The organization was founded in a series of meetings held inPeshawar during 1988, attended byAbdullah Azzam,Osama bin Laden,Muhammad Atef,Ayman al-Zawahiri and other veterans of theSoviet–Afghan War.[113] Building upon the networks ofMaktab al-Khidamat, the founding members decided to create an organization named "Al-Qaeda" to serve as a "vanguard" forjihad.[113][114] WhenSaddam Husseininvaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden offered to supportSaudi Arabia by sending hisMujahideen fighters. His offer was rebuffed by the Saudi government, which instead sought the aid of theUnited States. The stationing of U.S. troops in theArabian Peninsula prompted bin Laden to declare ajihad against both the rulers of Saudi Arabia – whom he denounced asmurtadd (apostates) – and against the US. From 1992, al-Qaeda established its headquarters inSudan until it was expelled in 1996. It then shifted its base to theTaliban-ruledAfghanistan and later expanded to other parts of the world, primarily in theMiddle East andSouth Asia. In 1996 and 1998, bin Laden issued twofatāwā that demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia.
Al-Qaeda only indirectly controls its day-to-day operations. Its philosophy calls for thecentralization of decision making, while allowing for thedecentralization of execution.[125] The top leaders of al-Qaeda have defined the organization's ideology and guiding strategy, and they have also articulated simple and easy-to-receive messages. At the same time, mid-level organizations were given autonomy, but they had to consult with top management before large-scale attacks and assassinations. Top management included the shura council as well as committees on military operations, finance, and information sharing. Through the information committees of al-Qaeda, Zawahiri placed special emphasis on communicating with his groups.[126] However, after thewar on terror, al-Qaeda's leadership has become isolated. As a result, the leadership has become decentralized, and the organization has become regionalized into several al-Qaeda groups.[127][128]
The group was initially dominated byEgyptians andSaudis, with some participation fromYemenis andKuwaitis. Over time, it has evolved into a more international terrorist organization. While its core group originally shared a background in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, it has since attracted fighters from other Arab groups, includingNorth Africans,Jordanians,Palestinians, andIraqis. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, Muslims from non-Arab backgrounds, such asPakistanis,Afghans,Turks,Kurds, andEuropean converts to Islam, have also joined the organization.[129]
Many Western analysts do not believe that the global jihadist movement is driven at every level by al-Qaeda's leadership. However, bin Laden held considerable ideological influence over revolutionary Islamist movements across the world. Experts argue that al-Qaeda has fragmented into a number of disparate regional movements, and that these groups bear little connection with one another.[130]
This view mirrors the account given by Osama bin Laden in his October 2001 interview withTayseer Allouni:
"this matter isn't about any specific person and... is not about the al-Qa'idah Organization. We are the children of an Islamic Nation, with Prophet Muhammad as its leader, our Lord is one... and all the true believers [mu'mineen] are brothers. So the situation isn't like the West portrays it, that there is an 'organization' with a specific name (such as 'al-Qa'idah') and so on. That particular name is very old. It was born without any intention from us. Brother Abu Ubaida... created a military base to train the young men to fight against the vicious, arrogant, brutal, terrorizing Soviet empire... So this place was called 'The Base' ['Al-Qa'idah'], as in a training base, so this name grew and became. We aren't separated from this nation. We are the children of a nation, and we are an inseparable part of it, and from those public demonstrations which spread from the far east, from the Philippines to Indonesia, to Malaysia, to India, to Pakistan, reaching Mauritania... and so we discuss the conscience of this nation."[131]
As of 2010[update] however,Bruce Hoffman saw al-Qaeda as a cohesive network that was strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas.[130]
Osama bin Laden (left) and Ayman al-Zawahiri (right) photographed in 2001
Osama bin Laden served as the emir of al-Qaeda from the organization's founding in 1988 until his assassination by US forces on May 1, 2011.[141]Atiyah Abd al-Rahman was alleged to be second in command prior to his death on August 22, 2011.[142]
Bin Laden was advised by aShura Council, which consists of senior al-Qaeda members.[126] The group was estimated to consist of 20–30 people.
After May 2011
Ayman al-Zawahiri had been al-Qaeda's deputy emir and assumed the role of emir following bin Laden's death. Al-Zawahiri replacedSaif al-Adel, who had served as interim commander.[143]
On June 5, 2012, Pakistani intelligence officials announced that al-Rahman's alleged successor as second in command,Abu Yahya al-Libi, had been killed in Pakistan.[144]
Nasir al-Wuhayshi was alleged to have become al-Qaeda's overall second in command and general manager in 2013. He was concurrently the leader ofal-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) until he was killed by a US airstrike in Yemen in June 2015.[145]Abu Khayr al-Masri, Wuhayshi's alleged successor as the deputy to Ayman al-Zawahiri, was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in February 2017.[146] Al-Qaeda's next alleged number two leader,Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, was killed by Israeli agents. His pseudonym was Abu Muhammad al-Masri, who was killed in November 2020 in Iran. He was involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.[147]
Al-Qaeda's network was built from scratch as a conspiratorial network which drew upon the leadership of a number of regional nodes.[148] The organization divided itself into several committees, which include:
The Military Committee, which is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks.
The Money/Business Committee, which funds the recruitment and training of operatives through thehawala banking system. US-led efforts to eradicate the sources of "terrorist financing"[149] were most successful in the year immediately following the September 11 attacks.[150] Al-Qaeda continues to operate through unregulated banks, such as the 1,000 or sohawaladars in Pakistan, some of which can handle deals of up toUS$10million.[151] The committee also procures false passports, pays al-Qaeda members, and oversees profit-driven businesses.[152] In the9/11 Commission Report, it was estimated that al-Qaeda required $30million per year to conduct its operations.
The Law Committee reviewsSharia law, and decides upon courses of action conform to it.
The Islamic Study/Fatwah Committee issues religious edicts, such as an edict in 1998 telling Muslims to kill Americans.
The Media Committee ran the now-defunct newspaperNashrat al Akhbar (English:Newscast) and handledpublic relations.
In 2005, al-Qaeda formedAs-Sahab, a media production house, to supply its video and audio materials.
After Al-Zawahiri (2022 – present)
Al-Zawahiri was killed on July 31, 2022, in a drone strike in Afghanistan.[153] In February 2023, a report from the United Nations, based on member state intelligence, concluded that de facto leadership of al-Qaeda had passed toSaif al-Adel, who was operating out of Iran. Adel, a former Egyptian army officer, became a military instructor in al-Qaeda camps in the 1990s and was known for his involvement in the Battle of Mogadishu. The report stated that al-Adel's leadership could not officially be declared by al-Qaeda because of "political sensitivities" ofAfghan government in acknowledging the death of Al-Zawahiri as well as due to "theological and operational" challenges posed by the location of al-Adel inIran.[154][155]
Command structure
Most of al-Qaeda's top leaders and operational directors were veterans who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were the leaders who were considered the operational commanders of the organization.[156] Nevertheless, al-Qaeda was notoperationally managed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Several operational groups exist, which consult with the leadership in situations where attacks are in preparation.[126] "...Zawahiri does not claim to have direct hierarchical control over al Qaeda's vast, networked structure. Al Qaeda's core leadership seeks to centralize the organization's messaging and strategy rather than to manage the daily operations of its franchises. But formal affiliates are required to consult with al Qaeda's core leadership before carrying out large-scale attacks." Al-Qaeda central (AQC) is a conglomerate of expert committees, each in supervision of distinct tasks and objectives. Its membership is mostly composed ofEgyptian Islamist leaders who participated in theanti-communistAfghan Jihad. Assisting them are hundreds of Islamic field operatives and commanders, based in various regions of theMuslim World. The central leadership assumes control of the doctrinal approach and overall propaganda campaign; while the regional commanders were empowered with independence in military strategy and political maneuvering. This novel hierarchy made it possible for the organisation to launch wide-range offensives.[157]
When asked in 2005 about the possibility of al-Qaeda's connection to theJuly 7, 2005 London bombings,Metropolitan Police CommissionerSir Ian Blair said: "Al-Qaeda is not an organization. Al-Qaeda is a way of working... but this has the hallmark of that approach... Al-Qaeda clearly has the ability to provide training... to provide expertise... and I think that is what has occurred here."[158] On August 13, 2005,The Independent newspaper, reported that the July7 bombers had acted independently of an al-Qaeda mastermind.[159]
Nasser al-Bahri, who was Osama bin Laden's bodyguard for four years in the run-up to 9/11 wrote in his memoir a highly detailed description of how the group functioned at that time. Al-Bahri described al-Qaeda's formal administrative structure and vast arsenal.[160] However, the authorAdam Curtis argued that the idea of al-Qaeda as a formal organization is primarily an American invention. Curtis contended the name "Al-Qaeda" was first brought to the attention of the public in the 2001 trial of bin Laden and the four men accused of the1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa. Curtis wrote:
The reality was that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy. But there was no organization. These were militants who mostly planned their own operations and looked to bin Laden for funding and assistance. He was not their commander. There is also no evidence that bin Laden used the term "al-Qaeda" to refer to the name of a group until after September 11 attacks, when he realized that this was the term the Americans had given it.[161]
During the 2001 trial, theUS Department of Justice needed to show that bin Laden was the leader of a criminal organization in order to charge himin absentia under theRacketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The name of the organization and details of its structure were provided in the testimony ofJamal al-Fadl, who said he was a founding member of the group and a former employee of bin Laden.[162] Questions about the reliability of al-Fadl's testimony have been raised by a number of sources because of his history of dishonesty, and because he was delivering it as part of aplea bargain agreement after being convicted of conspiring to attack US military establishments.[163][164] Sam Schmidt, a defense attorney who defended al-Fadl, said:
There were selective portions of al-Fadl's testimony that I believe was false, to help support the picture that he helped the Americans join together. I think he lied in a number of specific testimony about a unified image of what this organization was. It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists. It made them identifiable as a group and therefore made it easier to prosecute any person associated with al-Qaeda for any acts or statements made by bin Laden.[161]
The number of individuals in the group who have undergone proper military training, and are capable of commanding insurgent forces, is largely unknown. Documents captured in the raid on bin Laden's compound in 2011 show that the core al-Qaeda membership in 2002 was 170.[165] In 2006, it was estimated that al-Qaeda had several thousand commanders embedded in 40 countries.[166] As of 2009[update], it was believed that no more than 200–300 members were still active commanders.[167]
According to the 2004 BBC documentaryThe Power of Nightmares, al-Qaeda was so weakly linked together that it was hard to say it existed apart from bin Laden and a small clique of close associates. The lack of any significant numbers of convicted al-Qaeda members, despite a large number of arrests on terrorism charges, was cited by the documentary as a reason to doubt whether a widespread entity that met the description of al-Qaeda existed.[168] al-Qaeda's commanders, as well as its sleeping agents, are hiding in different parts of the world to this day. They are mainly hunted by the American and Israeli secret services.
