 Tugboats surround USSMissouri during an attempt to free her 21 January 1950 | |
| Date | 17 January 1950 |
|---|---|
| Location | Thimble Shoal Light, nearOld Point Comfort |
| Cause | Negligence |
| Outcome | Battleship hull damaged |
TheUSSMissouri grounding occurred 17 January 1950 when thebattleshipUSS Missouri (BB-63)ran aground while sailing out ofChesapeake Bay. No one was injured, but the battleship remained stuck for over two weeks before being freed from the sand. The ship was so damaged that she had to return to port and enterdry dock for repairs.
After the battleship was freed, anaval court of inquiry found Captain William D. Brown and a handful of other naval officers guilty of negligence. Brown was moved down 250 places on the promotion list, effectively ending his naval career.
Missouri was repaired and reentered service with the active fleet shortly afterward. She would go on to serve in theKorean War before being decommissioned in 1954. She entered thePuget Sound Reserve Fleet inBremerton, Washington, where she remained until being reactivated in 1984 as part of the600-ship Navy plan put forth by thenPresidentRonald Reagan and hisNavy SecretaryJohn Lehman.
Missouri was one of theIowa-class "fast battleship" designs planned in 1938 by the Preliminary Design Branch at theBureau of Construction and Repair. She was laid down at theBrooklyn Navy Yard on 6 January 1941, launched on 29 January 1944 and commissioned on 11 June. The ship was the third of theIowa class, but the fourth and finalIowa-class ship commissioned by theUnited States Navy.[1][2] The ship was christened at her launching byMary Margaret Truman, daughter ofHarry S. Truman, then a United States senator fromMissouri.[3]
Missouri was active in thePacific Theatre of World War II, escorting theFast Carrier Task Forces and shelling beachheads for Allied Army and Marine Corps personnel involved in amphibious operations against the Imperial Japanese forces. After theatomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki theEmpire of Japan capitulated to Allied demands, signing theinstrument of surrender to the allied powers aboardMissouri on 2 September 1945.
Between 1945 and 1950 the US fleet of battleships had been entirely decommissioned; however,Missouri was spared this fate due to the influence of now-President Truman, who refused to allow the battleship to be decommissioned, and against the advice ofSecretary of DefenseLouis Johnson,Secretary of the NavyJohn L. Sullivan, andChief of Naval OperationsLouis E. Denfeld, Truman orderedMissouri to be maintained with the active fleet partly because of his fondness for the battleship and partly because the battleship had been christened by his daughter.[4][5] As a result,Missouri was involved in various training and flag waving exercises at home and abroad between World War II and the Korean War.[6]
In October 1949, amid increasing political scrutiny,[A 1]Missouri arrived at theNorfolk Naval Shipyard for three months of scheduled maintenance. During this period CaptainHarold Page Smith was relieved by Captain William D. Brown. A graduate ofAnnapolis and veteran of 30 years, Captain Brown had amassed a distinguished record commandingsubmarines anddestroyers, but had never commanded a ship the size ofMissouri, and had not been to sea in a command capacity since World War II.[7][8] Captain Brown formally assumed command ofMissouri on 10 December, just ahead of the completion of maintenance work on the battleship. On 23 December, Brown took the battleship out for a brief trip around theVirginia Capes and returned to Norfolk on Christmas Eve. Her next scheduled departure was 17 January, at which timeMissouri was to sail toGuantánamo Bay for maneuvers.[7]
On 13 January, Brown received a request from theNaval Ordnance Laboratory for theMissouri to proceed through a channel in which the United States Navy had strewn acoustic cables as part of an ongoing project that aimed to identify ships by their propeller signatures. The request was entirely optional, but as the captain was preoccupied with the details of the upcoming sortie toCuba he gave the letter little attention and instead referred the matter to his operations officer,Commander John R. Millett, who in turn referred the letter to the ship's navigator,Lieutenant Commander Frank G. Morris.[9][10]
On 14 January, Captain Brown and his operations and navigating officers met to discuss the upcoming cruise to Cuba and the details surrounding this cruise, and also talk briefly about the acoustical test they were to run. The ship was to pass between two orange-and-white-stripedbuoys that marked the entrance and exit from the range. The range itself was located precariously close to the "danger bearing"—the shoal area in which the safe 50–60 feet (15–18 m) of water that could accommodate a ship shoaled to only 10–20 feet (3.0–6.1 m). To make matters worse, the range through whichMissouri was to pass had originally been marked with five buoys, but this number had been reduced to two buoys two days prior to the arrival of Captain Brown.[9] Morris was aware that three of the five buoys had been removed from the range, but had not received authorization to delete the non-existent buoys from the chart.[10] Although informed of this during the conference, Captain Brown and Commander Millett left the conference under the mistaken belief that there were still five buoys marking the acoustical range.[9]
