| Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen | |
|---|---|
| حركة الشباب المجاهدين Ḥarakat ash-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn | |
| Also known as | Al-Shabaab |
| Leaders |
|
| Dates of operation | 2006–present
|
| Country |  Somalia Kenya Ethiopia |
| Allegiance |  Al-Qaeda (2012–present) |
| Headquarters | |
| Ideology | |
| Status | Active(since 2006) |
| Size |
|
| Allies | Non-state allies |
| Opponents | State opponents Non-State opponents
|
| Battles and wars | |
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujāhideen,[b] simply known asal-Shabaab,[c] or by its state name, theIslamic Emirate of Somalia, is a Sunni Islamist militant[38][39] and political movement based inSomalia.[40][41] It is involved in the ongoingSomali Civil War as anIslamist group, regularly invokingtakfir to rationalize itsterrorist attacks on Somalicivilians andcivil servants.[15][16][17] Allied to thepan-Islamist militant organizational-Qaeda, it is also in a more limited capacity active elsewhere inEast Africa, and has forged ties with other insurgent groups likeAQIM andAQAP.
Formed in the mid-2000s as a youth militia within the wider military wing of theIslamic Courts Union, al-Shabaab came to prominence during the 2006–2009Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia, during which it presented itself as a vehicle for the waging of armed resistance against the occupying Ethiopian army. In subsequent years, it gained popular support fromSomalis and became a dominant force in south and central Somalia, defending large swathes of territory by fighting against theAfrican Union Mission to Somalia and theFederal Government of Somalia, as well as the latter'stransitional predecessor. Al-Shabaab gained international prominence due to its recruitment of foreign fighters, including fighters who are fromWestern countries. Countries including theUnited States, theUnited Kingdom, and theUnited Arab Emirates have designated it as aterrorist organization, and the United States hasmilitarily intervened in order to fight against the group.
Between 2011 and 2013, a coalition ofAfrican Union forces, led by the Somali government, wrested a significant amount of territory from al-Shabaab, including the capital city,Mogadishu. During the same period, the group was plagued by internal conflicts over its leadership and ideological direction, which intensified when, in February 2012, al-Shabaab's leadershippledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. It suffered further military losses in 2014, as a result ofOperation Indian Ocean, and the killing of itsemir,Ahmed Abdi Godane. Several years thereafter, al-Shabaab retreated from the major cities, but it remained influential in many rural areas, and it prioritizedguerrilla attacks over territorial acquisitions. It is responsible for many high-fatality attacks, including the2013 Westgate attack,October 2017 Mogadishu bombings and the2022 Somali Ministry of Education bombings. Apart from its activities in Somalia, the group also operates in East African neighboring countries, extending its insurgency to Kenya's border regions with itsJaysh Ayman wing,[42] and carrying out amajor incursion into Ethiopia in 2022. Attendant to its recent resurgence, it was estimated to have increased its combat strength to between 7,000 and 18,000 fighters during 2022.[43][27]
Al-Shabaab is also known asAsh-Shabaab,Hizb al-Shabaab ("Party of the Youth"),[44] Al Osra Army in Somalia (Arabic:جيش العسرة في الصومال).[45][46] The termal-Shabaab means "the youth" in Arabic. It has also referred to itself as theIslamic Emirate of Somalia since 2011.[47]
| Part of a series on |
| Jihadism |
|---|
 Islam portal |
Although it is unclear when al-Shabaab was formed, it is understood to have originated as a youth militia within the military wing of theIslamic Courts Union, an umbrella group which providedde facto governance in much of Somalia until thecountry was invaded by Ethiopia in December 2006.[48][49][50] From 2007 to 2008, al-Shabaab established itself as an independent actor, gaining prominence as a vehicle of armed resistance against the Ethiopianmilitary occupation.[49][50] Many of its early leaders and members previously belonged not only to the Islamic Courts Union but also to the olderal-Ittihad al-Islamiya, a group founded on the tenets ofSalafism and opposition toclannism.[51] Many early al-Shabaab leaders had also been trained asmujahideen inAfghanistan.
According to theInternational Crisis Group, Salafism has been a core unifying principle of al-Shabaab, although this principle is not interpreted uniformly by the group's members and leaders.[49] In particular, al-Shabaab officially and generally advocates a form ofSalafi jihadism with transnational aims,[52][41] linking local grievances to the plight ofMuslims worldwide.[49] Academics have also noted the influence of non-Salafi Islamic movements in Somalia on al-Shabaab.[53]
Following its pan-Islamist political outlook, incursions into Somalia by Ethiopia – and later by Kenya, the United States, and others – are viewed by al-Shabaab as part of a wider American-sponsoredwar against Islam.[51][54] For instance, al-Shabaab denounced the2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia as a "Zionist-Crusader aggression",[51] in which the United States "unleashed its 'hunting dogs' in Ethiopia and Kenya" by deploying "the world's crusader forces" to counter the rise of theIslamic Courts Union.[55] However, this globalist framework is not universal within the group,[56][57] an ideological fault-line which has sometimes fosteredfactionalism and internal conflict. Much of al-Shabaab's Somali support base sees as its primary goal the establishment of a stable Islamic state inside Somalia,[54][58] or, more ambitiously, inside so-calledGreater Somalia, uniting the ethnic Somali populations of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.[59] Other domestic supporters are concerned primarily with clan-related and local objectives, and are therefore prone to infighting and shifting alliances.[60]
However, these ideological differences can accommodate broad opposition within the group to common adversaries – notably opposition to external intervention in Somalia, often publicly expressed in quasi-Qutbist terms;[61] and opposition to the internationally recognisedFederal Government of Somalia (FGS), which, lacking a basis in religious (Sharia) law, is seen to lack legitimacy.[49] As part of its opposition to the Somali federal government, Al-Shabaab declarestakfir against FGS and justify attacks against FGS government officials and civilian supporters.[15][16][17] Al-Shabaab hardliners broadly adhere to aTakfiri interpretation of the principle ofal-wala' wal-bara' (lit. 'loyalty and disavowal'),[49][62] insofar as it prescribes dissociation from non-Muslims and those perceived asapostates.[16][63][64][17][15][16][17]
A major component of al-Shabaab's ideology isIslamic expansionism which is incorporated into itsPan-Islamist cause.Ummah themes warning Somalis of the plots from internationalNGOs, "Christian Crusaders" (United States,Ethiopia,AMISOM) and their collaborators are a regular feature of the movement's propaganda. During theEthiopian invasion of Somalia, al-Shabaab positioned itself as a militia under the IslamicMuqawwama (resistance coalition) of theIslamic Courts Union, taking the most hardline stance against the invading "Christian crusaders". After the collapse of the ICU in 2007, al-Shabaab launched its own independent insurgency, gaining popular support from Somalis for defending the country fromAmerican imperialism and foreign occupation.Al-Qaeda began enhancing its co-operation and support to al-Shabaab during this period, which enabled the movement to establish itself as the strongest military power in Southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab regards Somalia'sFederal Government as an illegitimate "apostate" entity backed by foreign invaders.[23][65]
The group has persecuted those individuals belonging to Somalia's smallChristian minority; whom it accused of aiding the agenda of foreign "Crusaders" to "convert Somalis to Christianity".[66] In 2009, al-Shabaab destroyed aSufi shrine and its associated graves; asserting that over-embellishing burial sites into shrines is incompatible withSharia.[67][68] Al-Shabaab has clashed with the pro-AMISOM Sufi militias of "Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a".[69][70] In addition, its statements have expressedanti-Zionist sentiments,[71][72] and the group claimed that its2019 DusitD2 complex attack was retaliation against the declaration ofJerusalem as the capital of Israel.[73]
