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21°57′N113°45′E / 21.95°N 113.75°E /21.95; 113.75
| Wanshan Archipelago Campaign | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theCross-Strait conflict | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Republic of China |  People's Republic of China | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Qi Hongzhang | Hong Xuezhi | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 4,000 40+ naval vessels | 10,000 24 naval vessels | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 700+ 4gunboats sunk 11 naval vessels captured | 300+ 1landing ship 1 gunboat severely damaged | ||||||
TheWanshan Archipelago Campaign (万山群岛战役) was a campaign fought betweennationalist andcommunist forces for the control ofWanshan Archipelago (Wanshan Qundao, 万山群岛), and resulted incommunist victory. Thearchipelago consists of 48 islands strategically located at the mouth of thePearl River, a chokepoint on the communication lines toHong Kong andMacau. The largest island is the Laurel Mountain (Guishan, 桂山) Island, which was formerly known as Trash Tail (Lajiwei, 垃圾尾) Island. Other major islands include Outer Linding (Wailinding, 外伶仃) Island, Dong'ao (东澳) Island, Tri-gate (Sanmen, 三门) Island, Greater Ten-thousand Mountain (Da Wanshan, 大万山) Island, Lesser Ten-thousand Mountain (Xiao Wanshan, 小万山) Island, Burden Pole (Dangan, 担杆) Islands, and Jianpeng (佳蓬) Islands.
AfterHainan Island had fallen into thecommunist hands, thenationalist 3rd Fleet withdrew to Wanshan Archipelago and together with the various nationalist units as the local garrison, the nationalists planned to blockade the mouth of thePearl River and cutting off the maritime links between the mainland andHong Kong andMacau. Thenationalist naval commander-in-chief Gui Yongqing (桂永清) organized the Wanshan Defense Command, and namednationalist commander-in-chief of the 3rd Fleet Qi Hongzhang (齊鴻章) as the commander, who set up his headquarters on board thefrigateTaihe (太和), the largestnationalist warship among more than three dozennationalist naval vessels in the region, and the flagship of thenationalist 3rd Fleet. In response, thecommunist force decided to take thearchipelago and eliminate the threat and crush thenationalist blockade of the mouth of the Pearl River. Thecommunist deputy corps commander Hong Xuezhi (洪学智) was named as the commander of the Riverine Defense Force of the Cantonese Military Region to be in charge of the incoming operation, and the commander of force began to mass atZhongshan on May 8, 1950, after a joint command headquarters was set up.
Nationalistorder of battleAround 4,000, including:
Communistorder of battleAround 10,000 total, including:
Thecommunist task force sailed to Wanshan Archipelago at the dawn of May 25, 1950. Shortly before dawn, the advance guard of thecommunist force in charge of fire support reached thenationalist anchorage at the Laurel Mountain (Guishan, 桂山) Island. ThecommunistgunboatLiberation, a formernationalistgunboat namedDancing Phoenix defected to thecommunist side commanded by its formernationalist commander, Captain Lin Wenhu (林文虎), a brilliant naval officer, launched a surprise attack on thenationalist naval force at the anchorage under the cover of darkness. Fully aware that his 25-tongunboat was completely incapable of sinking its large opponents each displaced over a thousand tons, Captain Lin skillfully ordered his crew to concentrate fire on the superstructures of larger nationalist ships. Nearly everynationalist large warship in the anchorage had its bridge struck, and the flagship, the frigateTaihe suffered the most: nearly everyone on the bridge was either killed or wounded, and Qi Hongzhang (齐鸿章), thenationalist commander-in-chief was severely wounded himself. With the commander-in-chief severely wounded and most of his staff killed, thenationalist command in charge of both land and naval defense was thus effectively paralyzed. The confined space of the anchorage severely limited the maneuverability of thenationalist warships for fearing collision in the darkness, and thecommunistgunboat was able to utilizing the blind spots of the largernationalist naval guns by fighting at extremely close quarter when engaging the larger nationalist ships after sinking anationalistgunboat. In the meantime, two othercommunistgunboats,Vanguard andStruggle, managed to sink twonationalistgunboats east of Ox Head (Niutou, 牛头) Island, while two battalions of thecommunist landing force took Green Islet (Qing Zhou, 青洲) and Triangle (Sanjiao, 三角) Island.
