Air interdiction (AI), also known asdeep air support (DAS), is the use of preventivetactical bombing andstrafing bycombat aircraft against enemy targets that are not an immediate threat, to delay, disrupt or hinder later enemy engagement on friendly forces. It is a core capability of virtually all military air forces, and has been conducted in conflicts sinceWorld War I. Aircraft that are used for this purpose are known asinterdictors.
A distinction is often made betweentactical andstrategic air interdiction, depending on the objectives of the operation. Typical objectives in tactical interdiction are meant to affect events rapidly and locally, for example through direct destruction of forces or supplies en route to the active battle area. By contrast, strategic objectives are often broader and more long-term, with fewer direct attacks on enemy fighting capabilities, instead focusing on infrastructure, logistics and other supportive assets.
The term deep air support relates toclose air support and denotes the difference between their respective objectives. Close air support, as the name suggests, is directed towards targets close to friendly ground units, as closely coordinated air-strikes, in direct support of active engagement with the enemy. Deep air support or air interdiction is carried out further from the active fighting, based more on strategic planning and less directly coordinated with ground units. Despite being more strategic than close air support, air interdiction should not be confused withstrategic bombing, which is unrelated to ground operations.
Air interdiction can cause the physical destruction orattrition of soldiers andmatériel before they can reach the battlefield, sever enemy'slines of communication, prevent soldiers and matériel from reaching the battlefield. It can create systemic inefficiencies in the enemy's logistic system so that soldiers and matériel arrive at the battlefield more slowly or in an uneconomical manner.[1][2][3]
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| This sectionneeds expansion. You can help byadding to it.(November 2023) |
In the lead up to the invasion of France, theAllied strategic bomber force was switched from thedestruction of the enemy air force and means of production to a destruction of the railway routes to the intended landing areas. Once the landings were underway, the Allied tactical and strategic air forces were used to prevent the German strategic armoured reserves from being brought up to the coast and reinforce the divisions there.
Operation Strangle was a series of air interdiction operations during theItalian Campaign ofWorld War II by the Allied air forces to interdictGerman supply routes in Italy north ofRome from 19 March 1944 to 11 May 1944. Its aim was to prevent essential supplies from reaching German forces inCentral Italy and compel a German withdrawal. The strategic goal of the air assault was to eliminate or greatly reduce the need for a ground assault on the region. The Allies failed in the overly ambitious objective of the campaign, namely the forced withdrawal of German forces from theGustav Line, and did not curtail the flow of supplies. However, the air interdiction seriously complicated the German conduct of defensive operations and played a major role in the success of the subsequent Allied ground assaultOperation Diadem.[4][5]
Two principal interdiction lines were maintained across the narrow boot of Italy. This meant that no through trains were able to run from thePo Valley to the front line, and that south ofFlorence nearly all supplies had to be moved by truck. Over the course of eight weeks, the Allies flew 21,000 sorties (388 per day) and dropped 22,500 tonnes of bombs.[5][6] The operation employedmedium bombers andfighter bombers over a 150-square-mile (390 km2) area from Rome toPisa and fromPescara toRimini.[7]Operation Strangle was a sustained interdiction attack on North Korea's supplies and communications by theUnited Nations forces during theKorean War. Beginning in August 1951, the campaign's 87,552 interdiction sorties were credited with destroying 276 locomotives, 3,820railroad cars, 19,000rail cuts[clarification needed], and 34,211 other vehicles[citation needed]. TheNorth Koreans countered the campaign by movinganti-aircraft (AA) guns and crews towards the front line and placing them in higher concentrations around important targets, causing heavy casualties in the UN forces. Despite high losses, Operation Strangle destroyed 900 AA gun positions and damaged 443.[8]
By December 1951, North Korea was able to repair rail cuts in less than six hours, bridges in two to four days, and other bomb damages fairly quickly. By May 1952, it was apparent that their supply efforts had increased support to their front-line troops despite the air attacks. By June, half of the North's anti-aircraft guns - 132 cannons and 708 automatic weapons - were posted along North Korea's railroads.[9] | This sectionneeds expansion. You can help byadding to it.(November 2023) |
During theCold War, theNATO alliance leaned into the concept of air interdiction.[10]"Air interdiction...is essential to the overall effectiveness of the Allies' military forces. Their role in supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriate long-distance airlift and air refuelling capabilities. "[10]
Operation Linebacker was the codename of a U.S.Seventh Air Force andU.S. NavyTask Force 77 air interdiction campaign conducted againstNorth Vietnam from 9 May to 23 October 1972, during theVietnam War.
Its purpose was to halt or slow the transportation of supplies and materials for theNguyen Hue Offensive (known in the West as theEaster Offensive), an invasion of theSouth Vietnam by the North VietnamesePeople's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) that had been launched on 30 March.Linebacker was the first continuous bombing effort conducted against North Vietnam since the end ofOperation Rolling Thunder in November 1968.Both theIranian Air Force (IIAF) and theIraqi Air Force (IQAF) made concerted efforts during the early days of theIran-Iraq War to interdict the other side. For both sides this largely amounted to engaging in armed reconnaissance and attacking targets of opportunity, with few attacks on pre-planned targets. The IIAF did have the advantage of having superior munitions and tactical reconnaissance - possessing a squadron ofRF-4E Phantoms and pre-revolution targeting intelligence - but their efforts largely mirrored that of the IQAF.[11]
The IQAF's interdiction efforts peaked during the first 45 days of the war, but later declined to more sporadic missions, increasing in conjunction with major offensives. Interdiction by the IIAF was more sustained through late 1980 but after mid-January 1981 also declined. While both sides caused considerable damage on the other, with the Iranians arguably achieving more, neither interdiction effort was particularly effective nor did they play a factor in the outcome of the war. Both sides pulled back their air forces to avoid mounting losses and with the reasoning that, while they might not play a role in winning the war, they could still be used to avoid defeat.[11]