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| Other short titles | Alien Tort Claims Act |
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| Enacted by | the1st United States Congress |
| Citations | |
| Statutes at Large | 1 Stat. 73 |
| Codification | |
| U.S.C. sections created | 28 U.S.C. § 1350 |
| Legislative history | |
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| United States Supreme Court cases | |
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TheAlien Tort Statute (codified intopositive law in 1948 as28 U.S.C. § 1350;ATS), also called theAlien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), is a section in theUnited States Code that givesfederal courts jurisdiction overlawsuits filed by foreign nationals fortorts committed in violation ofinternational law. It was first introduced by theJudiciary Act of 1789 and is one of the oldest federal laws still in effect in the U.S.
The ATS was rarely cited for nearly two centuries after its enactment, and its exact purpose and scope remain debated.[1][2] TheU.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Act's primary purpose as "[promoting] harmony in international relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for international-law violations in circumstances where the absence of such a remedy might provoke foreign nations to hold the United States accountable."[3]
Since 1980, courts have generally interpreted the ATS to allow foreign nationals to seek remedies in U.S. courts forhuman rights violations committed outside the United States, provided there is a sufficient connection to the United States.[4] Bothcase law andjurisprudence differ on what characterizes a sufficient U.S. connection, particularly with respect to corporate entities.[2]
The statute reads as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.[5]
The ATS was part of theJudiciary Act of 1789, which was passed by theFirst U.S. Congress to establish thefederal court system.[6] There is little survivinglegislative history regarding the Act, and its original meaning and purpose are uncertain.[7][8] Scholars have surmised that it was intended to assure foreign governments that the U.S. would seek to prevent and remedy breaches of customary international law, especially breaches concerning diplomats and merchants.[9]
The ATS may have been enacted in response to a number of international incidents caused by the unavailability of remedies for foreign citizens in the U.S.[10] Thepeace treaty ending theAmerican Revolutionary War provided for the satisfaction of debts to British creditors, but several states refused to enforce the payment of such debts, prompting threats of retaliation by Great Britain.[note 1] In 1784, French diplomatFrançois Barbé-Marbois was assaulted in Philadelphia, but no legal remedy was available to him, as any prosecution was left to the discretion of local authorities.[1] The incident was notorious internationally and prompted Congress to draft a resolution asking states to allow suits in tort for the violation of the law of nations; few states enacted such a provision, and Congress subsequently included the ATS in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
However, until 1980 the ATS remained largely dormant, being invoked in only two reported court decisions.[11]
In 1980, theU.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decidedFilártiga v. Peña-Irala, which "paved the way for a new conceptualization of the ATS".[11] InFilartiga, two Paraguayan citizens resident in the U.S., represented by theCenter for Constitutional Rights, brought suit against a Paraguayan former police chief who was also living in the United States.[12] The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had tortured and murdered a member of their family, and they asserted that U.S. federal courts had jurisdiction over their suit under the ATS. The district court dismissed for lack ofsubject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the "law of nations" does not regulate a state's treatment of its own citizens.
TheSecond Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. First, it held that the ATS, which allowed jurisdiction in the federal courts over a suit between two aliens, was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power, because "the law of nations ... has always been part of the federalcommon law", and thus the statute fell withinfederal-question jurisdiction.[13] Second, the court held that the contemporary law of nations had expanded to prohibit state-sanctioned torture. The court found that multilateral treaties and domestic prohibitions ontorture evidenced a consistent state practice of proscribing official torture. The court similarly found thatUnited Nations declarations, such as theUniversal Declaration on Human Rights, manifested an expectation of adherence to the prohibition of official torture. The court therefore held that the right to be free from torture had become a principle of customaryinternational law. However, one of the judges on the panel hearing the case later wrote thatFilartiga "should not be misread or exaggerated to support sweeping assertions that all (or even most) international human rights norms found in the Universal Declaration or in international human rights treaties have ripened into customary international law enforceable in the domestic courts".[14]
SinceFilartiga, jurisdiction under the ATS has been upheld in dozens of cases.[15]
The firstU.S. Supreme Court case to directly address the scope of the ATS wasSosa v. Alvarez-Machain in 2004.[16] The plaintiff, Alvarez, brought a claim under ATS forarbitrary arrest and detention. He had been indicted in the United States for torturing and murdering aDrug Enforcement Administration officer. When the United States was unable to secure Alvarez's extradition, the United States paid Sosa, a Mexican national, to kidnap Alvarez and bring him into the U.S. Alvarez claimed that his "arrest" by Sosa was arbitrary because the warrant for his arrest only authorized his arrest within the U.S. TheU.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Alvarez's abduction constituted arbitrary arrest in violation of international law.