In 2017, observers estimated that al-Shabaab comprised between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters.[74] In 2018, theCouncil on Foreign Relations andUnited States military revised this figure downwards, estimating 3,000 to 6,000 and 4,000 to 6,000 respectively.[75] Reflecting an apparent al-Shabaab resurgence, theUnited States Africa Command estimated 5,000 to 10,000 fighters two years later, in 2020.[76][77] Most recently, an expert report submitted to theUnited Nations Security Council in early February 2022 estimated that al-Shabaab's fighting force had grown to between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters.[43] In late 2022, President of SomaliaHassan Sheikh Mohamud stated the faction had around 15,000 to 18,000 fighters.[27]
The group is led by an executive tanfid council of 7 to 14 members - a configuration also seen in equivalent organisations such as al-Qaeda, supported by a consultative shura. It operates several internal departments known asmakhtab, includingJabhat (military),Sanaaca (explosives),Da'wa (preaching),Zakat (taxation),Wilayah (local administration),Garsoor (Islamic courts),Amniyat (intelligence agency) andJaysh al-Hisbah (police force).[76][78] The organization appoints governors (waali) of which there are ten, and who oversee all civil services in Shabaab-controlled areas, including welfare and roads.[79]
Especially in its early years, al-Shabaab was sometimes described by its opponents as dominated by the prominentHawiye clan,[56] who remain influential in the group.[17] According to a 2018 analysis by the Somali Hiraal Institute, five of the ten members of the executive shura council were Hawiye, as were about 94 of the top 220 officials.[80] However, al-Shabaab opposes clannism, and has tried to appeal to minority groups and to appoint leaders from a variety of ethnic groups and clans.[81] It incorporates a relatively large contingent offoreign fighters(see§ Foreign recruitment). Rank-and-file members, though sometimes recruited by force,[60] are also attracted by the regular pay that al-Shabaab offers and by its politicalpropaganda.[81] In the past, many young al-Shabaab recruits were drawn from marginalised southern clans, such as theJareer.[81][82] Many arechildren.[83]
In February 2012,Fu'ad Qalaf Shongole, an al-Shabaab officer with responsibility for "awareness raising", encouraged a Somali gathering to send their unmarried daughters to fightjihad with al-Shabaab, which until then had used only male fighters.[84] However, according to International Crisis Group, women rarely participate directly in military affairs, though they do play important roles in recruitment, intelligence, and explosivessmuggling.[85]
Al-Shabaab was founded inLas Anod in 2003.[86][87] During that same year, the AmericanCentral Intelligence Agency began covert operations targeting theIslamic Courts Union (ICU) by backing anti-ICU Somali warlords[88] with the aim of preventing the formation of a 'Taliban like' state in Somalia that could provide haven toal-Qaeda.[89] In 2005, Mogadishu was hit by a significant wave of unexplainedassassinations and disappearances. The Islamic Courts claimed that covert US government operations and warlords were targeting high ranking ICU officials. According to C. Barnes & H. Hassan, "It was in this context that a military force known as al-Shabaab ('the Youth') emerged, related to but seemingly autonomous of the broad based Courts movement."[90] Contrary to many reports, al-Shabaab was neither the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union nor its most important military component. Al-Shabaab fighters operated as the youth wing of the Courts' militia and gained a fierce reputation during the war against the CIA-backedSomali warlord alliance in Mogadishu in early to mid-2006, distinguishing themselves within the ICU's military wing.[91]
Al-Shabaab rose to prominence and radicalized following the full scale Ethiopian invasion of Somalia during December 2006.[92][93] At the time, al-Shabaab was about six hundred fighters strong.[94] The invasion resulted in the deaths of many Islamic Courts Union affiliates, leaving a vacuum for the small group of several hundred youth that served as the ICU's Shabaab militia to gain prominence.[95] During themilitary occupation the group garnered popular support from across many segments of Somali society, as al-Shabaab was widely viewed as a genuine resistance movement against the Ethiopian military occupation; despite its inclinations towards hardline interpretations of Islam. Though the invasion had fractured theIslamic Courts Union, it galvanizednon-ethnic religiousIslamic nationalism on which al-Shabaab capitalized, especially for recruitment purposes, with thousands of new recruits drawn to the group.[96][93]
During 2008, al-Shabaab began rapidly expanding and governing territory for the first time.[97][93] The African Union reported al-Shabaab was about 2,000 fighters strong during 2008.[98] Many ordinary citizens had beenradicalized by the US-backed Ethiopian invasion, enabling al-Shabaab to firmly embed itself in the regions social, economic and political environment.[99] According to Cocodia, "al-Shabaab from an objective standpoint is the response of an unlawfully deposed regime employing all means possible to reclaim the authority that was wrenched from it." In the initial years, many Somalis perceived al-Shabaab as disciplined, orderly, and fair, which earned the group significant legitimacy. However, this perception was later lost due to their arbitrary rulings.[88] Violence andwar crimes against civilians carried out by the Ethiopian military rallied many to support the organization, and over the following two years al-Shabaab became battle hardened. In this period, the group laid the foundation for an enduring insurgency in Somalia, establishing networks and territorial bases concentrated in the rural south-central regions.[93][49]
A critical juncture in transformation of al-Shabaab was the assassination of the groups military leaderAden Hashi Ayro in an American airstrike during May 2008. It resulted in several significant developments for al-Shabaab, most prominently the accession ofAhmed Godane to leadership of the organization. Godane moved al-Shabaab in a far more violent direction, alienating many fighters and civilian supporters. The assassination of Ayro did nothing to prevent the groups expansion.[93] The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in January 2009 significantly diminished the public support that al-Shabaab had previously enjoyed as a resistance faction.[100] However, this move came too late to have a substantial impact on the group's transformation into a formidable oppositional force.[93]
Having made important territorial gains from mid-2008, al-Shabaab increasingly focused its attention on opposition to the SomaliTransitional Federal Government, as the Ethiopian-led war segued into the next phase of the protractedSomali Civil War.[101] By 2009–10, al-Shabaab controlled most of central and southern Somalia (south of the semi-autonomous region ofPuntland), and it had formed administrative structures to govern territories under its control.[50][102][103] It had particular success building relationships with local leaders in order to build cross-clan coalitions, combining its principled anti-clannism with a "pragmatic clannism": a willingness to manipulate clan networks and exploit inter-clan politics.[104][49][56][81]
By 2009, al-Shabaab started drastically altering its choice of targets and frequency of attacks. The use ofkidnappings and bombings in urban areas significantly grew in use.[93] The groups significant support from theSomali diaspora dwindled in response to the usage of terror tactics.[98]
.jpg)
In subsequent years, however, al-Shabaab's strong position was significantly weakened, as – in the context of afamine in the region and, simultaneously, a military offensive against the group – the group experienced territorial and strategic setbacks in the military arena; an internal struggle over the group's direction and leadership; and, in response to both, a wave of high-profiledefections.