At 7:25 am 17 January 1950Missouri set sail for theAtlantic Ocean withharbor pilot R. B. McCoy at the helm.[6] Because of the better view afforded on the forward mast structure, the battleship was sailed through theChesapeake Bay from the eighth level of the battleship's forward mast structure. At the time she had a full complement ofammunition and water, and her fuel tanks were 95% full, which broughtMissouri's total displacement to 57,000 tons; she drew 35 feet 9 inches (10.90 m) at her bow and 36 feet 9 inches (11.20 m) at her stern.[9] At 7:49 am, near theElizabeth River Channel Buoy 3, the pilot turned control of the battleship over to Captain Brown and departed for shore.[9] The weather was clear andMissouri was now free to run through the acoustic channel.Missouri sailed toward two red markers that Commander George Peckham believed marked the shoal water in the channel.[6]
With the departure of R. B. McCoy, Captain Brown assumed full command ofMissouri. He ordered the battleship engines brought to two-thirds speed and order a course set for 053 on the recommendation of navigator, Lieutenant Commander Morris.[9]
At 8:05 am, asMissouri sailed pastFort Wool, Captain Brown turned control of the ship (known in naval terms as the "conn" of the ship) over to theofficer of the deck and departed for the chart house. His arrival at the chart house caused Ensign E. R. Harris, who had been tracking the battleship's course on the chart, to move away from the table, resulting in the interruption of the plot.[10] Around the same time Captain Brown informed Commander Peckham thatMissouri would soon run an acoustical range. This was the first time that theexecutive officer had heard about a planned acoustical range run.[11]
Approximately two minutes after departing for the chart room, Captain Brown reemerged on the open bridge and reassumed the conn of the battleship. He summoned Lieutenants Hatfield and Arnold,Missouri's morning and forenoon officers of the watch, respectively, and informed them of the planned run through the acoustical range. As with Commander Peckham, this was the first time that either of these two men had heard anything about the planned acoustical test run. When Captain Brown noted their confused looks, he promptly informed the men to "Go get yourselves informed", at which point both officers reported to the chart room on level eight. There they learned of the impending run through the acoustical range by looking at the chart with the buoys marking the range; despite this, both remained confused over aspects of the planned run.[11][12]
At 8:10 am Captain Brown ordered a course change to 060 degrees and informed the men that the conn for the battleship would remain on the eighth-level bridge until they cleared the course. This was unusual forMissouri, as the conn was usually shifted to the fourth-level bridge during the transit at the point when a ship passed Fort Wool andOld Point Comfort. The initial course change to 060 was altered to 058 as a result of a strongocean current that swungMissouri too far to the right during the course correction.[11][13]
It was at this point that the first indication that something was dangerously amiss during the transit occurred. The executive officer, who passed through the chart room while preparing for the shift change, noticed thatMissouri was rapidly approaching the shoal water, and promptly told Morris "For God's sake watch it!"[11] At the same time a discussion occurred on the eighth-level bridge as to whether it would be advisable for the battleship's speed to be increased to 15 knots. Morris and Millet differed in opinion on the idea; the former felt speed should be reduced five knots, and the latter felt that any steady speed held during the transition would be okay. Captain Brown therefore decided to increase speed to 15 knots, and the engine room replied by increasing power.[11]
Around the same time, Lieutenant Arnold located a small buoy with orange-and-white stripes 1,000 yards (910 m) away. Initially this buoy was identified as one of the acoustical range markers as a result of the letter "B" painted on it, but this information was not properly relayed to the rest of the crew. Mistakenly believing that this was the marker for the right side of the range, both Captain Brown and the battleship's operations officer agreed to order the battleship to pass to the left of the marker. By thenMissouri was sailing for the danger line marking the separation between the deep water of the channel into the shallow water of the shoals. This was made apparent when a pair ofspar buoys marking the entrance to a shallow fishing channel appeared ahead ofMissouri. Brown incorrectly identified these markers as the end of the acoustical range, but several of thequartermasters, as well as Commander Peckham, Lieutenant Arnold, and other officers knew this was an incorrect assumption. It was at this point the first recommendation to turn right was made by Morris, the navigator; Brown declined because of his mistaken belief that the markers for the fish channel were actually the end of the acoustical range.[11] A similar recommendation from Commander Peckham also went unheeded.[14]