The Supreme Court reversed and clarified that ATS did not create a cause of action, but instead merely "furnish[ed] jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations."[16] Such actions must "rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized."[17] Although the scope of ATS is not limited to violations of international law recognized in the 18th century, with respect to recognizing contemporary international norms, the Court's opinion stated that "the judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping."[18]
In Alvarez's case, "a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy."[19]
Exercising legal jurisdiction in the United States over matters that occurred abroad is a controversial practice and some have suggested thatCongress eliminate it.[20] Others believe that a multilateral solution, including through either theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or the UN, would be more appropriate.[21]
The Supreme Court held inSosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the ATS provides a cause of action for violations of international norms that are as "specific, universal, and obligatory" as were the norms prohibiting violations of safe conducts, infringements of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy in the 18th century.[22] Courts have found matters actionable under the ATS to includetorture; cruel,inhuman, or degrading treatment;genocide;war crimes;crimes against humanity;summary execution; prolongedarbitrary detention; andforced disappearance.[23]
SinceSosa, courts have struggled to define the level of specificity required for a norm to be actionable under the ATS.[24] For example, subsequent toSosa, theU.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overturned prior lower-court decisions that had found cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment actionable, noting thatSosa repudiated theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a source of law under the ATS.[25] Similarly, courts have held thateconomic, social, and cultural rights are too indeterminate to satisfySosa's specificity requirement. For example, inFlores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., the Second Circuit stated that the rights to life and to health are too indeterminate to constitute a cause of action under the ATS.[26]
TheU.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, however, has held that the limits of a norm need not be defined with particularity to be actionable; rather, the norm need only be so defined that the particular acts upon which a claim is based certainly fall within the bounds of the norm.[27] InDoe v. Qi, the court stated, "The fact that there may be doubt at the margins – a fact that inheres in any definition – does not negate the essence and application of that definition in clear cases." The court also described how to determine whether specific actions fall within the proscriptions of an international norm, holding that the actions alleged should be compared with actions that international adjudicatory bodies have found to be proscribed by the norm in question. It therefore examined decisions by institutions such as theHuman Rights Committee, theEuropean Court of Human Rights, and theAfrican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to determine that pushing, hitting, and choking a plaintiff during one day of incarceration did not constitute cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment, whereas forcing a hand into a plaintiff's vagina did constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
In 2011, there was acircuit split regarding whether corporations, as opposed to natural people, could be held liable under the ATS. In 2010 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held inKiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. that "customary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate liability for international crimes" and thus that "insofar as plaintiffs bring claims under the ATS against corporations, plaintiffs fail to allege violations of the law of nations, and plaintiffs' claims fall outside the limited jurisdiction provided by the ATS".[28] However,the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,[29] the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,[30] and theD.C. Circuit Court of Appeals all ruled thatcorporate liability is possible under the statute.[31]
The U.S. Supreme Court grantedcertiorari on October 17, 2011, to answer the question of corporate liability. After arguments on February 28, 2012, the Court ordered the case to be reargued the following term on the separate question of extraterritoriality.[32] On April 17, 2013, inKiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Court issued a decision affirming the Second Circuit's decision, but on different grounds, holding that the ATS did not create jurisdiction for a claim regarding conduct occurring outside the territory of the United States, leaving the question of corporate liability unresolved.
InJesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Supreme Court again revisited the question of corporate liability and ruled that foreign corporations may not be sued under the ATS.[33] However, the only parts of the opinion that commanded a majority of the court expressly limited its holding to suits againstforeign corporations. The concurring opinions by JusticesAlito andGorsuch focused on foreign relations concerns with foreign corporations. Justice Alito expressly limited his concurrence to foreign corporations: "Because this case involves a foreign corporation, we have no need to reach the question whether an alien may sue a United States corporation under the ATS."[34] Because the majority opinion was limited to foreign corporations, it is possible thatJesner does not settle the question of corporate liability for U.S. corporations.[35]
In September 1996, fourBurmese villagers filed suit againstUnocal and its parent company, the Union Oil Company of California; in October 1996, another fourteen villagers also brought suit.[36] The suits alleged various human rights violations, including forced labor, wrongful death, false imprisonment, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence, all relating to the construction of theYadana gas pipeline project inMyanmar, formerly Burma.
In 2000, the district court dismissed the case on the grounds that Unocal could not be held liable unless Unocal wanted the military to commit abuses, and that plaintiffs had not made this showing. Plaintiffs appealed and ultimately, shortly prior to when the case was to be argued before the Ninth Circuiten banc court in December 2004, the parties announced that they had reached a tentative settlement. Once the settlement was finalized in March 2005, the appeal was withdrawn and the district court opinion from 2000 was also vacated.
According to a joint statement released by the parties, while the specific terms were confidential, "the settlement will compensate plaintiffs and provide funds enabling plaintiffs and their representatives to develop programs to improve living conditions, health care and education and protect the rights of people from the pipeline region. These initiatives will provide substantial assistance to people who may have suffered hardships in the region."[37]
On April 3, 2017, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the caseJesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, which asks the question: "Whether the Alien Tort Statute ... categorically forecloses corporate liability".[38] The case arose when plaintiffs and their families were injured by terrorist attacks in theMiddle East over a ten-year period. American nationals brought their claim under the Anti-Terrorism Act,18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), and foreign nationals brought their claim under the ATS. The plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank helped finance terrorism by allowing Hamas and other terrorist groups to use bank accounts for terrorists and to pay the families of suicide bombers.[39]
The District Court, following the Second Circuit decision inKiobel that corporations are immune from liability under the ATS, dismissed the ATS suit. The Second Circuit, also adhering toKiobel, affirmed.[40]
On April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that foreign corporations may not be sued under the Alien Tort Statute.[33] JusticeKennedy wrote for a splintered majority. In the majority opinion, the Court expressed its concern for foreign relations problems if the Court were to extend liability to foreign corporations. "For 13 years, this litigation has 'caused significant diplomatic tensions' with Jordan, a critical ally in one of the world's most sensitive regions ... These are the very foreign-relations tensions the First Congress sought to avoid."[41] JusticesThomas, Alito, and Gorsuch concurred.
JusticeSotomayor wrote a 34-page dissent, arguing the decision "absolves corporations from responsibility under the ATS for conscience-shocking behavior".[42] According to Sotomayor, immunizing corporations from liability "allows these entities to take advantage of the significant benefits of the corporate form and enjoy fundamental rights ... without having to shoulder attendant fundamental responsibilities."[43]
The plaintiffs inKiobel were citizens ofNigeria who claimed that Dutch, British, and Nigerian oil-exploration corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government during the 1990s in committing violations of customary international law.[28] The plaintiffs claimed thatRoyal Dutch Shell compelled its Nigerian subsidiary, in cooperation with theNigerian government, to brutally crush peaceful resistance to aggressive oil development in theNiger River Delta.[44] Plaintiffs sought damages under the ATS. The defendants moved to dismiss based on a two-pronged argument. First, they argued that customary international law itself provides the rules by which to decide whether conduct violates the law of nations where non-state actors are alleged to have committed the wrong in question. Second, they contended that no norm has ever existed between nations that imposes liability upon corporate actors. On September 29, 2006, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims foraiding and abetting property destruction; forced exile;extrajudicial killing; and violation of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association. It reasoned that customary international law did not define those violations with sufficient particularity. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to the remaining claims of aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention; crimes against humanity; and torture or cruel,inhuman, and degrading treatment. The district court then certified its entire order for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit based on the serious nature of the questions at issue.