The group's military fortunes turned with the failure of the August 2010Ramadan offensive – the inauguration of theBattle of Mogadishu – which resulted in heavy al-Shabaab losses.[50] By August 2011, al-Shabaab had announced a "strategic withdrawal" fromMogadishu, although, from outlying districts, it continued to exert influence in the city and to launch deadlyguerrilla attacks against AMISOM and the TFG.[102] In October and November 2011, Kenya and Ethiopia – partnering with local militias – launched offensives against al-Shabaab strongholds: Kenya'sOperation Linda Nchi on the southern front, while Ethiopia approached from the west. The group lost territory to both armies, notably losingBaidoa to Ethiopia in February 2012 andlosing the port city (and revenue hub) ofKismayo to Kenya in October 2012.[102][105] Military pressures on the group were sustained into 2013.
Some al-Shabaab members viewed the 2010 Ramadan offensive as disastrously ill-conceived, and subsequent territorial losses galvanised internal opposition to the leadership ofAhmed Abdi Godane, who was publicly named the group's emir in December 2007.[106] Asa severe drought afflicted the region, critics, generally associated with the leadership ofHassan Dahir Aweys andMukhtar Robow,[103][107] opposed al-Shabaab's response to the resulting famine, particularly its obstruction of foreignhumanitarian aid to populations in its territories(seebelow).[108][109][110] More broadly, they argued that the group's authoritarian style of governance, and use of violence, were causing the group to lose public support. Some suggested that these leadership missteps were the result of Godane's lack of clan roots, which they said led him to undervalue the lives both of civilians and of al-Shabaab fighters.[50]
These criticisms became intertwined with a broader and pre-existing dispute over the increasingly globalist flavour of al-Shabaab's ideology – Godane was among the faction which viewed Somalia as only one battleground of global jihad.[54][58] Godane's announcement in February 2012 of a merger withal-Qaeda(see§ Al-Qaeda) thus also met opposition.[111][112] Other senior al-Shabaab members met at a conference in Baidabo,[113] and outlined a policy programme which diverged from Godane's: they rejected Godane's proposal to change the group's name to al-Qaeda in East Africa, and resolved to focus on domestic issues rather than global jihad. They also resolved to establish a regional shura of Islamic clerics, independent of al-Qaeda control.[111][114] Godane's rival Aweys declared publicly that "al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda are merely a small part of the larger Islamic group and al-Qaeda's ideology should not be viewed as the sole, righteous path for Islam."[115]
.jpg)
In 2013, these internal rifts led to internecine violence as Godane effected what was virtually apurge of his critics.[103] Among those killed wereIbrahim al-Afghani and three other senior commanders, executed in June;[116] andOmar Hammami, killed in September.[117] JournalistSimon Tisdall viewed the September 2013Westgate shopping mall shooting inNairobi, Kenya as a reflection of the internal power struggle, with Godane's hardline globalist faction seeking to exert its authority.[118]
From mid-to-late 2011, and into 2012, al-Shabaab faced an increasing number of defections.[102] It was not the first such wave of defections: in particular, in late 2009, after the Ethiopian departure from Somalia, several leaders had defected to the Somali government, citing complaints about al-Shabaab's use ofsuicide attacks and executions;[119] its "false interpretations of Islam";[120] and its use ofextortion and attitude towards foreign humanitarian aid.[121] Such defections were viewed as strategically important to al-Shabaab's adversaries, not only for their propaganda use but because former militants could provide intelligence about al-Shabaab's combat strategy.[122] However, according to AMISOM and the Somali government, the volume of defections in the period around 2012 was unprecedented, and indicated that al-Shabaab's cohesion and authority were deteriorating: in June 2012, the government said that around 500 al-Shabaab militants had already defected to it, and that more were doing so every day.[123] Al-Shabaab brutalities, which alienated local populations, were again cited as central in motivating defections.[124] On September 5 and September 22, 2012, two large contingents of al-Shabaab fighters – around 200 each time – surrendered to the government coalition in Afmadow and Garsale respectively.[122][125] Another wave of defections and desertions followed Godane's 2013 purges – Aweys, for example, fled the group in mid-2013.[116]
Following its territorial losses, al-Shabaab reverted to the tactics ofasymmetric warfare, launching guerrilla attacks on AMISOM and government positions and territories.[50][102] Southern commander Aweys had announced this new strategy in a media interview shortly after the withdrawal from Mogadishu in August 2011.[126] Al-Shabaab increasingly avoided direct military combat and large battles, in favour of "dictat[ing] the conflict's pace by undertaking smaller ambushes at locations of its own choosing".[49] The group undertook high-profile attacks outside Somalia such as theWestgate shopping mall attack by four militants left 67 dead - the deadliest attack in Kenya since the1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi. That death-toll was exceeded two years later in the Garissa University College attack in which 148 people were killed in an attack targeting Christian students. Furthermore, two sophisticated attempts to target airliners were observed in 2016. In February a device in a laptop bag that had passed screening was detonated mid-flight, killing only the bomber, and in March another laptop bomb exploded during screening. Reacting to apparent advances in the group's bomb-making capabilities, the UN Security Council later prohibited the transfer of bomb components to Somalia. The group has also developed a strategy of maintaining a "semi-territorial presence" in key regions and parts of key cities: while it no longer had exclusive and military authority over substantial territory, it retained a sporadic presence, and therefore significant influence, in many places.[127][128]
Nonetheless, by 2016, al-Shabaab was viewed as significantly weakened by the military campaign against it, with earlier losses compounded in 2014–15 byOperation Indian Ocean, a joint endeavour by AMISOM, the Somali government, and the United States.[127][129] The Somali government claimed in October 2014 that over 700 al-Shabaab militants had surrendered since September, when it had extended anamnesty offer to them.[130] Reports of further senior defections continued into 2015.[131][132][133][134] Moreover, anAmerican drone strike killed Godane on September 1, 2014;[135] he was succeeded as al-Shabaab leader byAhmad Diri, who took office the same week.[136] Other senior members were killed in armed clashes or by American drone strikes in 2014 and 2015.[137][138][139][140] According to some reports, since Godane's death, the group has placed less weight on global jihad than on local grievances.[50][103][59]