Insurgent forces
According to author Robert Cassidy, al-Qaeda maintains two separate forces which are deployed alongside insurgents in Iraq and Pakistan. The first, numbering in the tens of thousands, was "organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces" in the Soviet–Afghan war.[166] The force was composed primarily of foreignmujahideen from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Many of these fighters went on to fight in Bosnia and Somalia for globaljihad. Another group, which numbered 10,000 in 2006, live in the West and have received rudimentary combat training.[166]
Other analysts have described al-Qaeda's rank and file as being "predominantly Arab" in its first years of operation, but that the organization also includes "other peoples" as of 2007[update].[169] It has been estimated that 62 percent of al-Qaeda members have a university education.[170] In 2011 and the following year, the Americans successfully settled accounts with Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, the organization's chief propagandist, and Abu Yahya al-Libi's deputy commander. The optimistic voices were already saying it was over for al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, it was around this time that the Arab Spring greeted the region, the turmoil of which came great to al-Qaeda's regional forces. Seven years later, Ayman al-Zawahiri became arguably the number one leader in the organization, implementing his strategy with systematic consistency. Tens of thousands loyal to al-Qaeda and related organizations were able to challenge local and regional stability and ruthlessly attack their enemies in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe and Russia alike. In fact, from Northwest Africa to South Asia, al-Qaeda had more than two dozen "franchise-based" allies. The number of al-Qaeda militants was set at 20,000 in Syria alone, and they had 4,000 members in Yemen and about 7,000 in Somalia. The war was not over.[59]
In 2001, al-Qaeda had around 20 functioning cells and 70,000 insurgents spread over sixty nations.[171] According to latest estimates, the number of active-duty soldiers under its command and allied militias have risen to approximately 250,000 by 2018.[172]
Financing
Al-Qaeda usually does not disburse funds for attacks, and very rarely makes wire transfers.[173] In the 1990s, financing came partly from the personal wealth of Osama bin Laden.[174] Other sources of income included theheroin trade and donations from supporters in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other IslamicGulf states.[174] A 2009leaked diplomatic cable stated that "terrorist funding emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern."[175]
Among the first pieces of evidence regarding Saudi Arabia's support for al-Qaeda was the so-called "Golden Chain", a list of early al-Qaeda funders seized during a 2002 raid in Sarajevo by Bosnian police.[176] The hand-written list was validated by al-Qaeda defector Jamal al-Fadl, and included the names of both donors and beneficiaries.[176][85] Osama bin-Laden's name appeared seven times among the beneficiaries, while 20 Saudi and Gulf-based businessmen and politicians were listed among the donors.[176] Notable donors included Adel Batterjee, andWael Hamza Julaidan. Batterjee was designated as a terror financier by the US Department of the Treasury in 2004, and Julaidan is recognized as one of al-Qaeda's founders.[176]
Documents seized during the 2002 Bosnia raid showed that al-Qaeda widely exploited charities to channel financial and material support to its operatives across the globe.[177] Notably, this activity exploited the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Muslim World League (MWL). The IIRO had ties with al-Qaeda associates worldwide, including al-Qaeda's deputy Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri's brother worked for the IIRO in Albania and had actively recruited on behalf of al-Qaeda.[178] The MWL was openly identified by al-Qaeda's leader as one of the three charities al-Qaeda primarily relied upon for funding sources.[178]
Several Qatari citizens have been accused of funding al-Qaeda. This includesAbd Al-Rahman al-Nuaimi, a Qatari citizen and a human-rights activist who founded the Swiss-basednon-governmental organization (NGO)Alkarama. On December 18, 2013, theUS Treasury designated Nuaimi as a terrorist for his activities supporting al-Qaeda.[179] The US Treasury has said Nuaimi "has facilitated significant financial support to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and served as an interlocutor between al-Qaeda inIraq and Qatar-based donors".[179]
Nuaimi was accused of overseeing a $2million monthly transfer to al-Qaeda in Iraq as part of his role asmediator between Iraq-based al-Qaeda senior officers and Qatari citizens.[179][180] Nuaimi allegedly entertained relationships with Abu-Khalid al-Suri, al-Qaeda's top envoy in Syria, who processed a $600,000 transfer to al-Qaeda in 2013.[179][180] Nuaimi is also known to be associated with Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani, aYemeni politician and founding member ofAlkarama, who was listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the US Treasury in 2013.[181] The US authorities claimed that Humayqani exploited his role in Alkarama to fundraise on behalf of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).[179][181] A prominent figure in AQAP, Nuaimi was also reported to have facilitated the flow of funding to AQAP affiliates based in Yemen. Nuaimi was also accused of investing funds in the charity directed by Humayqani to ultimately fund AQAP.[179] About ten months after being sanctioned by the US Treasury, Nuaimi was also restrained from doing business in the UK.[182]
Another Qatari citizen, Kalifa Mohammed Turki Subayi, was sanctioned by the US Treasury on June 5, 2008, for his activities as a "Gulf-based Al-Qaeda financier". Subayi's name was added to theUN Security Council's Sanctions List in 2008 on charges of providing financial and material support to al-Qaeda senior leadership.[180][183] Subayi allegedly moved al-Qaeda recruits to South Asia-based training camps.[180][183] He also financially supported Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Pakistani national and senior al-Qaeda officer who is believed to be the mastermind behind the September 11 attack according to the9/11 Commission Report.[184]
Qataris provided support to al-Qaeda through the country's largest NGO, theQatar Charity. Al-Qaeda defector al-Fadl, who was a former member of Qatar Charity, testified in court that Abdullah Mohammed Yusef, who served as Qatar Charity's director, was affiliated to al-Qaeda and simultaneously to theNational Islamic Front, a political group that gave al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden harbor inSudan in the early 1990s.[85]
It was alleged that in 1993Osama bin Laden was usingMiddle East basedSunni charities to channel financial support to al-Qaeda operatives overseas. The same documents also report Bin Laden's complaint that the failed assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had compromised the ability of al-Qaeda to exploit charities to support its operatives to the extent it was capable of before 1995.[185]
Qatar financed al-Qaeda's enterprises through al-Qaeda's former affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. The funding was primarily channeled throughkidnapping for ransom.[186] The Consortium Against Terrorist Finance (CATF) reported that the Gulf country has funded al-Nusra since 2013.[186] In 2017,Asharq Al-Awsat estimated that Qatar had disbursed $25million in support of al-Nusra through kidnapping for ransom.[187] In addition, Qatar has launched fundraising campaigns on behalf of al-Nusra. Al-Nusra acknowledged a Qatar-sponsored campaign "as one of the preferred conduits for donations intended for the group".[188][189]
Strategy
This section needs to beupdated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(August 2016)
In the disagreement over whether al-Qaeda's objectives are religious or political, Mark Sedgwick describes al-Qaeda's strategy as political in the immediate term but with ultimate aims that are religious.[190]On March 11, 2005,Al-Quds Al-Arabi published extracts fromSaif al-Adel's document "Al Qaeda's Strategy to the Year 2020".[10][191]Abdel Bari Atwan summarizes this strategy as comprising five stages to rid theUmmah from all forms of oppression:
Provoke the United States and the West into invading a Muslim country by staging a massive attack or string of attacks on US soil that results in massive civilian casualties.