Around the same time inMissouri'sCombat Information Center (CIC) crew members manning the battleship's navigational radar system noticed that the radar returns indicated thatMissouri was steaming for dangerous waters; however, the CIC crew did not report this information to the captain. Lieutenant John Carr, the officer on duty in the CIC at the time of the grounding, concluded that the radar equipment was likely not operating correctly. Carr later explained the decision not to report the radar information by stating, "the standard practice on board ship did not call for radar advice to the bridge in the absence of specific requests."[13] He also pointed out that thefathometer, a water depth-reading instrument, was out of order and had not been repaired in the yard.[15]
At 8:15 amMissouri crossed the danger bearing into the shoal water. At this time Commander Peckham sent a message to Captain Brown stating "Ship heading into Danger shoals. Recommend you come right immediately!", but this message was relayed by "talkers" (men charged with relaying messages for officers to different stations) and the talker who was supposed to pass Peckham's message to Brown had a tendency to mumble badly.[14] At the same time Peckham was attempting to alert Brown of the impending grounding, Morris again approached Brown and recommended coming right to avoid the shoal water. Captain Brown did not recall being informed of this, and made no reply to Morris. At this point Morris took a bearing on Thimble Shoals, and alarmed at the impending grounding Morris frantically returned to the captain waving his arms and shouting "Come right! There's shoal water ahead!" A disbelieving Captain Brown dismissed Morris' pleas by stating that it was his belief that the navigator did not know where they were. To verify Morris' claims of impending shoal water, Brown asked Commander Millet to check Morris's position. As a precautionary move, Brown then ordered Quartermaster Travis,Missouri'shelmsman, to alter course to 058, but this order came too late.[11]
At 8:17 am,Missouri slid up on a shoal (or mud bar) and stuck to the ground. In a last-ditch effort to prevent the grounding, Peckham sent a message to Brown stating "Come right immediately! Twist ship!",[A 2] but this effort was too little, too late;Missouri had already run aground. Her hull had traveled approximately 2,500 feet (760 m),[16] which was very nearly the entire length of the shoal, raising the battleship several feet out of the water, and her engines were shut down after the bay sand began to clog the battleship's intakes in engineering.[6][A 3] She had come to rest on an almost even keel[16] on the sandbar within plain sight of "Admirals Row", the historic homes along Dillingham Boulevard atNaval Station Norfolk occupied by 18 flag officers of the United States Navy stationed atHampton Roads, and the homes of a similar number of high-ranking officers of theUnited States Army stationed atFort Monroe.[17]
By 8:30 am a request went out summoning all available tugs to the site of the grounding with the hope that they would be able to free the leviathan before any further damage occurred.[6] An attempt made byMissouri's sailors on the day of the grounding met with failure, as did an initial attempt to pullMissouri back into deep water with sixteen tugboats.[18] Before the tugs could lend any further assistance, the naval brass postponed the attempt, pending the outcome of further assessment.Missouri had traversed the shoal nearly 2,500 feet, and to compound her problem she had run aground during an unusually high tide.[16] To add insult to injury, she had become the butt of a number of bad jokes among the American public, the Navy's rival service branches, and theSoviet Union's Atlantic fleet, who were quick to pounce upon the dreadnought's grounding as material for the naval publicationRed Fleet.[19]
Initially, high-ranking US Navy officials elected to contract a private salvage firm to free the battleship, but Admiral Allan E. Smith, at the time Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic, and the man who was responsible for issuingMissouri's orders disagreed with this plan. He reasoned that if the Navy got her on to the shoal, then they should be responsible for getting her off the shoal. Ultimately, he won his case for a US Navy salvage effort, but he was explicitly informed by officials atThe Pentagon that his career would ride on his ability to successfully getMissouri back into deep water.[19] To better organize the salvage effort, Smith and a number of men on his staff moved aboardMissouri to supervise her return to deep water.[20] Smith's supervision also extended to answering the nearly 10,000 letters sent to the Navy from concerned citizens offering advice on how to get the battleship back into deep water.[21]
Commanding this salvage effort wasRear AdmiralHomer N. Wallin.[19] Wallin was the Navy Yard Commandant at Norfolk, and as a captain he had been instrumental in repairing damage atPearl Harbor after the7 December 1941 air raid by theImperial Japanese Navy that had brought the United States intoWorld War II. In total the salvage team that Wallin commanded successfully resurrected 19 of the 21 ships initially declared total losses and helped to refit those ships to serve in the Second World War. Wallin initiated a five-point plan aimed at gettingMissouri off the mud and back into the water:[6]