In October 2017, more than 500 people were killed bya suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu, including many children, provoking domestic and international outrage. Al-Shabaab did not claim responsibility for the attack but was suspected of involvement.[141] In December 2019,another suicide truck bomb marked the beginning of a series of al-Shabaab attacks on the capital city, which continued into 2022.[142][143][144] Al-Shabaab also targeted American military personnel inan attack on a Kenyan base in January 2020.[145] By 2020, the group's strategy of semi-territorialism allowed it operate freely in much of rural Somalia, with its primary base in theJubba River Valley,[51] although air strikes against its leaders continued;[146] and it has recently won military successes against the government.[147] It had also expanded its operations in Puntland,[148][149] prompting a military offensive by Puntland forces in 2021.[150][151] As of July 2022, al-Shabaab is generally considered to be "resurgent",[152] a situation partly enabled by a reduction in the number of American air strikes,[153] and possibly motivated by competition withIslamic State in Somalia, which has been conducting its own expansionary campaign.[154]
On 20 July 2022,al-Shabaab launched an invasion into Ethiopia'sSomali Region.[155][156]Taking advantage of the ongoingTigray War, the goal of the operation was to establish a presence for the group within southernEthiopia. The incursion began with over a thousand al-Shabaab fighters staging diversionary attacks on fourEthiopian-Somali border towns in order to allow a force of 500 to 800 fighters to penetrate the Ethiopian security zone and advance into the region, who then advanced 150 km into the region.[157] After two weeks of intense clashes and airstrikes, the ENDF and Somali Region security forces began to reassert control.[158] Abattalion of around 500 al-Shabaab fighters succeeded in evading the Ethiopian army and reached its main target, theBale Mountains.[159]
In August 2022, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared "total war" against Al Shabaab during a televised address after the group carried out a deadlyhotel attack in Mogadishu and also announced that the Somalia military had regained territory from al Shabaab in the central Galmudug state and Southwest state.[160] By September 2022 Somali andATMIS offensive operations against al-Shabaab, with U.S. support, would escalate to the highest point in five years.[161] The operation, which is considered a combined Somali-ATMIS offensive,[161] began in August 2022 and, with assistance from U.S. airstrikes, has been focused on disrupting al-Shabaab activity in Somalia's centralHiraan region.[162][161] Other Al Shabaab-controlled areas in southern Somalia have been targeted by the Somalia military as well.[163] On 20 September 2022, as the military operation progressed, a statement was released by the Somali Ministry of Information which revealed that President Sheikh would not offer any other option than surrender for al-Shabaab members.[164]
On 29 October 2022, al-Shabaab took responsibility fora twin car bombing that occurred in Mogadishu targeting theMinistry of Education. The attacks killed 121 people and injured 333, making it the deadliest at the time since 2017.[165]
On 26 May 2023, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility foran attack that reportedly killed 137 soldiers in theBuulo Mareer base, just 75 mi (121 km) south-west of the capital Mogadishu. Meanwhile, Ugandan PresidentYoweri Museveni stated that the number is closer to 54 African Union peacekeepers stationed in Somalia.[166]
In December 2024, the UN Security Council approved a resolution to establish theAfrican Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (Aussom), a streamlined successor to theAfrican Union Transition Mission in Somalia (Atmis), which ends in 2024. Aussom will deploy up to 12,626 personnel to support Somalia's fight against the al-Shabaab insurgency.[167]
On 26 December 2024, the militant group of al-Shabaab confirmed the death of Mohamed Mire Jama,[168] a senior leader of the group, who had been designated as a terrorist by theUnited States,[169] in an Americandrone strike nearKunyo Barrow of theLower Shabelle region in theSouth West State of Somalia.[170]
In early 2025, al-Shabaab launched a large-scale militaryoffensive, capturing dozens of towns and vast areas of territory. In its most ambitious operation in years, the group's ultimate objective is to seizeMogadishu and overthrow the federal government. Probing attacks that began in January escalated into major offensives on multiple fronts, stretching government troops and auxiliary clan militias to their breaking point. By April the military situation had deteriorated to the extent that waves of rumors were circulating onsocial media of an impending insurgent assault on the capital. While this did not occur, an attack was carried out on themotorcade of Somali PresidentHassan Sheikh Mohamud while it was driving through the city.Airstrikes by international actors and sporadic localcounterattacks have slowed the advance.[171]
According toThe Telegraph, as the group has gained major ground this year, al-Shabaab has sought to implement a "hearts and minds" strategy, aiming to shed its reputation for repression and for carrying out suicide bombings that frequently kill civilians. Large-scale and indiscriminatesuicide attacks in Mogadishu, once capable of killing hundreds, have largely ceased. Analysts have compared the campaign to theTaliban's 2021 offensive inAfghanistan, noting that al-Shabaab and theTaliban are "very structurally, militarily and ideologically similar." The internationally recognized governments of both Somalia and Afghanistan have been described by observers as products of theWar on Terror, plagued bycorruption, predatory governance, and low public legitimacy.[172]
.jpg)
Although al-Shabaab has disseminated its propaganda by various media, the bulk of its engagement with Somalis in rural areas is either face-to-face or by radio broadcast.[173] Face-to-face, the group holds seminars onIslamic jurisprudence and community meetings on such matters such as grain and livestock distribution.[173] It operates its own radio station,Radio Andalus, mainly operated usingrelay stations and other equipment seized from private radio stations, including theBBC.[174] Presenters broadcast in Somali, Arabic,Swahili and English.[174] In April 2010, al-Shabaab banned BBC andVoice of America broadcasts on Somali radio, objecting to what they alleged was Christian propaganda.[175] Also in 2010, and prior to its expulsion from Mogadishu the following year, al-Shabaab launched a television news channel,al-Kataib News.[176] The group has also been known to conductmilitary parades in its territories, as a show of force.[177]
Al-Shabaab began creatingpropaganda films early in its campaign against Ethiopian forces,[173] produced by its dedicated media wing,al-Kataib Media Foundation.[178]
Since 2009, al-Shabaab's films have become noticeably more "professional", both in their production quality and in their messaging, reportedly with direct support from al-Qaeda's as-Sahab Media Foundation.[178] The early films were distributed primarily, and widely, online, and were primarily used as tools for recruitment, particularly among foreign jihadists.[173] More recent films show al-Shabaab distributing humanitarian aid and participating in other community or religious activities – though others are much more gruesome, displaying the corpses of beheaded members alleged to have been spies.[174][179] Propaganda films are also occasionally used to attempt to mobilise jihadi activity abroad: in October 2013, one film encouraged British jihadists to follow the example set byLee Rigby's killers,[180] while a February 2015 film called (without effect) for attacks on shopping malls in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, including theWest Edmonton Mall inAlberta, Canada, and theMall of America inBloomington, Minnesota.[181][182]
Send me acruise likeMaa'lam Adam al Ansari
And send me a couple of tons likeZarqawi
And send me a drone likeAbu Layth al Libi
AndSpecial Forces likeSaleh Ali Nabhan.
Send me all four and send me much much more
I pray for that on my way to heavens door
Send me four and send me more, that what I implore
An amazingmartyrdom I strive for and adore.