In a 2–1 decision issued on September 17, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that corporations cannot be held liable for violations of customary international law, finding that: (1) under both U.S. Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedents over the previous 30 years that address ATS suits alleging violations of customary international law, the scope of liability is determined by customary international law itself; (2) under Supreme Court precedent, the ATS requires courts to apply norms of international law—and not domestic law—to the scope of defendants' liabilities. Such norms must be "specific, universal and obligatory"; and (3) under international law, "corporate liability is not a discernible—much less a universally recognized—norm of customary international law",[28][45] that the court could apply to the ATS, and that the plaintiffs' ATS claims should indeed be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Kiobel petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Second Circuit's decision, and this was granted on October 17, 2011. Oral arguments were held on February 28, 2012,[46][47] The arguments received considerable attention in the legal community.[48][49] Unexpectedly, the Court announced on March 5, 2012, that it would hold additional arguments on the case during the October 2012 term, and directed the parties to file new briefs on the question "Whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute ... allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States."[50] The case was reargued on October 1, 2012; on April 17, 2013, the Court held that there is a presumption that the ATS does not apply outside the United States.[51]
In 2000, residents of the island ofBougainville inPapua New Guinea brought suit against multinational mining companyRio Tinto. The lawsuit is based on a1988 revolt against Rio Tinto, and the plaintiffs allege that the Papua New Guinea government, using Rio Tinto helicopters and vehicles, killed about 15,000 people in an effort to put down the revolt.[52] On October 25, 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sittingen banc, issued a divided opinion holding that certain claims against a foreign corporation implicating the conduct of a foreign government on foreign soil could proceed under the ATS. The company filed a petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the decision; on April 22, 2013, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in the light of its decision inKiobel.
Charles McArthur Emmanuel (also known as "Chuckie Taylor" or "Taylor Jr."), the son of formerLiberian presidentCharles Taylor, was the commander of the infamously violent Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), commonly known in Liberia as the "Demon Forces".[53] In 2006, U.S. officials arrested Taylor upon entering the U.S. (via theMiami International Airport) and the Department of Justice later charged him based on torture he committed inLiberia.[54] He was convicted of multiple counts of torture and conspiracy to torture[55] and was sentenced to 97 years in prison.[56] The World Organization for Human Rights USA and theFlorida International University College of Law filed a civil suit in the Southern District of Florida on behalf of five of Taylor's victims pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute and theTorture Victim Protection Act.[57] The plaintiffs won by default judgment as to liability on all counts, and in February 2010, following trial on damages at which Taylor appeared, the court found Taylor liable to the plaintiffs for damages of over $22 million.[58][59]
On October 2, 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, inPresbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., held that "themens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in Alien Tort Statute actions is purpose rather than knowledge alone."[60] In this case—which involves allegations against a Canadian oil company concerning its purported assistance to the government in Sudan in the forced movement of civilians residing near oil facilities—the court concluded that "plaintiffs have not established Talisman's purposeful complicity in human rights abuses". In reaching that conclusion, the Second Circuit stated that "the standard for imposing accessorial liability under the Alien Tort Statute must be drawn from international law; and that under international law a claimant must show that the defendant provided substantial assistance with the purpose of facilitating the alleged offenses."
On August 11, 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision inSinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Company.[61] In this case, plaintiffs alleged thatCoca-Cola bottlers inColombia collaborated with Colombian paramilitary forces in "the systematic intimidation, kidnapping, detention, torture, and murder of Colombian trade unionists". However, the district court dismissed the complaint and the Eleventh Circuit upheld that ruling. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's recentAshcroft v. Iqbal decision[62] in addressing the adequacy of the complaint, which must have "facial plausibility" to survive dismissal, and noted that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demands "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation". The Eleventh Circuit then applied theIqbal standard to plaintiffs' allegations against Coca-Cola and held that they were insufficient to survive dismissal.