Incite local resistance to occupying forces.
Expand the conflict to neighboring countries and engage the US and its allies in a long war of attrition.
Convert al-Qaeda into an ideology and set of operating principles that can be loosely franchised in other countries without requiring direct command and control, and via these franchises incite attacks against the US and countries allied with the US until they withdraw from the conflict, as happened with the2004 Madrid train bombings, but which did not have the same effect with theJuly 7, 2005 London bombings.
The US economy will finally collapse by 2020, under the strain of multiple engagements in numerous places. This will lead to a collapse in the worldwide economic system, and lead to global political instability. This will lead to a global jihad led by al-Qaeda, and aWahhabiCaliphate will then be installed across the world.
Atwan noted that, while the plan is unrealistic, "it is sobering to consider that this virtually describes thedownfall of the Soviet Union."[10]
According toFouad Hussein, a Jordanian journalist and author who has spent time in prison with Al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda's strategy consists of seven phases and is similar to the plan described in al-Qaeda's Strategy to the year 2020. These phases include:[192]
"The Awakening." This phase was supposed to last from 2001 to 2003. The goal of the phase is to provoke the United States to attack a Muslim country by executing an attack that kills many civilians on US soil.
"Opening Eyes." This phase was supposed to last from 2003 to 2006. The goal of this phase was to recruit young men to the cause and to transform the al-Qaeda group into a movement. Iraq was supposed to become the center of all operations with financial and military support for bases in other states.
"Arising and Standing up", was supposed to last from 2007 to 2010. In this phase, al-Qaeda wanted to execute additional attacks and focus their attention on Syria. Hussein believed other countries in theArabian Peninsula were also in danger.
Al-Qaeda expected a steady growth among their ranks and territories due to the declining power of the regimes in the Arabian Peninsula. The main focus of attack in this phase was supposed to be on oil suppliers andcyberterrorism, targeting the US economy and military infrastructure.
The declaration of an Islamic Caliphate, which was projected between 2013 and 2016. In this phase, al-Qaeda expected the resistance from Israel to be heavily reduced.
The declaration of an "Islamic Army" and a "fight between believers and non-believers", also called "total confrontation".
"Definitive Victory", projected to be completed by 2020.
According to the seven-phase strategy, the war is projected to last less than two years.
According to Charles Lister of theMiddle East Institute and Katherine Zimmerman of theAmerican Enterprise Institute, the new model of al-Qaeda is to "socialize communities" and build a broad territorial base of operations with the support of local communities, also gaining income independent of the funding of sheiks.[193]
Name
The English name of the organization is a simplifiedtransliteration of the Arabic nounal-qāʿidah (القاعدة), which means "the foundation" or "the base". The initialal- is the Arabicdefinite article "the", hence "the base".[194] In Arabic,al-Qaeda has four syllables (/alˈqaː.ʕi.da/). However, since two of the Arabic consonants in the name are notphones found in the English language, the common naturalizedEnglish pronunciations include/ælˈkaɪdə/,/ælˈkeɪdə/ and/ˌælkɑːˈiːdə/. Al-Qaeda's name can also betransliterated asal-Qaida,al-Qa'ida, orel-Qaida.[195]
The doctrinal concept of "al-Qaeda" was first coined by thePalestinianIslamist scholar andJihadist leaderAbdullah Azzam in an April 1988 issue ofAl-Jihad magazine to describe a religiously committed vanguard of Muslims who wage armedJihad globally to liberate oppressedMuslims from foreign invaders, establishsharia (Islamic law) across theIslamic World by overthrowing the rulingsecular governments; and thus restore the past Islamic prowess. This was to be implemented by establishing anIslamic state that would nurture generations of Muslim soldiers that would perpetually attack United States and its allied governments in the Muslim World. Numerous historical models were cited by Azzam as successful examples of his call; starting from theearly Muslim conquests of the 7th century to the recentanti-SovietAfghan Jihad of the 1980s.[196][197][198] According to Azzam's world-view:
It is about time to think about a state that would be a solid base for the distribution of the (Islamic) creed, and a fortress to host the preachers from the hell of theJahiliyyah [the pre-Islamic period].[198]
Bin Laden explained the origin of the term in a videotaped interview withAl Jazeera journalistTayseer Alouni in October 2001:
The name 'al-Qaeda' was established a long time ago by mere chance. The lateAbu Ebeida El-Banashiri established the training camps for ourmujahedeen against Russia's terrorism. We used to call the training camp al-Qaeda. The name stayed.[199]
It has been argued that two documents seized from theSarajevo office of theBenevolence International Foundation prove the name was not simply adopted by themujahideen movement and that a group called al-Qaeda was established in August 1988. Both of these documents contain minutes of meetings held to establish a new military group, and contain the term "al-Qaeda".[200]
Former British Foreign SecretaryRobin Cook wrote that the word al-Qaeda should be translated as "the database", because it originally referred to the computer file of the thousands ofmujahideen militants who were recruited and trained with CIA help to defeat the Russians.[201] In April 2002, the group assumed the nameQa'idat al-Jihad (قاعدة الجهادqāʿidat al-jihād), which means "the base of Jihad". According toDiaa Rashwan, this was "apparently as a result of the merger of the overseas branch of Egypt'sal-Jihad, which was led byAyman al-Zawahiri, with the groups Bin Laden brought under his control after his return to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s."[202]
Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian Islamic scholar and Jihadist theorist who inspired al-Qaeda
Thepan-Islamist militant movement of al-Qaeda developed amid the rise ofIslamic revivalist andJihadist movements after theIranian Revolution (1978–1979) and during theAfghan Jihad (1979–1989). The writings of Egyptian Islamist scholar and revolutionary ideologueSayyid Qutb strongly inspired the founding leaders of al-Qaeda.[203] In the 1950s and 1960s, Qutb preached that because of the lack ofsharia law, theMuslim world was no longerMuslim, and had reverted to the pre-Islamic ignorance known asjahiliyyah. To restoreIslam, Qutb argued that a vanguard of righteousMuslims was needed in order to establish "trueIslamic states", implementsharia, and rid the Muslim world of any non-Muslim influences. In Qutb's view, the enemies of Islam included "world Jewry", which "plottedconspiracies" and opposed Islam.[204] Qutb envisioned this vanguard to march forward to wage armedJihad against tyrannical regimes after purifying from the widerJahili societies and organising themselves under a righteous Islamic leadership; which he viewed as the model of early Muslims in theIslamic State of Medina under the leadership of theIslamic prophet Muhammad. This idea would directly influence many Islamist figures such asAbdullah Azzam andOsama bin Laden; and became the core rationale for the formulation of "al-Qaeda" concept in the near future.[205] Outlining his strategy to topple the existing secular orders, Qutb argued inMilestones:
[It is necessary that] aMuslim community to come into existence which believes that ‘there is no deity except God,’ which commits itself to obey none but God, denying all other authority, and which challenges the legality of any law which is not based on this belief.. . It should come into the battlefield with the determination that its strategy, its social organization, and the relationship between its individuals should be firmer and more powerful than the existingjahili system.[205][206]
Islam is different from any otherreligion; it's a way of life. We [Khalifa and bin Laden] were trying to understand what Islam has to say about how we eat, who we marry, how we talk. We read Sayyid Qutb. He was the one who most affected our generation.[207]
Qutb also influencedAyman al-Zawahiri.[208] Zawahiri's uncle and maternal family patriarch, Mafouz Azzam, was Qutb's student, protégé, personal lawyer, and an executor of his estate. Azzam was one of the last people to see Qutb alive before his execution.[209] Zawahiri paid homage to Qutb in his workKnights under the Prophet's Banner.[210]
Qutb argued that many Muslims were not true Muslims. Some Muslims, Qutb argued, wereapostates. These alleged apostates included leaders of Muslim countries, since they failed to enforcesharia law.[211] He also alleged that theWest approaches the Muslim World with a "crusading spirit"; in spite of the decline of religious values in the 20th century Europe. According to Qutb; the hostile and imperialist attitudes exhibited by Europeans and Americans towards Muslim countries, their support for Zionism, etc. reflected hatred amplified over a millennia of wars such as theCrusades and was born out ofRomanmaterialist andutilitarian outlooks that viewed the world in monetary terms.[212]
Sayyid Ahmed's revival of the ideology of jihad became the prototype for subsequent Islamic militant movements in South and Central Asia and is also the main influence over the jihad network of Al Qaeda and its associated groups in the region.[214][215]
Objectives
The long-term objective of al-Qaeda is to unite the Muslim World under a supra-nationalIslamic state known as theKhilafah (Caliphate), headed by an electedCaliph descended from theAhl al-Bayt (Muhammad's family). The immediate objectives include the expulsion of American troops from the Arabian Peninsula, waging armedJihad to topple US-allied governments in the region, etc.[216][217]
The following are the goals and some of the general policies outlined in al-Qaeda's Founding Charter "Al-Qaeda's Structure and Bylaws" issued in the meetings inPeshawar in 1988:[218][216]
"General Goals
i. To promotejihad awareness in theIslamic world ii. To prepare and equip the cadres for the Islamic world through trainings and by participating in actual combat iii. To support and sponsor thejihad movement as much as possible iv. To coordinate Jihad movements around the world in an effort to create a unified international Jihad movement.