Al-Shabaab was an early adopter among African insurgents of theInternet, which it uses to distribute its propaganda videos and for various other propaganda functions.[173] Especially in its early years, it used online chatrooms and discussion forums, encouraging foreign fighters and even military commanders to post updates and field public questions about the state of the jihad.[178] Particularly prominent was American-born Omar Shafik Hammami, also known asAbu Mansoor al-Amriki, who for many years kept avideo blog about his life in al-Shabaab and who, from 2009, also created and postedraps about jihad.[184][185] Al-Shabaab also had an official website, which carried official statements and news – including sundry edicts and threats – and religious guidance. Since the site was closed in 2009, it has distributed its press releases and videos using other sympathetic websites, or, more commonly, usingsocial media networks.[173][178]
Indeed, although al-Shabaab spokesmen occasionally grant interviews to "carefully semaklected" local and foreign journalists,[178] social media networks have provided an important channel for interaction with the press, as well as for disseminating information and building support. Al-Shabaab has usedFacebook, particularly to communicate with theSomali diaspora;[178] and it has made prolific and innovative use ofTwitter since late 2011,[186] although its first accounts were active as early as 2009.[187] Online engagement with al-Shabaab surged during Operation Linda Nchi, the Kenyan offensive of 2011–12, when al-Shabaab used Twitter, under the handle @HSMPress, to urge Somalis to take up arms against the Kenyan forces[188] and to portray its own military losses as tactical retreats.[189] In an extreme example of the latter in late 2011, al-Shabaab photos purportedly showed several dozen AMISOM casualties – but, according to anAfrican Union spokesperson, in fact showed al-Shabaab's own casualties dressed in their adversaries' uniforms.[190][191] What received most attention, however, were tweets al-Shabaab posted mocking theKenya Defence Forces (KDF) and sparring with Major Emmanuel Chirchir, then the KDF's official spokesman.[187][192] Responding to Chirchir's claim that Kismayo had been captured by the KDF, al-Shabaab tweeted that the KDF "boys are a grotesque parody of an army! [al-Shabaab] can outpace urworld-class runners by far. Indeed, they 'Run like a Kenyan'".[193] Showing uncharacteristic levity, al-Shabaab also suggested by Tweet that it meet a UN official for "acaramel macchiato".[194]
Most of al-Shabaab's Tweets are in English, suggesting that they are intended for a foreign audience.[195] In 2011, officials in the United States, where Twitter is based, said they were considering having the account closed, but had legal andfree speech concerns.[196] Chirchir himself tweeted that such a move would be counterproductive, as "al-Shabaab needs to be engaged positively, and Twitter is the only avenue."[197] Nonetheless, in January 2013, Twitter suspended al-Shabaab's English-language account. Observers guessed that the suspension was a response to the account having issueddeath threats against Kenyanhostages and against French spyDenis Allex, followed in the latter case by confirmation that the execution had taken place.[198][199] A new English-language account, opened in February 2013,[200] was closed in September. This suspension also followed an apparent violation of Twitter's rules: al-Shabaab had recently used the account to claim responsibility for an unsuccessfulambush of a convoy carrying Somali PresidentHassan Sheikh Mohamud, and to warn that, "next time, you won't be as lucky".[201]
Al-Shabaab relaunched its English-language Twitter account once again on September 11, 2013.[202] Two weeks later, the group gained notoriety forlive-tweeting the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack, "justifying the attack, creating fictional threats, providing news on hostages and mocking the police and military response".[185] The account, which then had 15,000 or morefollowers, wasretweeted several million times before it was shut down by Twitter.[173][178] And after @HSMPress was deleted, the live updates continued from other, new accounts: over the course of the attack, which lasted several days, at least eight different al-Shabaab-affiliated Twitter accounts were active.[173] Al-Shabaab had opened a new Twitter account by December that year, with an official tellingAl Jazeera that, "The aim is to vigorously challengedefamatory reports in the media by presenting an accurate portrayal of the current state of Jihad in Somalia and countering Western, state-sponsored propaganda machines".[186] It has since tweeted, from various accounts, during other attacks;[203] Facebook, too, has had difficulty expeditiously removing graphic al-Shabaab content when it appears on newly created accounts.[204] The group is adept in using intricately structured networks of amplifier accounts, leveraging algorithms and emerging technologies, to disseminate its messages.
.jpg)
In territories it holds, al-Shabaab typically maintains "limited but effective" administrative control over resident populations,[49] providing services – such asdispute resolution through Sharia-based courts – which are sometimes compared favourably to those offered in government-held territories.[51][205][206] Somalis have been observed to travel out of government-controlled areas into al-Shabaab territory to settle disputes, particularly involving clan dynamics, lacking trust in official institutions.[207] Al-Shabaab claimed some credit for Somalia's excellentcrop yield in early 2010, saying thatSomali grain production had flourished due to al-Shabaab's reduction of food imports, and that the policy hadredistributed income to poor, rural Somali farmers.[208] However, the group has also allegedly committed widespreadhuman rights abuses against populations in its territories, including through a brutal interpretation and application of Islamic jurisprudence onhudud.[209][210]
Despite routinely expelling, attacking, and harassing aid workers, al-Shabaab permits some agencies to work in areas under its control. At the height of its territorial control it implemented a system of aid agency regulation, taxation and surveillance. Where agencies are allowed to operate, this is often due to the desire of al-Shabaab to coopt and materially and politically benefit from the provision of aid and services.[211] Senior aid agency representatives often strongly rejected claims that they talked with al-Shabaab, while aid workers working in al-Shabaab-controlled areas often reported they directly negotiated with the group out of necessity.[212] Complaints made against the group include its attacks on aid workers. According to journalistJon Lee Anderson:
The number of people in Somalia who are dependent on international food aid has tripled since 2007, to an estimated 3.6 million. But there is no permanent foreign expatriate presence in southern Somalia, because the Shabaab has declared war on the UN and on Western non-governmental organizations. International relief supplies are flown or shipped into the country and distributed, wherever possible, through local relief workers. Insurgents routinely attack and murder them, too; forty-two have been killed in the past two years alone.[213]
In 2009, Godane imposed an al-Shabaab ban on the UNWorld Food Programme and Western agencies in Somalia. The ban was opposed by other senior members, including Robow and Aweys, but Godane overruled them.[108][214]
In response to the2011 Eastern Africa drought, which lasted until early 2012,[215] al-Shabaab announced in July 2011 that it had withdrawn its restrictions on international humanitarian workers.[216] The group also adapted its propaganda strategy to accommodate the changing circumstances. In some cases, group members employed humanitarian aid as a recruitment tool, using relief supplies as bribes and as an incentive to join the militants, whose numbers had decreased due to casualties and defections.[217] Group members dismissed the UN declaration of famine in various regions as grossly exaggerated and banned various organizations from providing aid to those regions.[218] In response, in August 2011, Somali Prime MinisterAbdiweli Mohamed Ali announced the establishment of a new 300-man security force, which, assisted by AMISOM, was tasked with protecting aid convoys from al-Shabaab and with securingIDP camps while relief was being distributed.[219] Although fighting disrupted aid delivery in some areas, humanitarian access to al-Shabaab-controlled areas improved, and a scaling up of relief operations in mid-November prompted the UN to downgrade the humanitarian situation in several regions from famine to emergency levels.[220]
In July 2018, al-Shabaab announced a complete ban onsingle-useplastic bags within its territory in a broadcast in which it stated that they "pose a serious threat to the well-being of humans and animals alike", and in the same announcement, it also imposed a complete ban on the logging of several species of rare trees.[221][206] Some have argued that, whilst these environmentally-conscious advances are welcome, they are overshadowed by the group's terrorist activities, whilst others have mocked the United States and other countries for taking less action on climate change than a terrorist group.[222]
Al-Shabaab acknowledged the existence of theCOVID-19 pandemic and announced the formation of a coronavirus prevention and treatment committee.[223] In mid-June 2020, the group announced that it had set up a coronavirus treatment centre inJilib, about 380 km (236 mi) south of the capital, Mogadishu.[224]