Nigerian villagers brought claims againstChevron Corporation regarding events that occurred on a Chevron offshore drilling platform in 1998, when Nigerian soldiers suppressed a protest against Chevron's environmental and business practices. The protesters, with the help of nonprofit organizations including theCenter for Constitutional Rights, the Public Interest Lawyers Group, andEarthRights International, brought claims for wrongful death, torture, assault, battery, and negligence against Chevron, alleging that the company had paid the soldiers that landed on the platform and were therefore liable for the actions that they took. In December 2008, a jury found that Chevron was not liable.[63]
In 2007, theWorld Organization for Human Rights USA filed a lawsuit againstYahoo! on behalf of Chinese dissidentsWang Xiaoning andShi Tao (his mother Gao Qinsheng), claiming jurisdiction under the ATS.[64] According to the complaint, Wang and Shi Tao used Yahoo! accounts to share pro-democracy material, and a Chinese subsidiary of Yahoo! gave the Chinese government identifying information that allowed authorities to identify and arrest them.[65] The Complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were subjected to "torture, cruel, inhuman, or other degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, and forced labor".[66]
Yahoo! settled the case in November 2007 for an undisclosed amount of money, and it agreed to cover the plaintiff's legal costs as a part of the settlement. In a statement released after the settlement was made public, Yahoo! said that it would "provide 'financial, humanitarian and legal support to these families' and create a separate 'humanitarian relief fund' for other dissidents and their families".[67]
A recent case concerning the ATS wasJohn Doe I, et al. v. Nestle, which was heard by the Supreme Court on December 1, 2020, and decided June 17, 2021.[68] Consolidated withCargill, Inc. v. Doe,[69] the case alleges that Nestlé and Cargill aided and abetted forced child labour in theIvory Coast in connection with the harvesting of cocoa.[70] The applicability of the ATS was interpreted by each circuit individually, with the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in support of investigating Nestle's liability, while the Second Circuit maintained that the Statute did not apply to corporate liability.[68] In an 8–1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. federal judiciary lacked jurisdiction over the case due to neither corporate defendant having sufficient connections to the U.S. beyond "mere corporate presence".[71]
TheNestle/Cargill ruling was assessed by international legal jurists as narrowing the scope of the ATS while failing to clarify whether or how corporate defendants may be liable under it.[2] While the Court rejected "general corporate activity", such as the making of operational decisions, as insufficient U.S.-based conduct to establish jurisdiction under the Statute, it did not specify what activities or ties would meet the requirements. However, the Court rejected the defendants' argument to narrow the applicability of the ATS to abuses that take place on U.S. soil, and also disagreed with theTrump administration'samicus curiae brief asserting that there should be no aiding and abetting cause of action under the Statute.[2]
On July 3, 2023, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision inDoe v. Cisco.[72] In this case,Falun Gong practitioners alleged that they were victims of human rights abuses perpetrated by theChinese Communist Party and enabled by the technological assistance ofCisco and two Cisco executives.[73]
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' ATS claims against the Cisco executives. However, it reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' ATS claims against the corporate defendant, Cisco, and the dismissal of claims under theTorture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) against the Cisco executives.[72]
The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision inNestlé to conclude that corporations can be held liable under the ATS. Citing the Supreme Court's ruling inSosa, the court held that aiding and abetting liability is cognizable under the ATS. It ruled that "plaintiffs' allegations against Cisco were sufficient to meet the applicable aiding and abetting standard".[72] The case was remanded for further proceedings.[72][74] In September 2024, the Ninth Circuit denied Cisco's petition for rehearing and stated that the court had "faithfully applied the Sosa framework to the facts of this case".[75] Cisco filed acertiorari with the Supreme Court in January 2025.[76]
John Doe VII v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (09–7125) is a lawsuit filed in theUnited States by 11Indonesian villagers againstExxonMobil Corporation alleging that the company is responsible forhuman rights violations in the oil-rich province of Aceh, Indonesia. The case has broad implications for multinational corporations doing business in other countries. Indonesian security forces committed torture, rape, and murder against the plaintiffs and their families while under contract with ExxonMobil to guard theArun gas field during the late 1990s and early 2000s; plaintiffs claim that Exxon is responsible for these atrocities.[77]
ExxonMobil has tried to have the case dismissed nine times and dragged out litigation for over 20 years. In November 2021 plaintiffs' legal team filed a motion to set a trial date, and in July 2022, US District JudgeRoyce Lamberth denied ExxonMobil's motions to dismiss the case, clearing the way for the lawsuit to go to trial, although no trial date was set.[78]