General Policies 1. Complete commitment to the governing rules and controls ofShari‘a in all the beliefs and actions and according to the book [Qur’an] andSunna as well as per the interpretation of the nation'sscholars who serve in this domain 2. Commitment to Jihad as a fight for God's cause and as an agenda of change and to prepare for it and apply it whenever we find it possible... 4. Our position with respect to the tyrants of the world,secular andnational parties and the like is not to associate with them, to discredit them and to be their constant enemy till they believe in God alone. We shall not agree with them on half-solutions and there is no way to negotiate with them or appease them 5. Our relationships with truthful Islamic jihadist movements and groups is to cooperate under the umbrella of faith and belief and we shall always attempt to at uniting and integrating with them... 6. We shall carry a relationship of love and affection with the Islamic movements who are not aligned with Jihad... 7. We shall sustain a relationship of respect and love with active scholars... 9. We shall reject the regional fanatics and will pursue Jihad in an Islamic country as needed and when possible 10. We shall care about the role ofMuslim people in the Jihad and we shall attempt to recruit them... 11. We shall maintain our economic independence and will not rely on others to secure our resources. 12. Secrecy is the main ingredient of our work except for what the need deems necessary to reveal
13. Our policy with theAfghani Jihad is support, advise and coordination with the Islamic Establishments in Jihad arenas in a manner that conforms with our policies"
— Al-Qa`ida's Structure and Bylaws, p.2,[218][216]
Al-Qaeda aims to establish anIslamic state in theArab World, modelled after theRashidun Caliphate, by initiating a global Jihad against the "International Jewish-Crusader Alliance" led by the United States, which it sees as the "external enemy" and against the secular governments inMuslim countries, that are described as "the apostate domestic enemy".[219] Once foreign influences and the secular ruling authorities are removed fromMuslim countries throughJihad; al-Qaeda supports elections to choose the rulers of its proposedIslamic states. This is to be done through representatives of leadership councils (Shura) that would ensure the implementation ofShari'a (Islamic law). However, it opposes elections that institute parliaments which empower Muslim and non-Muslim legislators to collaborate in making laws of their own choosing.[219] In the second edition of his bookKnights Under the Banner of the Prophet,Ayman Al Zawahiri writes:
We demand... the government of the rightly guiding caliphate, which is established on the basis of the sovereignty ofsharia and not on the whims of the majority. Itsummah chooses its rulers....If they deviate, theummah brings them to account and removes them. Theummah participates in producing that government's decisions and determining its direction. ... [The caliphal state] commands the right and forbids the wrong and engages injihad to liberate Muslim lands and to free all humanity from all oppression and ignorance.[219]
Grievances
A recurring theme in al-Qaeda's ideology is the perpetual grievance over the violent subjugation of Islamic dissidents by the authoritarian,secularist regimes allied to the West. Al-Qaeda denounces thesepost-colonial governments as a system led byWesternised elites designed to advanceneo-colonialism and maintainWestern hegemony over the Muslim World. The most prominent topic of grievance is over theAmerican foreign policy in the Arab World; especially over its strong economic and military support toIsrael. Other concerns of resentment include presence ofNATO troops to support allied regimes; injustices committed against Muslims inKashmir,Chechnya,Xinjiang,Syria,Afghanistan,Iraq etc.[220]
While the leadership's own theological platform is essentially Salafi, the organization's umbrella is sufficiently wide to encompass various schools of thought and political leanings. Al-Qaeda counts among its members and supporters people associated withWahhabism,Shafi'ism,Malikism, andHanafism. There are even some Al-Qaeda members whose beliefs and practices are directly at odds with Salafism, such asYunis Khalis, one of the leaders of the Afghan mujahedin. He was a mystic who visited the tombs of saints and sought their blessings – practices inimical to bin Laden's Wahhabi-Salafi school of thought. The only exception to this pan-Islamic policy isShi'ism. Al-Qaeda seems implacably opposed to it, as it holds Shi'ism to be heresy. In Iraq it has openly declared war on the Badr Brigades, who have fully cooperated with the US, and now considers even Shi'i civilians to be legitimate targets for acts of violence.[221]
On the other hand, ProfessorPeter Mandaville states that Al-Qaeda follows a pragmatic policy in forming its local affiliates, with various cells being sub-contracted toShia Muslim and non-Muslim members. The top-down chain of command means that each unit is answerable directly to central leadership, while they remain ignorant of their counterparts' presence or activities. These transnational networks of autonomous supply chains, financiers, underground militias and political supporters were set up during the 1990s, when Bin Laden's immediate aim was the expulsion of American troops from theArabian Peninsula.[222]
Attacks on civilians
Under the leadership ofOsama bin Laden andAyman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda organization adopted the strategy of targetingnon-combatant civilians of enemy states that indiscriminately attacked Muslims. Following theSeptember 11 attacks, al-Qaeda provided a justification for the killing of non-combatants/civilians, entitled, "A Statement from Qaidat al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington". According to a couple of critics, Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, it provides "ample theological justification for killing civilians in almost any imaginable situation."[223]
Among these justifications are that America is leading the west in waging aWar on Islam so that attacks on America are a defense of Islam and any treaties and agreements between Muslim majority states and Western countries that would be violated by attacks are null and void. According to the tract, several conditions allow for the killing of civilians including:
retaliation for the American war on Islam which al-Qaeda alleges has targeted "Muslim women, children and elderly";
when it is too difficult to distinguish between non-combatants and combatants when attacking an enemy "stronghold" (hist) or non-combatants remain in enemy territory, killing them is allowed;
those who assist the enemy "in deed, word, mind" are eligible for killing, and this includes the general population in democratic countries because civilians can vote in elections that bring enemies of Islam to power;
the necessity of killing in the war to protect Islam and Muslims;
Muhammad, when asked whether the Muslim fighters could use the catapult against the village ofTaif, replied affirmatively, even though the enemy fighters were mixed with a civilian population;
if the women, children and other protected groups serve as human shields for the enemy;
if the enemy has broken a treaty, killing of civilians is permitted.[223]
Under the leadership ofSayf al-Adel, al-Qaeda's strategy has undergone transformation and the organization has officially renounced the tactic of attacking civilian targets of enemies. In his bookFree Reading of 33 Strategies of War published in 2023, Sayf al-Adel counselledIslamist fighters to prioritize attacking the police forces, military soldiers, state assets of enemy governments, etc. which he described as acceptable targets in military operations. Asserting that attacking women and children of enemies are contrary to Islamic values, Sayf al-Adel asked: "If we target the general public, how can we expect their people to accept our call toIslam?"[224]
Al-Qaeda has carried out a total of six major attacks, four of them in its jihad against America. In each case the leadership planned the attack years in advance, arranging for the shipment of weapons and explosives and using its businesses to provide operatives with safehouses and false identities.[225]
1991
To prevent the former Afghan kingMohammed Zahir Shah from coming back from exile and possibly becoming head of a new government, bin Laden instructed a Portuguese convert toIslam, Paulo Jose de Almeida Santos, to assassinate Zahir Shah. On November 4, 1991, Santos entered the king's villa inRome posing as a journalist and tried to stab him with a dagger. A tin ofcigarillos in the king's breast pocket deflected the blade and saved Zahir Shah's life, although the king was also stabbed several times in the neck and was taken to hospital, later recovering from the attack. Santos was apprehended by General Abdul Wali, a former commander of theRoyal Afghan Army, and jailed for 10 years in Italy.[226][227]
1992
On December 29, 1992, al-Qaeda launched the1992 Yemen hotel bombings. Two bombs were detonated inAden, Yemen. The first target was the Movenpick Hotel and the second was the parking lot of the Goldmohur Hotel.[228]
The bombings were an attempt to eliminate American soldiers on their way to Somalia to take part in the international famine relief effort,Operation Restore Hope. Internally, al-Qaeda considered the bombing a victory that frightened the Americans away, but in the US, the attack was barely noticed. No American soldiers were killed because no soldiers were staying in the hotel at the time it was bombed, however, an Australian tourist and a Yemeni hotel worker were killed in the bombing. Seven others, who were mostly Yemeni, were severely injured.[228] Two fatwas are said to have been appointed by al-Qaeda's members,Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, to justify the killings according to Islamic law. Salim referred to a famous fatwa appointed byIbn Taymiyyah, a 13th-century scholar admired by Wahhabis, which sanctioned resistance by any means during the Mongol invasions.[229][unreliable source?]