Al-Shabaab is noteworthy in the region for its extensive recruitment of foreign fighters(seelist below).[225][226] These foreign recruits include members of the Somali diaspora or ethnicSomalis overseas; citizens of otherEast African countries; and citizens of countries further afield, including in theMiddle East and theWest.[227][54] Non-Somali fighters have occasionally orchestrated high-profile al-Shabaab attacks, notably the2010 Kampala bombings and2019 DusitD2 complex attack inNairobi.[228] However, of greater importance to al-Shabaab are the combat experience and specialised skills of some, usuallyArab, foreign fighters,[229] which have been linked to al-Shabaab's increased sophistication in producing explosives,[117] improvedsniper capability,[227] and increased propensity to use suicide attacks.[50] Foreign fighters may also have access to networks which improve al-Shabaab's capacity to recruit and operate in the region, and have made useful contributions to al-Shabaab's propaganda campaign: early Western recruits helped produce al-Shabaab's first English-language propaganda, and, thanks to its East African membership, Swahili remains the second most common language in al-Shabaab publications.[117][230] Foreign fighters also have symbolic importance for al-Shabaab propaganda: al-Shabaab has intentionally played up the diversity of its recruits as a paean to itspan-Islamism – that is, to demonstrate that it transcends clannism and nationalism, embodying a united transnationalummah.[117]
Foreign recruitment peaked in the period between 2011 and 2013,[117] which was also the period in which the phenomenon received the most attention. The 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia attracted foreign volunteers to al-Shabaab's cause,[54] and, as of 2010, al-Shabaab included an estimated 200–300 foreign fighters, not including a further 1,000 ethnic Somalis from the diaspora.[229] In subsequent years, al-Shabaab recruitment became a concern for the governments of both the United Kingdom and the United States. At a security conference in London in 2010, the former head ofMI5,Jonathan Evans, said that "a significant number of U.K. residents" were training with al-Shabaab;[231] the precise number of British recruits was estimated at between 50[232] and 100[233] persons. There was also evidence that the group had received funding from Somali residents in Britain.[234] Between 2012 and 2013, several British citizens facedcontrol orders or even criminal charges related to association with al-Shabaab.[235][236]
Sweden, Denmark, Canada, and the United States similarly encountered evidence of citizens' affiliation with al-Shabaab.[54] In the United States, theU.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee heard as early as 2009 – fromMichael Leiter, director of theNational Counterterrorism Center – that American and other foreign fighters were being recruited and trained by al-Shabaab.[57] In 2011, theHouse Committee on Homeland Security reported that more than 40Muslim Americans and 20 Canadians had fought with al-Shabaab, and that at least 15 of those volunteers had been killed in Somalia.[237] Later that year, a U.S. military official told theNew York Times that about 30 U.S. citizens were al-Shabaab fighters.[238] This was a resumption of an earlier trend of al-Shabaab recruitment among Americans, which previously had peaked in 2007–08.[239] Also in 2011, twoSomali Americans in Minnesota were convicted of illegally financing al-Shabaab.[238] By mid-2013, observers believed that recruitment of U.S. citizens had subsided.[240]
In general, foreign activity in al-Shabaab has decreased, first, and perhaps most importantly, because theSyrian civil war becamethe focal point for foreign jihadist recruitment networks.[117] Other factors, however, are more specific to al-Shabaab. One factor was the group's internal struggle of 2011–2013: as tensions between Somali and non-Somali members increased, Godane scapegoated the foreigners as the cause of the group's disunity and, during his 2013 purge, executed various foreign recruits(seeabove).[117][50] In addition to serving as a disincentive to foreign fighters, this shift reduced the influence of the group's remaining foreign leaders.[103] Moreover, whereas the ascendancy of Godane and his faction had partly internationalized al-Shabaab, in subsequent years, al-Shabaab became (re-)"domesticated": as it made territorial gains, its attention was increasingly consumed by local governance and the management of clan dynamics, activities in which foreign fighters – frequently mistrusted by local populations – lacked utility and influence.[50] As the conflict, and al-Shabaab's priorities, became more localized and clan-based, they also held less appeal for foreign fighters themselves.[117] Foreign fighters also attracted the counterterrorism efforts of foreign countries, and were sometimes suspected of disloyalty and spying by their Somali peers.[50]
As of 2020, estimates of the number of foreign recruits still active in al-Shabaab ranged from 450 to 2,000.[227] Most of those recruits are from East Africa – primarily Kenya,[241] but also Tanzania and Uganda, all countries in which al-Shabaab recruitment networks are well entrenched.[49][117] The flow of recruits fromArab countries and the West has diminished substantially since 2014, except for in the case ofYemen.[228][117] Moreover, few foreign fighters hold strategically important roles in the group. Many are among the rank-and-file of the military wing.[117][242] Those in leadership positions tend to have prominent, but strategically marginal or mid-level, roles – for example, in managing the group's public relations or external relations, or in supervising and training other foreign recruits.[50] (Godane's nationalist critics, however, argue that earlier, under his leadership, foreign fighters did in fact gain significant influence over the group.[58]) Since 2013, al-Shabaab has also established two external military units, on Godane's initiative: one, inEthiopia, has struggled, but the other, in theGreat Lakes region, has carried out several attacks inKenya.[228]
Between 2010 and 2012,Hizbul Islam, a smaller group of Somali militants,[243] was merged with al-Shabaab: after suffering military defeats against al-Shabaab in southern towns, Hizbul Islam was officially absorbed by its former rival in December 2010.[244][245] However, on September 24, 2012, Hizbul Islam announced that it would split from al-Shabaab, claiming the union had only ever been nominal and that the factions' political philosophies had differed irreconcilably. Hizbul Islam said that it welcomed "negotiations with all groups for the interest of Somalia", and added that al-Shabaab had been considerably "weakened" in recent years.[246][247]
Al-Shabaab has Kenya-based affiliates, withal-Hijra as its official Kenyan wing from 2012, then with a unit established in 2013 known asJaysh Ayman, based primarily in the Boni Forest. While the former group was used to carry out minor attacks within Kenya, the al-Shabaab leadership later switched its focus to Jaysh Ayman which proved more effective. Jaysh Ayman comprises both Somali and Kenyan fighters as well as fighters from overseas.
Al-Shabab pledged allegiance toal-Qaeda since 2012 and has reportedly forged ties withal-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, andal-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Before 2012, al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab had what academicDaniel Byman calls an "on-again, off-again" relationship, though both groups praised each other online in 2008.[248][249] During this early period, al-Shabaab occasionally harboured al-Qaeda leaders in Somalia, in exchange for their technical assistance.[248][250] In September 2009, in a video entitled "At Your Service Osama", al-Shabaab publicly declared allegiance to al-Qaeda leaderOsama bin Laden – but this reflected an "unrequited courtship", largely ignored by al-Qaeda.[251] However, after bin Laden's death and replacement byAyman al-Zawahiri, al-Shabaab became an official al-Qaeda affiliate in February 2012. In a fifteen-minute video message released on February 9, al-Shabaab leader Godane pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and al-Zawahiri on behalf of al-Shabaab.[252][253] Al-Zawahiri confirmed the alliance,[251] which he said would "please the believers and disturb the disbelievers" and "support the jihadi unity against theZio-Crusader campaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers."[254] The announcement was met with internal opposition among some factions of al-Shabaab(see§ Drought, al-Qaeda, and internal struggle).
By late 2012, the groups cooperated closely in various arenas, especially indoctrination and training, both in basicinfantry skills and in advanced explosives and assassination – after the merger, a corps of al-Qaeda-trained militants moved to Somalia to train members of al-Shabaab.[248] However, al-Shabaab remained "largely independent".[248] Similarly, although al-Shabaab has publicly exploited the al-Qaeda "brand", echoing al-Qaeda ideology in its recruitment videos,[248] it is unclear whether the alliance has affected al-Shabaab's behaviour and aims on the ground.[76] A 2021 statistical analysis suggests that it has not significantly affected al-Shabaab's military strategy.[255] While an al-Shabaab commander has claimed that the group will bring jihad first to East Africa "and afterward, with God's will, to America",[256] an analyst at theCenter for Strategic and International Studies argues that the group is far more interested in establishing Islamic State inside Somalia than in carrying out attacks in the West.[257]
In June 2012, GeneralCarter Ham of theU.S. Army said that al-Shabaab,al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Nigeria-basedBoko Haram were attempting to coordinate their activities, including in funding, training, and explosives.[257] In 2011, Boko Haram'sfirst suicide bomb attack had been preceded by a public statement warning that "our jihadists have arrived inNigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable", which analysts understood as an allusion to cooperation with al-Shabaab.[250][258] However, in the view of some observers, most consequential are al-Shabaab's links toal-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).[259][260] AQAP is based in Yemen, which has longstanding ties to Somalia, and analyst Katherine Zimmerman told theU.S. Congress that AQAP "almost certainly provided the equipment or the expertise" for al-Shabaab's2016 laptop bomb.[259]
A so-calledIslamic State has emerged in our land and stated to attempt to divide ourMujahidin, weaken our strength and carry out assassinations against our own. We have been ignoring their wicked behaviors for some time to give them a chance to change, but they have continued their wrongheadedness. Our senior command has ordered our fighters to attack and eliminate the 'disease' of IS and uproot the tree that would be used to undermine the fruits of theJihad.
