] and diplomacy during the war.[c]
Meanwhile, even before the war, British and Japanese intelligence had co-operated against Russia due to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. During the war,Indian Army stations inMalaya and China often intercepted and read wireless and telegraph cable traffic relating to the war, which was shared with the Japanese. In their turn, the Japanese shared information about Russia with the British with one British official writing of the "perfect quality" of Japanese intelligence. In particular, British and Japanese intelligence gathered much evidence that Germany was supporting Russia in the war as part of a bid to disturb the balance of power in Europe, which led to British officials increasingly perceiving that country as a threat to the international order.[28]
The alliance's provisions for mutual defence required Japan to enter the First World War on the British side. The Treaty made possible the Japanese seizure ofGerman possessions in the Pacific north of the equator during the War. Japan attacked theGerman base at Qingdao in 1914 and forced the Germans to surrender (seeSiege of Tsingtao). Japanese officers onboard British warships were casualties at theBattle of Jutland in 1916,[30] and onHMS Vanguard in 1917.[31] In 1917, Japanese warships were sent to theMediterranean and assisted in the protection of Allied shipping nearMalta from U-boat attacks. A memorial at theKalkara Naval Cemetery in Malta is dedicated to the 72 Japanese sailors who died in the conflict,[32] including the 1917 torpedoing of theJapanese destroyerSakaki.
The alliance formed the basis for positive trading and cultural exchanges between Britain and Japan.[33][34] Japanese agencies published numerous English-language releases and publications.[35] Rapid industrialisation and the development of the Japanese armed forces provided significant new export opportunities for British shipyards and arms manufacturers. Japanese educated in Britain brought new knowledge in science, engineering, and medicine to Japan, such as advances influid- andthermo-dynamics,[d] andophthalmology. British artists of the time such asJames McNeill Whistler,Aubrey Beardsley andCharles Rennie Mackintosh were heavily inspired by Japanesekimono,swords,crafts andarchitecture.
Unique cultural exchanges included that the author Yoshimoto Tadasu (b. 1878, d. 1973), who wroteTrue Britain (Shin no Eikoku) in 1902, was the first blind person in Japan to receive higher education, and brought some British ideas on public welfare to Japan. The clergyman Kumagai Tetsutaro (b. 1883, d. 1979) praised the book as having a major impact on opportunities for people with blindness.[34]
TheJapan–British Exhibition in 1910 inWhite City, London had eight million visitors. It sought to promote knowledge of Japan's modernization and the idea of an 'alliance of peoples' between Britain and Japan. It featured Japanese fine arts, musicians,Sumo demonstrations, and influenced byEdwardian expectations, it featured exhibitions ofAinu, Taiwanese and Japanese 'villages'. The organizers portrayed a cultural-historical parallel between Britain and Japan as symmetrical "Island Empires" in East and West. Organized by the Japanese government, it was one of the largest such expositions at its time.[35]
Despite the purportedly friendly relations between Britain and Japan during the early 20th century, the relationship started to strain over various issues. One such strain was the issue of the "racial equality clause" as proposed by the Japanese delegation at theParis Peace Conference. The clause, which was to be attached to theCovenant of the League of Nations, was compatible with the British stance of equality for all subjects as a principle for maintaining imperial unity; however, there were significant deviations in the stated interests of Britain'sdominions, notablyAustralia, and the British delegation ultimately acceded to imperial opposition and declined to support the clause.[36]
Another strain was theTwenty-One Demands issued by Japan to theRepublic of China in 1915. The demands would have drastically increased Japanese influence in China and transformed the Chinese state into ade factoprotectorate of Japan. Feeling desperate, the Chinese government appealed to Britain and the U.S., which forced Japan to moderate the demands issued; ultimately, the Japanese government gained little influence in China, but lost prestige amongst the Western nations (including Britain, which was affronted and no longer trusted the Japanese as a reliable ally).[37]
Even though Britain was the wealthiest industrialized power, and Japan was a newly industrialized power with a large export market, which would seem to create natural economic ties, those ties were somewhat limited,[33] which provided a major limitation of the alliance. British banks saw Japan as a risky investment due to what they saw as restrictive property laws and an unstable financial situation, and offered loans to Japan with high interest rates, similar to those they offered theOttoman Empire, Chile, China, andEgypt, which was disappointing to Japan. The banker and later Prime MinisterTakahashi Korekiyo argued that Britain was implying, through unattractive loan terms, that Japan had reverted from one of the "civilized nations" to "undeveloped nations", referring that Japan had more easily received foreign capital to fund itsFirst Sino-Japanese War than theRusso-Japanese War.[33]Nathaniel Rothschild was initially skeptical of Japan's economy; however, he would later describeOsaka as the "Manchester of Japan" and Japan as "one of the countries of the future."[33]Henry Dyer wrote after 1906 that Japanese bonds "has aroused keen interest among British investors, who have always been partial to Japanese bonds." Dyer, a recipient of theOrder of the Rising Sun from Emperor Meiji, had played a role in the expansion of industrialization and engineering in Japan as part of a significant foreign investment. Dyer criticized what he saw as widespread British skepticism of Japan's economy.[33] Meanwhile, influential industrialists in Japan such as businessmanIwasaki Yanosuke were at times skeptical of foreign investment, which led the Japanese government to channel it through some controlled enterprises acting as intermediaries with the private sector in London and Tokyo, which was seen as excess regulation by some British industrialists.[33] Nevertheless, Britain did lend capital to Japan during the Russo-Japanese War,[29] while Japan provided major loans to the Entente during World War I.[citation needed]