In 1996, bin Laden personally engineered a plot to assassinate United States PresidentBill Clinton while the president was inManila for theAsia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. However, intelligence agents intercepted a message before the motorcade was to leave, and alerted theUS Secret Service. Agents later discovered a bomb planted under a bridge.[230]
On October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda militants in Yemenbombed themissile destroyerUSS Cole in a suicide attack, killing 17 US servicemen and damaging the vessel while it lay offshore. Inspired by the success of such a brazen attack, al-Qaeda's command core began to prepare for an attack on the US itself.
Aftermath of the September 11 attacksMohamed Atta, the pilot hijacker of American Airlines Flight 11 and leader of the September 11 attacks
The September 11 attacks on America by al-Qaeda killed 2,996 people – 2,507 civilians, 343 firefighters, 72 law enforcement officers, 55 military personnel as well as 19 hijackers who committed murder-suicide. Two commercial airliners were deliberately flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, a third into the Pentagon, and a fourth, originally intended to target either theUnited States Capitol or theWhite House, crashed in a field in Stonycreek Township nearShanksville, Pennsylvania after passengers revolted. It was the deadliest foreign attack on American soil since theJapanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and to this day remains the deadliest terrorist attack in human history.
The attacks were conducted by al-Qaeda, acting in accord with the1998fatwa issued against the US and its allies by persons under the command of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and others.[29] Evidence points to suicide squads led by al-Qaeda military commanderMohamed Atta as the culprits of the attacks, with bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri,Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, andHambali as the key planners and part of the political and military command.
Messages issued by bin Laden after September 11, 2001, praised the attacks, and explained their motivation while denying any involvement.[231] Bin Laden strongly supported the attacks by identifying numerous grievances of Muslims, such as the general perception that the US was actively oppressing Muslims.[232] In his "Letter to the American people" published in 2002, Osama Bin Laden stated:
Why are we fighting and opposing you? The answer is very simple:
(1) Because you attacked us and continue to attack us. ....
The American government and press still refuses to answer the question:Why did they attack us in New York and Washington?
IfSharon is a man of peace in the eyes ofBush, then we are also men of peace!!! America does not understand the language of manners and principles, so we are addressing it using the language it understands.[31][233]
Bin Laden asserted that America was massacring Muslims in "Palestine,Chechnya,Kashmir andIraq" and Muslims should retain the "right to attack in reprisal". He also claimed the 9/11 attacks were not targeted at people, but "America's icons of military and economic power", despite the fact he planned to attack in the morning when most of the people in the intended targets were present and thus generating the maximum number of human casualties.[234]
Evidence later came to light that the original targets for the attack may have been nuclear power stations on the US East Coast. The targets were later altered by al-Qaeda, as it was feared that such an attack "might get out of hand".[235][236]
Designation as a terrorist group
Al-Qaeda is deemed adesignated terrorist group by the following countries and international organizations:
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US governmentresponded, and began to prepare itsarmed forces to overthrow the Taliban, which it believed was harboring al-Qaeda. The US offered Taliban leaderMullah Omar a chance to surrender bin Laden and his top associates. The first forces to be inserted into Afghanistan were paramilitary officers from the CIA's eliteSpecial Activities Division (SAD).
TheTaliban offered to turn over bin Laden to aneutral country for trial if the US would provide evidence of bin Laden's complicity in the attacks. US PresidentGeorge W. Bush responded by saying: "We know he's guilty. Turn him over",[276] and British Prime MinisterTony Blair warned the Taliban regime: "Surrender bin Laden, or surrender power."[277]
Soon thereafter the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan, and together with theAfghan Northern Alliance removed the Taliban government as part of thewar in Afghanistan. As a result of the USspecial forces andair support for the Northern Alliance ground forces, a number of Taliban andal-Qaeda training camps were destroyed, and much of the operating structure of al-Qaeda is believed to have been disrupted. After being driven from their key positions in theTora Bora area of Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda fighters tried to regroup in the ruggedGardez region of the nation.
By early 2002, al-Qaeda had been dealt a serious blow to its operational capacity, and the Afghan invasion appeared to be a success. Nevertheless, a significantTaliban insurgency remained in Afghanistan.
Debate continued regarding the nature of al-Qaeda's role in the 9/11 attacks. TheUS State Department released avideotape showing bin Laden speaking with a small group of associates somewhere in Afghanistan shortly before the Taliban was removed from power.[278] Although its authenticity has been questioned by a couple of people,[279] the tape definitively implicates bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the September 11 attacks. The tape was aired on manytelevision channels, with an accompanying English translation provided by theUS Defense Department.[280]
In September 2004, the9/11 Commission officially concluded that the attacks were conceived and implemented by al-Qaeda operatives.[281] In October 2004, bin Laden appeared to claim responsibility for the attacks in avideotape released through Al Jazeera, saying he was inspired by Israeli attacks on high-rises in the 1982invasion of Lebanon: "As I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind and that we should destroy towers in America in order that they taste some of what we tasted and so that they be deterred from killing our women and children."[282]
Al-Qaeda involvement in Africa has included a number of bombing attacks in North Africa, while supporting parties in civil wars in Eritrea and Somalia. From 1991 to 1996, bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders were based in Sudan.
