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Action theory ortheory of action is an area inphilosophy concerned withtheories about the processes causingwillfulhuman bodily movements of a more or less complex kind. Thisarea of thought involvesepistemology,ethics,metaphysics,jurisprudence, andphilosophy of mind, and has attracted the strong interest of philosophers ever sinceAristotle'sNicomachean Ethics (Third Book). With the advent ofpsychology and laterneuroscience, many theories of action are now subject toempirical testing.
Philosophical action theory, or thephilosophy of action, should not be confused withsociological theories ofsocial action, such as theaction theory established byTalcott Parsons. Nor should it be confused withactivity theory.
Basic action theory typically describesaction as intentional behavior caused by anagent in a particularsituation.[1] The agent'sdesires andbeliefs (e.g. a person wanting a glass of water and believing that the clear liquid in the cup in front of them is water) lead to bodily behavior (e.g. reaching across for the glass). In the simple theory (seeDonald Davidson), the desire and belief jointly cause the action.Michael Bratman has raised problems for such a view and argued that we should take the concept of intention as basic and not analyzable into beliefs and desires.
Aristotle held that a thorough explanation must give an account of both theefficient cause, the agent, and thefinal cause, the intention.
In some theories a desire plus a belief about the means of satisfying that desire are always what is behind an action. Agents aim, in acting, to maximize the satisfaction of their desires. Such a theory of prospectiverationality underlies much ofeconomics and othersocial sciences within the more sophisticated framework ofrational choice. However, many theories of action argue that rationality extends far beyond calculating the best means to achieve one's ends. For instance, a belief that I ought to do X, in some theories, can directly cause me to do X without my having to want to do X (i.e. have a desire to do X). Rationality, in such theories, also involves responding correctly to the reasons an agent perceives, not just acting on wants.
While action theorists generally employ the language ofcausality in their theories of what the nature of action is, the issue of what causal determination comes to has been central to controversies about the nature offree will.
Conceptual discussions also revolve around a precise definition ofaction in philosophy. Scholars may disagree on which bodily movements fall under this category, e.g. whether thinking should be analysed as action, and how complex actions involving several steps to be taken and diverse intended consequences are to be summarised or decomposed.