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In terms ofIhsan: |
TheAhl al-Ra'y[a], sometimes referred to in English asrationalists,[1][2][3][4] refers to an Islamic creedal group advocating for the use of reason for theological decisions and scriptural interpretation.[5] They were one of two main groups debating thesource of Islamic creed in the second century of Islam, the other beingAhl al-Hadith (the people of hadith).[6]
Its proponents, which included many early jurists of theHanafi school, used the termra'y to refer to "sound" or "considered" reasoning, such asqiyas (analogical deduction).[5] Their opponents from theAhl al-Hadith creedal group held that the Quran and authentichadith were the only admissible sources of Islamic law, and objected to any use ofra'y in jurisprudence, whether in the form ofqiyas,istislah (consideration of public interest), orhiyal (legal subterfuges).[7] According to Daniel W. Brown,Ahl al-Ra'y thought a hadith should "sometimes be subject to other overriding principles" such as the "continuous practice" of the community and "general principles of equity" which was claimed to "better represent the spirit of the Prophet" Muhammad.[8]
Over time, Hanafi jurists gradually came to accept the primacy of the Quran and hadith advocated by theAhl al-Hadith creedal group, restricting the use of other forms of legal reasoning to interpretation of these scriptures.[7] In turn,Hanbali jurists, who had led theAhl al-Hadith creedal group, gradually came to accept the use ofqiyas.[7]
Ra'y is anArabic word that literally meansreason,opinion,idea, and other similar words. According toLisan al-Arab,ra'y was used to refer to an excellent opinion inPre-Islamic Arabia. Later definitions used it to refer to an opinion derived from deepcontemplation and sound judgement. Those who prioritized the usage ofra'y inIslamic law became known asAhl al-Ra'y[9] orAșḥāb al-Ra'y[b],[1][3] sometimes referred to inEnglish asrationalists.[1][2][3][4] Other names includeAhl al-Qiyās[c],Ahl an-Naẓar[d], andAhl al-Kalām[e][1]. SometimesAhl al-Kalām is considered its own separate category, containing theMu'tazila and rejectors ofhadith.[8][10]
Ahl al-Ra'y did not necessarily reject allhadith. Rather, many accepted the usage of hadith but nonetheless, gave preference and greater importance tora'y.[11][12] To Ahl al-Ra'y, it was just one source ofIslamic law among many, not necessarily given any more importance than other sources likeqiyas oristihsan. They believed that hadith must sometimes be subjected to general religious principles like the "continuous practice" of the community and "general principles of equity" which was claimed to "better represent the spirit of theProphet"Muhammad.[8]
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Ra'y originally was viewed in a very positive sense to refer to sound and considered opinion based onreasoning. The emergence ofhadith did not initially affect these established forms oflegal reasoning, andra'y continued to dominate theIslamic world until the mid-8th century CE. About two-thirds ofZuhrī's transmitted doctrine containedra'y and only one third contained reports from earlier authorities. ForQatada ibn Di'ama, 62% of his transmitted doctrine containedra'y and of what was remaining, 84% was thera'y of previous authorities.[13]
However, starting around the end of the 7th century, there had been a growing movement to codify thesunnah into writtenhadith, rather than being largely verbally told byscholars andstorytellers. It became a common practice amongst some scholars to "travel in search ofknowledge" (talab al-'ilm). In this case, the "search for knowledge" was searching throughout the caliphate for textual sources that could be used for the compilation of hadith.[14] Whilera'y was initially the dominant source ofIslamic law, this would soon change with the rise of traditionalism (Ahl al-Hadith), as the term got an increasingly negative association witharbitrary orfallible humanthought.[13] The beginning of this decline seems to start withUmayyad CaliphUmar II, ordering that any judge he appointed resort to'ilm instead ofra'y when in doubt.[14]
Traditionalists would at times claimra'y was imposing human subjectivity onto God, while rationalists would at times claim much of thehadith materials, especiallyakhbār al-āḥād (single-transmitter reports), to have too uncertain accuracy.[15][16] Traditionalists would often be accused of being primitive while rationalists were accused of being impious.[16] In contrast to previous centuries where few jurists were seen as traditionalists (and most had acquired this description after the fact), the 9th century had many jurists identify clearly as traditionalists. The traditionalists had experienced an "unprecedented upsurge" by the last quarter of the 8th century, and by the mid-9th century, "ḥadīth had won the war againstra'y". Conversion from the rationalist to traditionalist camp was "frequent" while the reverse was "rare to nonexistent".[17] By the 9th century, the termra'y itself even lost any ground in legal discourse, with the termsqiyas andijtihad being favored, having not gained a negative connotation.[18]
AfterAl-Shafi'i (founder of theShafi'i school),traditionalism "gained significant strength, attracting many jurists who can easily be described as staunch opponents of rationalism".Ahmad ibn Hanbal (founder of theHanbali school) andDawud al-Zahiri (founder of theZahiri school) went even further than Al-Shafi'i in emphasis of the "centrality of scripture" and criticism of the apparent "repugnant nature of human reasoning". However, ibn Hanbal did accept the use ofqiyas when considered absolutely necessary while al-Zahiri categorically opposed it in all circumstances. Thus during the seven decades between al-Shafi'i and al-Zahiri, the traditionalist movement took a staunch uncompromising opposition towards rationalism.[19][20] TheMihna, an 18-year period of persecution against traditionalists, instituted byAbbasid caliphal-Ma'mun, had made its victims like ibn Hanbal emerge as heroes, and its eventual end exemplifying the defeat of the rationalists.[19] The Mihna's end had ended "the feud between the rationalists (Ahl al-Ra'y) and the traditionalists (Ahl al-Hadith)...with the victory of the latter."[4] However, even by the end of the Mihna, a majority of jurists did not fully subscribe to either camp, seeing the traditionalism of ibn Hanbal as too rigid and the rationalism of theMu'tazila and their supporters as toolibertarian.[19]
However, while exclusive affiliation to one of the two camps was common in the early to mid-9th century, most jurists by the end of the century had combined the two camps in some way. A synthesis of the two camps "flourished" between the years 870 and 1000.[19] As it became increasingly clear thathadith was here to stay, especially with the internationalization of Islamic legal scholarship (making a more universally-applicable hadith more appealing), rationalists started to reckon with the reality of the rise of hadith and that acceptance within mainstreamIslam would require compromising withtraditionalists. The jurist that seems to have initiated this re-grounding of rationalists was Muhammad ibn Shuja al-Thalji, seeking to preserve the cause of his school, the IraqiHanafites. Extreme traditionalists also moderated, such asHanbalites accepting limited use ofqiyas (an exception being the aforementioned Zahiri school which adamantly refused to join the synthesis). By the end of the ninth century, a majority of jurists had embraced this synthesis (which is not to say these jurists completely abandoned their leanings towards one position or the other).[21][22] By the 10th century, this synthesis had been fully in place, largely unquestioned until the 19th century.[19] According to Daniel W. Brown, "[t]his was, by all appearances, a complete triumph for theașḥāb al-ḥadith", however, this victory was limited. The theoretical position of hadith remained largely unchallenged by all of the classicalmadhhabs but there remained debates over ifMuhammad had legal intent in his statements, if his statements were related to his religious mission or other non-binding actions, and the surrounding context of his statements.[23]