The alliance was viewed as an obstacle already at theParis Peace Conference of 1919–1920. On 8 July 1920, the two governments issued a joint statement to the effect that the alliance treaty "is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant (of the League of Nations), which both Governments earnestly desire to respect".[38]
The demise of the alliance was signaled by the1921 Imperial Conference, in which British andDominion leaders convened to determine a unified international policy.[39] One of the major issues of the conference was the renewal of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance. The conference began with all butCanadian Prime MinisterArthur Meighen supporting the immediate renewal of an alliance with Japan. The prevailing hope was for a continuance of the alliance with the Pacific power, which could potentially provide security for British imperial interests in the area.[39] The Australians feared that they could not fend off any advances from theImperial Japanese Navy, and desired a continuance of the buildup of naval resources for a possible future conflict as they feared that an alliance with the United States (then in a state of post-warisolationism) would provide little protection.[40]
Meighen, fearing that a conflict could develop between Japan and the United States, demanded theBritish Empire remove itself from the treaty to avoid being forced into a war between the two nations. The rest of the delegates agreed that it was best to court America and try to find a solution that the American government would find suitable, but only Meighen called for the complete abrogation of the treaty.[41] The American government feared that the renewal of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance would create a Japanese-dominated market in the Pacific, and close China off from American trade.[42] These fears were elevated by the news media in America and Canada, which reported alleged secret anti-American clauses in the treaty, and advised the public to support abrogation.[43]
The press, combined with Meighen's convincing argument of Canadian fears that Japan would attack imperial assets in China, caused the Imperial Conference to shelve the alliance.[44] The conference communicated their desire to consider leaving the alliance to theLeague of Nations, which stated that the alliance would continue, as originally stated with the leaving party giving the other a twelve-month notice of their intentions.[45]
Empire delegates convinced America to invite several nations toWashington to participate in talks regarding Pacific and Far East policies, specifically naval disarmament.[46] When Japan came to theWashington Naval Conference, there was significant distrust of Britain in the press and public opinion, even amongst Japanese papers that had previously been more supportive of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.[47]
Despite the growing rift, Japan joined the conference in hopes of avoiding a war with the United States.[48] The Pacific powers of the United States, Japan,France andBritain would sign theFour-Power Treaty, and adding on various other countries such as China to create theNine-Power Treaty. The Four-Power Treaty would provide a minimal structure for the expectations of international relations in the Pacific, as well as a loose alliance without any commitment to armed alliances.[49] The Four-Power Treaty at the Washington Conference made the Anglo–Japanese Alliance defunct in December, 1921; however, it would not officially terminate until all parties ratified the treaty on 17 August 1923,[50] as Britain did not notify Japan, nor did Japan notify the UK, of the termination after the July 1921 end of term, as required by ARTICLE 6 of the1911 revision.
At that time, the Alliance was officially terminated, as per Article IV in the Anglo–Japanese Alliance Treaties of 1902 and 1911.[51] The distrust between the British Empire and Japan, as well as the manner in which the Anglo–Japanese Alliance concluded, have been suggested by some as being the leading causes of Japan's involvement inWorld War II, and that had the alliance not been terminated, Anglo-Japanese ties would not have deteriorated to that degree.[52]
However, more recent scholarship has argued that such an interpretation amounts to historical myth-making,[53] because it neglects how the political rivalry resulting from Japan and Britain's increasingly overlapping spheres of imperial influence had already substantially strained the alliance's political rationale for years before its termination.[54][55] One key line of evidence is that Japan-British imperial interests had substantially conflicted before 1921 because Japan was already perceived to be undermining European colonial rule over Asia. Britain had specifically become increasingly suspicious of a potential Japanese threat to its Asian colonies and interests due to growing Japanese ambitions in China,[56] the rise inPan-Asianism, as demonstrated by the support shown by Japanese state and non-state actors forIndian revolutionaries, and the presence of Japanese propagandists in Malaya and India.[57][58] Therefore, the end of the Alliance would instead be symptomatic of the already-present political reality of eroding ties between both countries, rather than its cause.[57]
Such tensions were also evident in then-contemporary British political figures, such asLord Curzon, who stated in 1920 that the main reason for the alliance with the "insidious and unscrupulous" Japanese was to keep them in order, rather than rooted in a friendly relations and diplomatic trust.[59] These views were also reflected in British papers such asThe Times, which even questioned Japanese contributions to the Allied side, and expressed suspicion towards Japan and sympathy with China in the aftermath of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.[60][56]
According to Zoltan Buzas, racially shaped threat perceptions led the British and the Americans to push for the termination of the alliance.[9]
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