Alice Marguerite Crary was born in 1967 in Seattle, Washington. During high school, she was a national champion rower at theLakeside School (Seattle) inSeattle, Washington, and competed internationally and placed 6th in the Junior Women's Eight at the 1985 World Rowing Junior Championships inBrandenburg, Germany.[3]
Crary is university distinguished professor at the Graduate Faculty of The New School for Social Research in New York City[6] and visiting fellow at Regent’s Park College, University of Oxford (where she was professor of philosophy 2018–19).[7] She held visiting fellowships at All Souls College, Oxford (2021–22), and the Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Sciences (2017–18).[8]
Crary frequently participates in and organizes events for public discussion, such as public debates on the valuation of life[9] and the treatment of animals and the cognitively disabled.[10] She has also written for theNew York Times.[11][12]
Crary's first monograph,Beyond Moral Judgment, discusses how literature and feminism help to reframe moral presuppositions.[13] HerInside Ethics argues that ethics in disability studies and animal studies is stunted by a lack of moral imagination, caused by a narrow understanding of rationality and by a philosophy severed from literature and art.[14][15] Crary has promoted the view that humans and animals have moral worth above and beyond any quantitative valuation.[16][9]
Crary's work on feminism is critical of standard views ofobjectivity inanalytic philosophy andpost-structuralism. Drawing on Wittgenstein and feminist theory, Crary rejects the view that objectivity is value-neutral, and thus incompatible with ethical and political perspectives.[17] According to Crary, these "ethically-loaded perspectives" invite both cognitive and ethical appreciation for the lives of women, in ways that count as objective knowledge.[18] Like her moral philosophy, her feminist conception of objectivity is informed by Wittgenstein, who she understands as proposing a "wide" view of objectivity: one in which affective responses are not merely non-cognitive persuasive manipulations but reveal real forms of suffering that give us a more objective understanding of the world.[19]
Crary is associated with the so-called "therapeutic" or "resolute" reading of Wittgenstein.[20][21] She co-edited a collection of essays of such readings,The New Wittgenstein, where her own contribution argues against the standard use-theory readings of Wittgenstein that often render his thought as politically conservative and implausible.[22] She has contributed to numerous collections of Wittgenstein scholarship, including interpretations of Wittgenstein'sOn Certainty.[23]
Adams, Carol J.; Crary, Alice; Gruen, Lori.The good it promises, the harm it does: critical essays on effective altruism. Oxford: Oxford University press.ISBN978-0-19-765570-2.
Cavell, Stanley; Bauer, Nancy; Crary, Alice; Laugier, Sandra (2022).Here and there: sites of philosophy. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University press.ISBN978-0-674-27048-0.
Diamond, Cora; Crary, Alice, eds. (2010).Wittgenstein and the moral life: essays in honor of Cora Diamond. Representation and mind. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.ISBN978-0-262-27096-0.
^Crary, Alice (August 24, 2015). "Feminist Thought and Rational Authority: Getting Things in Perspective".New Literary History.46 (2):287–308.doi:10.1353/nlh.2015.0010.S2CID143046249.
^See "What Do Feminists Want in an Epistemology?," in Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein, ed. Naomi Scheman and Peg O'Connor (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2002), pp. 112–113.
^Alice Crary, introduction to The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and Rupert Read (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 1.
^Silver Bronzo, "The Resolute Reading and Its Critics: An Introduction to the Literature," Wittgenstein-Studien 3 (2012), p. 46.