Islamist rebels in theSahara calling themselvesal-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have stepped up their violence in recent years.[287] French officials say the rebels have no real links to the al-Qaeda leadership, but this has been disputed. It seems likely that bin Laden approved the group's name in late 2006, and the rebels "took on the al Qaeda franchise label", almost a year before the violence began to escalate.[288]
In Mali, theAnsar Dine faction was also reported as an ally of al-Qaeda in 2013.[289] The Ansar al Dine faction aligned themselves with theAQIM.[290]
Before the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, westerners who had been recruits at al-Qaeda training camps were sought after by al-Qaeda's military wing. Language skills and knowledge of Western culture were generally found among recruits from Europe, such was the case withMohamed Atta, an Egyptian national studying in Germany at the time of his training, and other members of theHamburg Cell.Osama bin Laden andMohammed Atef would later designate Atta as the ringleader of the9/11 hijackers. Following the attacks, Western intelligence agencies determined that al-Qaeda cells operating in Europe had aided the hijackers with financing and communications with the central leadership based in Afghanistan.[184][297]
In 2003, Islamists carried out a series of bombings inIstanbul killing fifty-seven people and injuring seven hundred. Seventy-four people were charged by the Turkish authorities. Some had previously met bin Laden, and though they specifically declined to pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda they asked for its blessing and help.[298][299]
In 2009, three Londoners, Tanvir Hussain, Assad Sarwar and Ahmed Abdullah Ali, were convicted ofconspiring to detonate bombs disguised as soft drinks on seven airplanes bound for Canada and the US. TheMI5 investigation regarding the plot involved more than a year of surveillance work conducted by over two hundred officers.[300][301][302] British and US officials said the plot – unlike many similar homegrown European Islamic militant plots – was directly linked to al-Qaeda and guided by senior al-Qaeda members in Pakistan.[303][304]
In 2012, Russian Intelligence indicated that al-Qaeda had given a call for "forest jihad" and has been starting massive forest fires as part of a strategy of "thousand cuts".[305]
FollowingYemeni unification in 1990, Wahhabi networks began moving missionaries into the country. Although it is unlikely bin Laden or Saudi al-Qaeda were directly involved, the personal connections they made would be established over the next decade and used in theUSSCole bombing.[306] Concerns grew over al-Qaeda's group inYemen.[307]
In Iraq, al-Qaeda forces loosely associated with the leadership were embedded in theJama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group commanded byAbu Musab al-Zarqawi. Specializing in suicide operations, they have been a "key driver" of theSunni insurgency.[308] Although they played a small part in the overall insurgency, between 30% and 42% of all suicide bombings which took place in the early years were claimed by Zarqawi's group.[309][310] Reports have indicated that oversights such as the failure to control access to the Qa'qaa munitions factory inYusufiyah have allowed large quantities of munitions to fall into the hands of al-Qaida.[311] In November 2010, the militant groupIslamic State of Iraq, which is linked to al-Qaeda in Iraq, threatened to "exterminate allIraqi Christians".[312][313]
Al-Qaeda did not begin trainingPalestinians until the late 1990s.[314] Large groups such asHamas andPalestinian Islamic Jihad have rejected an alliance with al-Qaeda, fearing that al-Qaeda will co-opt their cells. This may have changed recently. The Israeli security and intelligence services believe al-Qaeda has managed to infiltrate operatives from the Occupied Territories into Israel, and is waiting for an opportunity to attack.[314]
Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri consider India to be a part of an alleged Crusader-Zionist-Hindu conspiracy against the Islamic world.[318] According to a 2005 report by theCongressional Research Service, bin Laden was involved in training militants for Jihad in Kashmir while living in Sudan in the early 1990s. By 2001, Kashmiri militant groupHarkat-ul-Mujahideen had become a part of the al-Qaeda coalition.[319] According to theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), al-Qaeda was thought to have established bases inPakistan administered Kashmir (inAzad Kashmir, and to some extent inGilgit–Baltistan) during the 1999Kargil War and continued to operate there with tacit approval of Pakistan's Intelligence services.[320]
Many of the militants active in Kashmir were trained in the samemadrasahs asTaliban and al-Qaeda.Fazlur Rehman Khalil of Kashmiri militant groupHarkat-ul-Mujahideen was a signatory of al-Qaeda's 1998 declaration ofJihad against America and its allies.[321] In a 'Letter to American People' (2002), bin Laden wrote that one of the reasons he was fighting America was because of its support to India on the Kashmir issue.[31] In November 2001,Kathmandu airport went on high alert after threats that bin Laden planned to hijack a plane and crash it into a target in New Delhi.[322] In 2002, US Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld, on a trip to Delhi, suggested that al-Qaeda was active in Kashmir though he did not have any evidence.[323][324] Rumsfeld proposed hi-tech ground sensors along theLine of Control to prevent militants from infiltrating into Indian-administered Kashmir.[324]An investigation in 2002 found evidence that al-Qaeda and its affiliates were prospering in Pakistan-administered Kashmir with tacit approval of Pakistan'sInter-Services Intelligence.[325] In 2002, a special team ofSpecial Air Service andDelta Force was sent intoIndian-administered Kashmir to hunt for bin Laden after receiving reports that he was being sheltered by Kashmiri militant groupHarkat-ul-Mujahideen, which had been responsible forkidnapping western tourists in Kashmir in 1995.[326] Britain's highest-ranking al-Qaeda operativeRangzieb Ahmed had previously fought in Kashmir with the groupHarkat-ul-Mujahideen and spent time in Indian prison after being captured in Kashmir.[327]
US officials believe al-Qaeda was helping organize attacks in Kashmir in order to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan.[328] Their strategy was to force Pakistan to move its troops to the border with India, thereby relieving pressure on al-Qaeda elements hiding in northwestern Pakistan.[329] In 2006 al-Qaeda claimed they had established a wing in Kashmir.[321][330] However Indian Army GeneralH. S. Panag argued that the army had ruled out the presence of al-Qaeda in Indian-administeredJammu and Kashmir. Panag also said al-Qaeda had strong ties with Kashmiri militant groupsLashkar-e-Taiba andJaish-e-Mohammed based in Pakistan.[331] It has been noted thatWaziristan has become a battlefield for Kashmiri militants fightingNATO in support of al-Qaeda and Taliban.[332][333][334]Dhiren Barot, who wrote theArmy of Madinah in Kashmir[335] and was an al-Qaeda operative convicted for involvement in the2004 financial buildings plot, had received training in weapons and explosives at a militant training camp in Kashmir.[336]
Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Kashmiri militant group which is thought to be behind2008 Mumbai attacks, is also known to have strong ties to senior al-Qaeda leaders living in Pakistan.[342] In late 2002, top al-Qaeda operativeAbu Zubaydah was arrested while being sheltered byLashkar-e-Taiba in a safe house inFaisalabad.[343] The FBI believes al-Qaeda and Lashkar have been 'intertwined' for a long time while the CIA has said that al-Qaeda funds Lashkar-e-Taiba.[343]Jean-Louis Bruguière told Reuters in 2009 that "Lashkar-e-Taiba is no longer a Pakistani movement with only a Kashmir political or military agenda. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a member of al-Qaeda."[344][345]
In a video released in 2008, American-born senior al-Qaeda operativeAdam Yahiye Gadahn said that "victory in Kashmir has been delayed for years; it is the liberation of the jihad there from this interference which, Allah willing, will be the first step towards victory over the Hindu occupiers of that Islam land."[346]
In September 2009, a USdrone strike reportedly killedIlyas Kashmiri who was the chief ofHarkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, a Kashmiri militant group associated with al-Qaeda.[347] Kashmiri was described byBruce Riedel as a 'prominent' al-Qaeda member[348] while others have described him as head of military operations for al-Qaeda.[349][350] Kashmiri was also charged by the US in a plot againstJyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper which was at the center ofJyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy.[351] US officials also believe that Kashmiri was involved in theCamp Chapman attack against the CIA.[352] In January 2010, Indian authorities notified Britain of an al-Qaeda plot to hijack an Indian airlines or Air India plane and crash it into a British city. This information was uncovered from interrogation of Amjad Khwaja, an operative ofHarkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, who had been arrested in India.[353]
In January 2010, US Defense secretaryRobert Gates, while on a visit to Pakistan, said that al-Qaeda was seeking to destabilize the region and planning to provoke a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.[354]
Internet
Al-Qaeda and its successors have migrated online to escape detection in an atmosphere of increased international vigilance. The group's use of the Internet has grown more sophisticated, with online activities that include financing, recruitment, networking, mobilization, publicity, and information dissemination, gathering and sharing.[355]
The range of multimedia content includes guerrilla training clips, stills of victims about to be murdered, testimonials of suicide bombers, and videos that show participation in jihad through stylized portraits of mosques and musical scores. A website associated with al-Qaeda posted a video of captured American entrepreneurNick Berg being decapitated in Iraq. Other decapitation videos and pictures, including those ofPaul Johnson,Kim Sun-il (posted on websites),[356] andDaniel Pearl obtained by investigators, have taken place.[357]
In December 2004 an audio message claiming to be from bin Laden was posted directly to a website, rather than sending a copy toal Jazeera as he had done in the past. Al-Qaeda turned to the Internet for release of its videos in order to be certain they would be available unedited, rather than risk the possibility of al Jazeera editing out anything critical of theSaudi royal family.[358]
The US government charged a British information technology specialist,Babar Ahmad, with terrorist offences related to his operating a network of English-language al-Qaeda websites, such as Azzam.com. He was convicted and sentenced to12+1⁄2 years in prison.[359][360][361]
Online communications
In 2007, al-Qaeda releasedMujahedeen Secrets, encryption software used for online and cellular communications. A later version,Mujahideen Secrets 2, was released in 2008.[362]
Aviation network