It would be later concluded that ifMissouri had to go aground her locale was perfect; she had grounded in protected waters and in an area abundant with salvage equipment.[21]
Because the grounding had occurred during an unusuallyhigh tide, a roughly comparable tide would be required to free her, projected for 2 February.[23] With time as a factor, Wallin took charge of the operation and put his plan into motion. With the assistance of Admiral Smith, Wallin was able to assemble a large salvage force which included submarine rescue ships, special salvage ships, divers, and pontoons to giveMissouri additional buoyancy when the time came for the tugs to move her.[18]
On 19 January,Comber, an armydredge, arrived at the site of theMissouri grounding and began to clearMissouri's intended path. On 22 January,Comber was joined by the civilian-run dredgeWashington in thedredging phase of Wallin's plan. Around this timeMissouri's crew began offloading all non-essential items. Both 16-inch (406 mm) and 5-inch (127 mm) shells, powder, food, drink, and other materials were removed from the battleship and placed aboard barges. At the same time, theCimarron-classfleet oilersChemung andPawcatuck began offloadingMissouri's fuel.[18] As the fuel was required to operate the generators aboardMissouri, its absence resulted in a shift from supplying the powerMissouri required with her own generators to relying on the submarine rescue ships for power and water.[24]
Originally, the weight-reduction phase had included removing the anchors from the battleship, but Wallin ordered one to be reattached to help shiftMissouri's center of gravity forward to a narrower part of the battleship, thereby reducing the friction at her widest point.[18] During this time, theBureau of Ships offered valuable technical and salvage advice to both the civilian and military participants in the salvage effort.[25]
On 31 January, an attempt was made to freeMissouri with the assembled collection of tug boats and salvage ships. It was thwarted by an anchor from a previous wreck that had become embedded inMissouri's hull. The extreme force generated by the tugs caused several two-inch cables made from wire rope to break, and the failed attempt also revealed thatMissouri needed to lose more weight. Changes included cutting the anchors and chains off the battleship—after they had been re-added at Wallin's request—and the inclusion of additional pontoons. A second attempt was tentatively scheduled for 1 February.[25][26]
On 1 FebruaryMissouri was finally freed with the assistance of 23 vessels.[3][6] Five tug boats pulled alongside, six pulled astern, and three swung to the bow to facilitate movement. Additionally, twoGypsy-classsalvage vessels,Salvager[27] andWindlass,[28] and seven yard tugs helped keep the other vessels in place.Kedge anchors were also used to expedite the process.[6] About the time thatMissouri began to move again, she suffered one last incident: while being towed off the shoal, she bumped intoWindlass, wiping out a portion ofWindlass's side railing. However, the damage was insignificant, and as the battleship slowly returned to the harbor, the band played "Missouri Waltz", "Anchors Aweigh", and "Nobody Knows the Trouble I've Seen". Crewmen also hoisted battle flags and hoisted signal flags which read "Reporting for Duty". A Norfolk harbor pilot was responsible for issuing the engine and rudder orders to the battleship, whileMissouri's own navigator issued course orders for the battleship during the tow.[29]
With an audience observing the process,Missouri finally returned to the deep water at 7:09 am.[29] Following her liberation from the muddy shoal,Missouri was towed back to the naval yard where her incomplete sister shipKentucky had been removed from dry dock to allowMissouri to undergo repairs, which—apart from structural inspection—included replacement of some of her double-bottom plating that had buckled and ruptured three fuel tanks.[6]
Captain Brown wascourt-martialed as a result of the incident, pleaded guilty, and was relieved of command ofMissouri. As a result of his plea, he suffered the loss of 250 places on the list of captains awaiting ships. He spent the rest of his active duty time on shore duty. Four others were court-martialed; two were cleared of all charges, one received a letter of reprimand, and one was reduced on the promotion list.[30]
Missouri was repaired and returned to fleet. She stayed in commission throughout the Korean War, and—after the cease-fire agreement—was decommissioned into theUnited States Navy reserve fleets, where she remained until the 1980s.[3] Despite proof to the contrary, rumors continued to circulate thatMissouri suffered permanent damage as a result of the grounding incident.[30]
Thereafter, the ship was sometimes referred to as the "Muddy Mo," a takeoff on "Mighty Mo".[31]
Shipwrecks and maritime incidents in 1950 | |
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| Shipwrecks |
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| Other incidents |
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