In early 2015, theIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) published online the first of a series of videos aimed at al-Shabaab, calling on the group to switch allegiances from al-Qaeda to ISIL and its leaderAbu Bakr al-Baghdadi.[262] These public appeals had reportedly been preceded by informal ISIL attempts to establish a relationship with al-Shabaab.[263] Yet al-Shabaab publicly ignored the overtures.[263] By September 2015, it had issued an internal memo, directed at pro-ISIL elements in its ranks, reaffirming the group's allegiance to al-Qaeda and banning any discussion about ISIL. The group also detained several fighters who had voiced support for ISIL.[264]
In October 2015, senior al-Shabaab commanderAbdul Qadir Mumin and approximately 20 of his followers in Puntland pledged allegiance to ISIL,[265] establishing what becameIslamic State in Somalia (ISIS).[261] Further defections in al-Shabaab ranks occurred in the border region between Somalia and northern Kenya,[266] leading the head of al-Shabaab in theLower Shabelle region, Abu Abdalla, to announce that all pro-ISIL members should leave the group or be killed.[267] The groups clashed violently on several occasions, most fiercely during 2015, and al-Shabaab's internal security service continued to arrest, and sometimes execute, suspected ISIS supporters within al-Shabaab's ranks.[261]
Violent conflict between the groups was reinvigorated in 2018 by ISIS provocation, and, in December, al-Shabaab's spokesman announced an offensive –code-named Operation Disease Eradication – against ISIS.[268] The same week, al-Shabaab's general command released an 8-page treatise rebuking ISIS's ideology and listing crimes it had committed under theQuran.[261]
In 2020, the Hiraal Institute estimated that al-Shabaab collected at least $15 million in revenue every month, implying revenue on a similar scale to the government's;[269] and the UN estimates that the group's military budget was approximately $21 million in 2019.[76] In the period after 2014, al-Shabaab established its own Ministry of Finance,[270] and it has cultivated various revenue streams, among which it switches as its military position or political circumstances change.[271]
During its early years, al-Shabaab received substantial external support in donations from the Somali diaspora or interested international jihadists,[271] enabled by the weakness of the Somalian government'sfinancial regulation framework and the ubiquitous use of thehawala system for receipt ofremittances.[272] Although al-Shabaab initially appeared a promising alternative to the Islamic Courts Union, its popularity with diaspora donors declined after the Ethiopian withdrawal and as the group gained a reputation for brutality.[271] Concurrently, however, al-Shabaab increased its ties to other jihadist groups, especially al-Qaeda, which have extensive capacity to generate income in theArabian Peninsula andHorn of Africa.[271] For example, years before al-Shabaab became an official al-Qaeda affiliate, bin Laden publicly called on Muslims to send money to al-Shabaab.[248] However, over the past decade, the counterterrorism efforts of foreign governments have obstructed international funding sources.[271]
According to authorities, the Somali state of Puntland is a key transit point for weapons shipments into Somalia from foreign countries – particularly frequent shipments ofsmall arms and ammunition from Yemen, typically transported across theGulf of Aden inskiffs, and occasionally larger shipments from theMakran coast of Iran.[clarification needed][273][274][275] Puntland authorities have also seized Yemeni explosives shipments, which they suspect are the result of cooperation between al-Shabaab and Yemen-based AQAP.[276]
In December 2009, adoptingResolution 1907, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions onEritrea, accusing the country of arming and financing militia groups, including al-Shabaab, in southern Somalia's conflict zones.[277] Reports in 2010 and 2011 by a UN International Monitoring Group alleged continuing Eritrean support to Somali rebels – including, in the latter year, about $80,000 in monthly financial support and two air deliveries of weapons – but the Eritrean government emphatically denied the accusations, describing them as "concocted, baseless and unfounded".[277][278] TheInternational Crisis Group added some credence to Eritrea's denials, suggesting that historical Eritrean support to Somali militants had been aimed at undermining Ethiopia during its 2006–9 invasion, and that Hizbul Islam was more likely a recipient than al-Shabaab.[279]
On July 5, 2012, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on Eritrea's intelligence chief and a high-ranking military officer, who allegedly facilitated support to al-Shabaab.[280] However, later that year, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported that it had found no evidence of direct Eritrean support to al-Shabaab in the preceding year.[281] Between then and 2017, successive annual reports of the Monitoring Group found no evidence for Eritrean involvement, while noting that Eritrea had not provided full access to investigators;[282][283] nonetheless, the UN Security Council did not enact the group's recommendation to lift its sanctions on Eritrea until November 2018.[284]
As al-Shabaab expanded its territorial control, it was able to augment its internal funding through illicit markets and local populations. The smuggling ofcharcoal has been an important source of income for the group since it first gained control of Somali port cities, especially Kismayo.[59] Calculating that al-Shabaab was earning between $15 million and $50 million annually from illegal trade, the UN banned Somali charcoal imports.[271] The group also profits from involvement in – or taxation of – the smuggling and sale ofivory,sugar, and, reportedly,heroin;[270][59] and it has been implicated inillegal mining and minerals exports in East Africa.[271] There is some evidence that al-Shabaab has profited frompiracy. In 2011, the head of the UN's counter-piracy division, Colonel John Steed, warned that there was circumstantial evidence that al-Shabaab increasingly sought to cooperate withpirate gangs and other criminal organizations.[285] Further reports suggested that al-Shabaab members had extorted pirates, demandingprotection money equivalent to 20% of the pirates'ransom proceeds, but did not provide evidence that al-Shabaab was itself involved in piracy.[286]
Also in the 2008–2011 period, al-Shabaab established a sophisticated taxation system, framed as a form ofzakat, in line with sharia, but often resembling extortion. Al-Shabaab taxes may apply to clans, traders, corporations, farmers, orlivestock herders – in fact, livestock are sometimes stolen outright by al-Shabaab militants, with the theft framed as a kind of pre-emptivein-kind taxation.[271] Humanitarian aid agencies are also taxed or extorted, in exchange for permission to operate inside certain territories(see§ Humanitarian access);[271] and al-Shabaab has been known to executekidnappings for ransom.[287] In recent years, facing territorial losses in urban areas, al-Shabaab has had less recourse to previous revenue streams – notably the charcoal trade, through Kismayo, and the remittance economy – and therefore has relied more heavily on extracting zakat.[81] The development of its security and intelligence services has allowed it to expand its tax base by imposing taxes even in areas outside its territorial control:[271] according to the Hiraal Institute, more than half of al-Shabaab's revenue in 2019–20 came from Mogadishu, whose major companies are taxed at 2.5% of their annual profits.[269] Indeed, a commander in the Somali army confessed to paying tax to al-Shabaab despite being at war with it.[269] The group has been known to punish non-payment severely, including byblockading villages under threat ofstarvation.[271]