Al-Qaeda is believed to be operating a clandestine aviation network including "severalBoeing 727 aircraft",turboprops andexecutive jets, according to a 2010Reuters story. Based on a USDepartment of Homeland Security report, the story said al-Qaeda is possibly using aircraft to transport drugs and weapons from South America to various unstable countries in West Africa. A Boeing 727 can carry up to ten tons of cargo. The drugs eventually are smuggled to Europe for distribution and sale, and the weapons are used in conflicts in Africa and possibly elsewhere. Gunmen with links to al-Qaeda have been increasinglykidnapping Europeans for ransom. The profits from the drug and weapon sales, and kidnappings can, in turn, fund more militant activities.[363]
Anders Behring Breivik, the perpetrator of the2011 Norway attacks, was inspired by al-Qaeda, calling it "the most successful revolutionary movement in the world." While admitting different aims, he sought to "create a European version of Al-Qaida."[367][368]
The appropriate response to offshoots is a subject of debate. A journalist reported in 2012 that a senior US military planner had asked: "Should we resort to drones and Special Operations raids every time some group raises the black banner of al Qaeda? How long can we continue to chase offshoots of offshoots around the world?"[369]
Criticism
According toCNN journalistsPeter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, a number of "religious scholars, former fighters and militants" who previously supportedIslamic State of Iraq (ISI) had turned against the al-Qaeda-supportedIraqi insurgency in 2008; due to ISI's indiscriminate attacks against civilians while targetingUS-led coalition forces. American military analystBruce Riedel wrote in 2008 that "a wave of revulsion" arose against ISI, which enabled US-alliedSons of Iraq faction to turn various tribal leaders in theAnbar region against the Iraqi insurgency. In response, Bin Laden and Zawahiri issued public statements urging Muslims to rally behind ISI leadership and support the armed struggle against American forces.[370]
In November 2007, formerLibyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) memberNoman Benotman responded with a public, open letter of criticism to Ayman al-Zawahiri, after persuading the imprisoned senior leaders of his former group to enter into peace negotiations with the Libyan regime. While Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the affiliation of the group with al-Qaeda in November 2007, the Libyan government released 90 members of the group from prison several months after "they were said to have renounced violence."[371]
In 2007, on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks,[372] the Saudi sheikhSalman al-Ouda delivered a personal rebuke to bin Laden. Al-Ouda addressed al-Qaeda's leader on television asking him:
My brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed... in the name of al-Qaeda? Will you be happy to meet God Almighty carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands or millions [of victims] on your back?[373]
According to Pew polls, support for al-Qaeda had dropped in the Muslim world in the years before 2008.[374] In Saudi Arabia, only ten percent had a favorable view of al-Qaeda, according to a December 2007 poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington-basedthink tank.[375]
In 2007, the imprisonedDr. Fadl, who was an influentialAfghan Arab and former associate ofAyman al-Zawahiri, withdrew his support from al-Qaeda and criticized the organization in his bookWathiqat Tarshid Al-'Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w'Al-'Alam (English:Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World). In response, Al-Zawahiri accused Dr. Fadl of promoting "an Islam without jihad" that aligns with Western interests and wrote a nearly two hundred pages long treatise, titled "The Exoneration" which appeared on the Internet in March 2008. In his treatise, Zawahiri justified military strikes against US targets as retaliatory attacks to defendMuslim community against American aggression.[372]
In an online town hall forum conducted in December 2007, Zawahiri denied that al-Qaeda deliberately targeted innocents and accused the American coalition of killing innocent people.[376] Although once associated with al-Qaeda, in September 2009LIFG completed a new "code" for jihad, a 417-page religious document entitled "Corrective Studies". Given its credibility and the fact that several other prominent Jihadists in the Middle East have turned against al-Qaeda, the LIFG's reversal may be an important step toward staunching al-Qaeda's recruitment.[377]
Other criticisms
Bilal Abdul Kareem, an American journalist based in Syria created a documentary aboutal-Shabab, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia. The documentary included interviews with former members of the group who stated their reasons for leaving al-Shabab. The members made accusations of segregation, lack of religious awareness and internal corruption and favoritism. In response to Kareem, theGlobal Islamic Media Front condemned Kareem, called him a liar, and denied the accusations from the former fighters.[378]
In mid-2014 after theIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant declared that they had restored theCaliphate, an audio statement was released by the then-spokesman of the groupAbu Muhammad al-Adnani claiming that "the legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the Caliphate's authority." The speech included a religious refutation of al-Qaeda for being too lenient regardingShiites and their refusal to recognize the authorityAbu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Adnani specifically noting: "It is not suitable for a state to give allegiance to an organization." He also recalled a past instance in whichOsama bin Laden called on al-Qaeda members and supporters to give allegiance toAbu Omar al-Baghdadi when the group was still solely operating in Iraq, as theIslamic State of Iraq, and condemnedAyman al-Zawahiri for not making this same claim for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Zawahiri was encouraging factionalism and division between former allies of ISIL such as theal-Nusra Front.[379][380]
^A. Geltzer, Joshua (2010). "4: The al-Qaeda world-view".US Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Al-Qaeda. New York: Routledge. pp. 83, 84.ISBN978-0-203-87023-5.
^Giustozzi, Antonio (2023). "2: The strategies of global jihadists in Pakistan after 2001".Jihadism in Pakistan. New York: I.B. Tauris. pp. 27–52.ISBN978-0-7556-4735-4.
^Celso, Anthony (2014). "1: Al-Qaeda's Jihadist Worldview".Al-Qaeda's Post-9/11 Devolution. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 15–29.ISBN978-1-4411-5589-4.
^Holbrook, Donald (2017).Al-Qaeda 2.0. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. viii, 2, 3.ISBN9780190856441.
^A. Geltzer, Joshua (2010). "4: The al-Qaeda world view".US Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Al-Qaeda. New York: Routledge. pp. 83, 84.ISBN978-0-203-87023-5.Al-Qaeda's 'pan-Islamic ideology' seeks to unify the umma not only by emphasising Islam over nationalism but also by specifically calling for unity among all Muslims, including the often hostile Sunnis and Shiites... 'For an organization led by a Sunni fundamentalist' to 'make common cause with Shiite terrorists', and then with potential Shiite supporters more broadly, was considered 'extraordinary'—yet doing so was central to al-Qaeda's vision of Islamic unity against America.
^Byman, Daniel (2015). "3: Strategy and Tactics".Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 53.ISBN978-0-19-021725-9.
Aly Sergie, Mohammed (April 27, 2023)."The Sunni-Shia Divide".Council on Foreign Relations. Archived fromthe original on June 10, 2023.Sunni al-Qaeda and Shia Hezbollah, have not defined their movements in sectarian terms, and have favored using anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and anti-American frameworks to define their jihad, or struggle.
Lupsha, Jonny (December 8, 2022)."What Is the Islamic State?".Wondrium Daily. Archived fromthe original on February 6, 2023.Bin Laden, a Sunni Muslim, saw cooperation between Islam's two sects—Sunni and Shia—as essential to Al-Qaeda's success.
^abDevji, Faisal (2005).Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst & Co. p. 53.ISBN1-85065-775-0.Al-Qaeda leaders like Osama Bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri have never been known either to preach or practice anti-Shia politics, indeed the opposite, with Bin Laden repeatedly urging Muslims to ignore internal differences and even appearing to uphold the religious credentials of Shiite Iran by comparing the longed-for-ouster of the Saudi monarch to the expulsion of the Shah
"The spider in the web".The Economist. September 20, 2001. Archived fromthe original on June 6, 2023.[Bin Laden] has insisted that differences within the Islamic world should be set aside for the sake of the broader struggle against western and Jewish interests. American officials say there is clear evidence of tactical co-operation between his organisation, al-Qaeda, the government of Iran, and Iran's proxies in Lebanon, the Hizbullah group. From the early 1990s, members of his group and its Egyptian allies were being sent to Lebanon to receive training from Hizbullah: an unusual example of Sunni-Shia co-operation in the broader anti-western struggle.
al-Aloosy, Massaab (2020).The changing ideology of Hezbollah. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 79.ISBN978-3-030-34846-5.according to the 9/11 Commission Report, Hezbollah allowed Al-Qaeda activists to train in their camps involved in terrorist attacks against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in September 1998... Osama Bin Laden mentioned Hezbollah in a 2003 speech—or as he called them the resistance—in a positive light as the group that compelled the US marines to withdraw from Lebanon
^United States v. Usama bin Laden et al., S (7) 98 Cr. 1023, Testimony of Jamal Ahmed Mohamed al-Fadl (SDNY February 6, 2001), archived from the original.
^"Al-Qaeda's Urges Muslims to Shun World Cup, Stops Short of Threats". Voice of America. November 19, 2022.Archived from the original on November 20, 2022. RetrievedNovember 20, 2022.Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the militant group's Yemen-based branch, criticized Qatar for 'bringing immoral people, homosexuals, sowers of corruption and atheism into the Arabian Peninsula' and said the event served to divert attention from the 'occupation of Muslim countries and their oppression.'
^Kiyici, Hakan (2024).Al-Qaedaism in the Context of Civil War. London: Lexington Books. p. 147.ISBN978-1-66692-402-2.
^Abou Zahab, Mariam (2020). "6: Salafism in Pakistan: The Ahl-e Hadith Movement".Pakistan. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 113.ISBN9780197534595.
^Bennett, Clinton (2005).Muslims and Modernity. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 181, 182.ISBN0-8264-5482-8.
^Kiyici, Hakan (2024).Al-Qaedaism in the Context of Civil War. London: Lexington Books. pp. 146, 147.ISBN978-1-66692-402-2.The idea of Deobandism is the third doctrinal school for al-Qaedaism. It became popular within northern India in response to reactions against British colonial and imperial power in the nineteenth century.
^Shahzad, Syed Saleem (2011). "8: The Theater of War".Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 202–205.
^Columbus, Frank; Leather, Kaia (2004). "9: Kashmiri Seperatists".Asian Economic and Political Issues Volume 10. Nova Science Publishers. pp. 159, 160.ISBN1-59454-089-6.