On May 15, 2023, the plaintiffs reached a confidential settlement with ExxonMobil, a week before the scheduled jury trial.[79][80]Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. was a class-action lawsuit againstTexaco Petroleum. It was filed in 1993 by Americanhuman rights lawyerSteven Donziger on behalf of indigenous collectives in theEcuadorian Amazon. The lawsuit sought compensation for "alleged environmental and personal injuries arising out of Texaco'soil exploration and extraction operations in the Oriente region between 1964 and 1992".[81]Legal proceedings followed in courts inEcuador and theUnited States for about a decade. The case was dismissed on May 30, 2001, on grounds offorum non conveniens (meaning that the case was outside the jurisdiction of US courts and should be heard in Ecuadorian or international courts).[82]
Following dismissal ofAguinda v. Texaco in the US, plaintiffs filedMaria Aguinda Salazar v, ChevronTexaco Corp in Ecuador in 2003, which in turn led to other progeny cases includingRepublic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp andMoi Vicente Enomenga Mantohue v. Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company.[82]
Doe v. Chiquita Brands International is aclass-actionlawsuit brought in theUnited States District Court ofNew Jersey, filed on June 13, 2007. The suit was filed byColombian families represented byEarthRights International (ERI), together with the Colombian Institute of International Law (CIIL), andJudith Brown Chomsky, against theCincinnati-based producer and distributor ofChiquita Brands International. The suit alleges that Chiquita funded and armed known terrorist organizations (as designated by theUnited States Secretary of State) in Colombia.
The 144 plaintiffs allege that terrorists funded by Chiquita Brands killed 173 individuals of whom the plaintiffs were legal representatives. The killings took place over a lengthy period of time from 1975 to 2004 and most occurred in the 1990s and 2000s.
Chiquita Brands has admitted in federal court that a subsidiary company (which was subsequently sold) paid Colombian terrorists to protect employees at its most profitable banana-growing operation. As part of a deal with prosecutors, the company pleaded guilty to one count of doing business with a terrorist organization. In exchange, the company will pay a $25-million fine and court documents will not reveal the identities of the group of senior executives who approved the illegal protection payments.[citation needed]
On June 10, 2024, Chiquita Brands International was found liable by a jury inUnited States Federal Court of financing the far-right paramilitary death squadUnited Self-Defense Forces of Colombia in theAntioquia andMagdalena Departments of Colombia.[83]
Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003), was a lawsuit filed in theUnited States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama by relatives of dead workers that were employed by theDrummond Company.[84]
Sintraminergetica has suedDrummond Company for allegedly conspiring withparamilitary groups to exterminate the union. This suit was brought after years of claims of abuses ranging from forcing potential employees to undergolie detector tests to reveal their political affiliation as a condition of employment, to the assassination of union leaders, their displacement from the mining zones, and accusations made against them of being guerilla supporters. On March 12, 2001, Valmore Locarno Rodriguez and Victor Hugo Orcasita Amaya, the president and vice president of the union local, were taken from a company bus en route from the mine to their homes. Locarno was assassinated with two shots in the head in front of his coworkers. Over the protests of the workers, Orcasita was taken away in a truck. The next day his body was found, with obvious signs of torture. On October 5 of the same year, under similar circumstances, Gustavo Soler, the union's new president, was taken from a bus, taken away in a pick-up, tortured, and killed. His body was found on October 7 by people from the area.
The court ruled that Sintraminergetica has standing to bring suit against Drummond and the Colombian managers of the company under the Alien Tort Statute. The crimes that claimed to be committed violated ILO pacts and agreements, and were alsocrimes against humanity andwar crimes, according to U.S. and international law.
On June 21, 2007, theBirmingham News reported that the US district judge presiding over the case in Birmingham dismissed the wrongful death charges against Drummond. The company is still being tried for a war crimes claim filed under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute.
On July 26, 2007, jurors in the case found Drummond not liable for the deaths of the three union representative and rejected the claims by Sintraminergetica that the company aided in the deaths.[85]
Drummond Company claims it has brought many jobs to the country and a level of stability to the mostly impoverished small town (corregimiento) ofLa Loma,Cesar, which has suffered civil unrest and corruption scandals. The company established a village for the mine workers and their families to live. The Drummond family established a school in the town for the mine workers' children.| International | |
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