Either directly or indirectly through black markets, al-Shabaab has access to arms intended for the Somali government. In 2018 and 2019, expert reports to the UN Security Council found that government military equipment enters theblack market, where some of it is sold to al-Shabaab militants. In some cases, senior government officials orchestrate large-scale diversions of government arms and ammunition; in others, low-ranking members of the security forces sell their weapons for subsistence.[275][288] An earlier report in 2014 had alleged that government officials were actively involved in the direct supply of governments arms to al-Shabaab.[289] The group has also been known to infiltrate government institutions, as became clear when regional government employees carried out al-Shabaab's24 July 2019 Mogadishu bombing, which killed Mogadishu MayorAbdirahmean Omar Osman.[275]
The following countries have officially listed al-Shabaab as aterrorist organization:
Australia (since 22 August 2009)[290][291]
Canada (since 5 March 2010)[292]
Malaysia[293]
New Zealand (since 10 February 2010)[294]
Singapore (since 18 March 2016)[295]
United Arab Emirates (since 15 November 2014)[296]
United Kingdom (since March 2010)[297]
United States (since 29 February 2008)[298]In 2012, with the support of the Somali government,[299] the United States began issuingbounties for al-Shabaab members under itsRewards for Justice Program. On June 7, theU.S. Department of State offered a total of $33 million in bounties for information leading to the capture of any of seven senior commanders, including $7 million for Godane, then the group's emir, and $5 million for Robow, then his deputy.[299] In response, al-Shabaab's Fu'ad Qalaf issued a mock bounty of his own, promising ten camels to anyone possessing information on U.S. PresidentBarack Obama, and a further, less valuable, reward of ten cocks and ten hens for information onHillary Clinton, theU.S. Secretary of State.[299] On an official state visit to Mogadishu, top U.S. envoyJohnnie Carson dismissed the counter-offer as "absurd". He also announced that the U.S. would impose sanctions, including visa and travel bans andasset freezes, on anyone attempting to thwart the ongoingpolitical transition in Somalia.[300]
On March 21, 2013, the U.S. Department of State offered $5 million apiece for information on two American senior al-Shabaab commanders, Omar Shafik Hammami andJehad Mostafa.[301] On March 15, 2014, it issued three further bounties, including one onAbdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir, who it said coordinated al-Shabaab's recruitment activities in Kenya.[302] On September 27, 2014, after Godane's death, the SomaliNational Intelligence and Security Agency announced its own bounty, offering $2 million for information leading to the arrest of the new emir, Umar, and a separate $1 million reward for information leading to his killing.[303] Several further Somali bounties were issued on April 10, 2015, with rewards ranging between $100,000 and $250,000.[304] In a separate programme, on April 3, 2015, the Kenyan government offeredKSh. 20 million ($215,000) for information leading to the arrest of Mohamed Mohamud, a commander of al-Shabaab's operations in Kenya.[305]
Prominent members presently in the top ranks of the organization include:
Former leading members of al-Shabaab include:
Prominent foreign al-Shabaab members have included:[314]
Al-Shabaab's outspokenness against foreign forces resonated with deep-rooted Somali hostility against Ethiopia.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of October 2025 (link)Somalia's neighbours are threatened by Al-Shabaab's blending of irredentist Greater Somalia rhetoric with Islamist ideology ...
President Mohamud says the group has 15,000 to 18,000 fighters
Somali military officials maintain that Iran has been running secret operations to undermine the United States in Somalia, providing sophisticated weapons, improvised explosive100000 als used to make bombs. The military officials allege that Iran and its proxies are complicit in al-Shabab attacks on the U.S. military, Somali forces, and the African Union Mission in Somalia
For Iran, working with non-State actors such as Al-Shabaab and the Houthis is an essential part of its foreign policy, aimed at expanding its geopolitical influence throughout the region. Tehran has developed an unspoken alliance with Al-Shabaab with the aim of creating a covert intelligence network that will allow it to achieve its goals and support its interests in the Middle East and Africa.
The Quds Force has been working with agents and allies, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and Somalia's Al-Shabaab, which are thought to have recently established relations with the Quds Force.
Somali police and finance ministry officials claim the Quds Force uses these networks to smuggle Iranian oil into Somalia and then sell cheap oil across Africa to subvert U.S. sanctions, with some of the proceeds used to support militants in Yemen and Somalia
Qatar has allegedly used al-Shabab to target groups it has identified as opposing its interests, including Somali politicians critical of Doha's role in the country and outside actors like the United Arab Emirates
Qatar's cultivation of African Islamists, principally Somalia's al-Shabab insurgents, has similarly troubled the United States, which has accused the movement of providing a haven for al-Qaeda militants involved in attacks against Americans
Qatari individuals and government representatives are reported to have been in regular contact with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen in order to exert geopolitical influence
Guns supplied by Iran to its Houthi allies in Yemen are being smuggled across the Gulf of Aden to Somalia, according to a Geneva-based think tank, where al Qaeda-linked al Shabab insurgents are battling a weak and divided government.
Iran has established links with the jihadist group Al-Shabaab in Somalia to attack United States and other international forces in the African country and the region and to supply arms to Houthi rebels in Yemen
In addition, increased smuggling activities involving small arms and light weapons are observed between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, with indications of shared military supplies or a common supplier. ... Houthis are evaluating options to carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast. To that end, they are strengthening ties with the terrorist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab).
Al-Shabaab (Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahedeen) is an Islamic insurgency that came to being in 2003 at an Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia consultation in Los Anod, Somaliland [...] and then organized a parallel conference in Las Anod and launched al-Shabaab as a Salafi-jihadist movement
Al-Shabaab formally incorporated in 2003 at an AIAI alumni conference in Las Anod, Somaliland
It is important to note that, contrary to many newspaper articles, Al Shabaab was not the armed wing of the Courts. In fact there were other groups under the Court umbrella that were more militarily important than Al-Shabaab.
In fact, al-Shabaab was extremely effective at framing their argument as a nationalist struggle against their historically intrusive Ethiopian neighbors.
When Ethiopia invaded, al-Shabaab had around 600 fighters.
This invasion chased out or killed many affiliates of the UIC, leaving behind a battle-hardened small contingent of youth who made up a marginal faction of the UIC prior to the Ethiopian invasion. This group goes by the name of al-Shabaab.
the 2006 US-Ethiopian invasion of Somalia gave the group the popular support it needed to radicalise ordinary citizens and cement its place within the region's social, economic, and political environment
In July a force of 500-800 al-Shabab fighters penetrated a security zone maintained by Ethiopia, then crossed 150km into that country with the aim of setting up a base in the Bale mountains.
| Participants |
| ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conflicts |
| ||||||||
| Policies | |||||||||
| Related |
| ||||||||
| Timeline | |
|---|---|
| Background | |
| Battles |
|
| OEF–HOA | |
| Other events | |
| Key players | |
| |
| |
| Timeline | |
| Background | |
| Operations and battles |
|
| Attacks |
|
| OEF–HOA | |
| Other events | |
| Key players | |
| |
| International | |
|---|---|
| National | |
| Other | |