^Fischer, Michael M. J. (2003).Iran. London: University of Wisconsin Press. p. xxii.ISBN0-299-18474-9.
Fair, C. Christine (2014).Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 249, 250.ISBN978-0-19-989270-9.
Al Qurtuby, Sumanto (2022).Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 217, 218.ISBN978-981-19-1336-5.
^Fair, J. Watson, C. Christine, Sarah, ed. (2015).Pakistan's Enduring Challenges. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 4, 30, 33.ISBN978-0-8122-4690-2.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
Brown, Rassler, Vahid, Don (2013). "2: Birth of the Nexus: The Haqqani network, foreign Fighters and the origins of al-Qa'ida".Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 3–14, 30,37–39,59–82.ISBN978-0-199-32798-0.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
Moj, Muhammad (2015).The Deoband Madrassah Movement. New York: Anthem Press. pp. 198, 199.ISBN978-1-78308-388-6.
Jamal, Arif (January 14, 2010)."The Growth of the Deobandi Jihad in Afghanistan".The Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on April 25, 2024. RetrievedSeptember 6, 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
^Moghadam, Assaf (2008).The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks. Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 48.ISBN978-0-8018-9055-0.
^ab"Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team"(PDF).UN Security Council. June 1, 2023. pp. 3–22. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on July 12, 2023 – via ecoi.net.The link between the Taliban and both Al-Qaida and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains strong and symbiotic..The relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaida remained close and symbiotic, with Al-Qaida viewing Taliban-administered Afghanistan a safe haven. Al-Qaida still aims to strengthen its position in Afghanistan and has been interacting with the Taliban, supporting the regime and protecting senior Taliban figures. Al-Qaida maintains a low profile, focusing on using the country as an ideological and logistical hub to mobilize and recruit new fighters while covertly rebuilding its external operations capability
^Gunaratna 2002, pp. 12, 86: "By forging a tactical relationship with Hezbollah, Al Qaeda mastered the art of bombing buildings."
^ab"Jaish-e-Mohammed". Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University. July 2018. Archived fromthe original on July 17, 2019. RetrievedAugust 11, 2019.
^Klausen, Jytte (2021)."2: The Founder".Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, ox2 6dp, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 53–54.ISBN978-0-19-887079-1.Archived from the original on April 4, 2023. RetrievedMarch 18, 2023.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
^J. Tompkins, Crossett, Paul, Chuck; Spitaletta, Marshal, Jason, Shana (2012)."19 – Al-Qaeda: 1988-2001".Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009. Fort Bragg, North Carolina: United States Army Special Operations Command. pp. 533, 544.Archived from the original on April 4, 2023. RetrievedMarch 18, 2023.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^abKlausen, Jytte (2021)."2: The Founder".Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 47–51.ISBN978-0-19-887079-1.Archived from the original on April 4, 2023. RetrievedMarch 18, 2023.
^Steinberg, Guido (2013). "Unlikely Internationalists: Putting German Jihadism into Perspective".German Jihad: On the Internationalization of Islamist Terrorism. Columbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 15, 17.ISBN978-0-231-50053-1.
^Gordon, David (2011)."Jemaah Islamiyah"(PDF).Homeland Security & Counterterrorism Program Transnational Threats Project.Archived(PDF) from the original on October 9, 2022 – via Center for Strategic & International Studies.
^Banlaoi, Rommel C. (April 1, 2009). "Media and Terrorism in the Philippines: The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement".Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism.4 (1):64–75.doi:10.1080/18335300.2009.9686924.S2CID144035702.
^McCloud, Kimberly; Osborne, Matthew (March 7, 2001)."WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden".CNS Reports. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.Archived from the original on May 6, 2011. RetrievedMay 4, 2011.
^Klausen, Jytte (2021). "1: Introduction".Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 1.ISBN978-0-19-887079-1.
^Sedgwick, Mark (August 10, 2010). "Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism".Terrorism and Political Violence.16 (4):795–814.doi:10.1080/09546550590906098.S2CID143323639.
^Haniff Hassan, Muhammad (2014).The Father of Jihad: 'Abd Allah 'Azzam's Jihad Ideas and Implications to National Security. London: Imperial College Press. pp. 133–134.ISBN978-1-78326-287-8.
^abPaz, Reuven (2001)."The Brotherhood of Global Jihad".SATP. Archived from the original on August 4, 2022. RetrievedAugust 4, 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
^abR. Halverson , Goodall, Jr., R. Corman, Jeffry, H. L., and Steven (2011). "3:The Jahiliyya".Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 45–46.ISBN978-0-230-10896-7.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Qutb, Sayyid; Al-Mehri, A.B (2006).Milestones (Ma'alim fi'l-tareeq). England: Maktabah Book Sellers and Publishers. pp. 46, 57.ISBN0-9548665-1-7.
^R. Halverson , Goodall, Jr., R. Corman, Jeffry, H. L., and Steven (2011). "9: The Infidel Invaders".Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 114–122.ISBN978-0-230-10896-7.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^abMarquardt, Heffelfinger, Erich, Christopher (2008).Terrorism & Political Islam: Origins, Ideologies, and Methods; a Counter Terrorism Textbook; 2nd Edition. Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences. pp. 37–38, 42,150–151, 153.ASINB004LJQ8O8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^abcKlausen, Jytte (2021). "2: The Founder".Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 53–54.ISBN978-0-19-887079-1.
^abcMcCants, William (September 2011)."Al Qaeda's Challenge: The Jihadists' War With Islamist Democrats".Foreign Affairs.90 (5):20–32.JSTOR23041773.Archived from the original on November 13, 2021. RetrievedNovember 13, 2021.Two months before 9/11, Zawahiri, who had become al Qaeda's second-in-command, published Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, which offers insight into why al Qacda decided to attack the United States within its borders. In it, he stated that al Qaeda aimed to establish an Islamic state in the Arab world: Just as victory is not achieved for an army unless its foot soldiers occupy land, the mujahid Islamic movement will not achieve victory against the global infdel alliance unless it possesses a base in the heart of the Islamic world. Every plan and method we consider to rally and mobilize the ummab will be hanging in the air with no concrete result or tangible return unless it leads to the establishment of the caliphal state in the heart of the Islamic world. Achieving this goal, Zawahiri explained elsewhere in the book, would require a global jihad: It is not possible to incite a conflict for the establishment of a Muslim state if it is a regional conflict.... The international Jewish-Crusader alliance, led by America, will not allow any Muslim force to obtain power in any of the Muslim lands. ... It will impose sanctions on whoever helps it, even if it does not declare war against them altogether. Therefore, to adjust to this new reality, we must prepare ourselves for a battle that is not confined to a single region but rather includes the apostate domestic enemy and the Jewish-Crusader external enemy. To confront this insidious alliance, Zawahiri argued, al Qaeda had to first root out U.S. influence in the region...
^"La France face au terrorisme"(PDF) (in French). Secrétariat général de la défense nationale (France). Archived fromthe original(PDF) on August 7, 2011. RetrievedAugust 6, 2009.
^Gunaratna 2002, p. 147: "The Al Qaeda team included Abu Talha al-Sudani, Saif al-Islam el-Masry, Salem el-Masry, Saif al-Adel and other trainers, including Abu Jaffer el-Masry, the explosives expert who ran the Jihad Wal camp Afghanistan. In addition to developing this capability with Iranian assistance, Al Qaeda also received a large amount of explosives from Iran that were used in the bombing of the East African targets. The training team brought Hezbollah training and propaganda videos with the intention of passing on their knowledge to other Al Qaeda members and Islamist groups."
^Wright 2008: 'In December, in order to stanch the flow of criticism, Zawahiri boldly initiated a virtual town-hall meeting... Zawahiri protested that Al Qaeda had not killed innocents. "In fact, we fight those who kill innocents. Those who kill innocents are the Americans... and their agents."'
Basile, Mark (May 2004). "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing".Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.27 (3):169–185.doi:10.1080/10576100490438237.S2CID109768129.
Cassidy, Robert M. (2006).Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.ISBN0-275-98990-9.
Hoffman, Bruce (2002). "The Emergence of the New Terrorism". In Tan, Andrew; Ramakrishna, Kumar (eds.).The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends, and Counter-Strategies. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press. pp. 30–49.ISBN981-210-210-8.
McGeary, Johanna (February 19, 2001)."A Traitor's Tale".Time. Vol. 157, no. 7. pp. 36–37. Archived fromthe original on November 21, 2007. RetrievedSeptember 15, 2009.
Schmid, Alex (2014). "Al Qaeda's "Single Narrative" and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives".Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies.doi:10.19165/2014.1.01 (inactive December 9, 2024).ISSN2468-0664.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of December 2024 (link)
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