After the sunrise, thenationalist fleet discovered that there was only a single smallcommunistgunboat fighting them, and as the enragednationalist sailors attempted to avenge the deaths of their comrades-in-arms, everynationalist naval vessel available joined the chase of thecommunist 25-tongunboatLiberation. However, unbeknown to thenationalist fleet, it was drawn to a temporary but carefully and skillfully designed trap devised by thecommunistgunboat captain, who was luring his opponent away from the islands, thus opening the way for thecommunist landing force. Once thenationalist fleet realized its mistake, it was too late: although thenationalist fleet managed to severely damage thecommunistlanding shipGuishan (桂山) in the chase, thecommunistlanding ship nonetheless successfully beached itself and unloaded all of the landing force it carried.
Thenationalist fleet was soon faced another dilemma: continue fighting the twocommunist naval vessels or saving the dying sailors, including the severely wounded commander-in-chief, who was out of consciousness by already this time. The loyal subordinates of thenationalist commander-in-chief chose not to let their commanding officer to die like many other wounded sailors, and speed away from the battlefield to seek better medical help in attempting to save those who were dying. Fearing additionalcommunist naval units that may launch another round of attack, all othernationalist naval vessels retreated from the battlefield around an hour after the first shot was fired, protecting the wounded flagship from possible enemy attacks, thus enabling the 25-toncommunistgunboatLiberation to safely return to its mainland base in a hero's welcome, butnationalist naval force nonetheless succeeded in killing thecommunist deputy politicalcommissar of the flotilla on board thegunboat.
Unfortunately for thenationalists, due to the chaos of the battle and the damage to the communication gears on board most of its naval vessels, the decision for the naval units to retreat from the battlefield to save the dying sailors and commanders was not relayed tonationalist force on the island, where the defenders interpreted such retreat as fleeing and abandoning them, and the morale of the land force collapsed as a result. In the meantime, thecommunist troops landed on the island believed the same and their morale was drastically boosted and their pressure on the defenders intensified. The demoralizednationalist defenders had managed to hold on their positions until the nightfall, and then asked and was allowed retreated from the island under the cover of darkness.
Once the main anchorage of the Wanshan Archipelago, the Laurel Mountain (Guishan, 桂山) Island fell into the communist hands, many other islands fell in a domino effect. From May 25, 1950, thru May 28, 1950, Ox Head (Niutou, 牛头) island, Spider Islet (Zhi Zhou, 蜘洲), Dalu (大碌), Large Head Islet (Datou Zhou, 大头洲) and other small islets fell into the communist hands.
On May 28, 1950, thenationalist naval force at the region was reinforced by 3frigates, 2landing ships, 4minesweepers, and severalgunboats newly arrived fromTaiwan. Thenationalist naval force cruised in waters north of Little Green Islet (Xiaoqingzhou, 小青洲) and Ox Head (Niutou, 牛头) island, attempted to bombard the communist positions on lands and the transport fleet. As the communistgunboats came out to meet them, thenationalist force still weary of previous naval engagement three days ago withdrew to open ocean, where the conditions favored the largernationalist fleet because there was more space to maneuver. However, the communistgunboats did not pursue because thecommunists were fully aware their meek naval strength and once the mission of preventing thenationalist naval fleet from bombarding thecommunist assets was completed, thecommunistsgunboats withdrew.
Although the bombardment mission ended early and thus was not a success, thenationalists were quick to devise a plan based on the experience to counterattack by wiping out the communist naval force after luring it out to the open ocean, and then retake the islands from the communists who would not have any naval support of their own. However, the communists also learned from earlier experience and reached the conclusion of not to engaging the much strongernationalist naval force in the open ocean where the condition favored the latter. In attempt to search the communists, a detachment of thenationalist fleet ventured too close to shore and three ships suffered damages from communist shore batteries on the Large Head Islet (Datou Zhou, 大头洲) and Triangle (Sanjiao, 三角) Island on May 30, 1950. Thenationalists consequently changed their tactics by letting the communists come to them at the waters favored thenationalists, instead of going to the communist's turf to seek out the communists in the coastal regions that favored the communists.
However, the communists had learned from the engagement as well and correctly deducted thenationalist objective, and thus made a plan of their own to counter that of thenationalist: instead of falling into thenationalist trap by fighting the waynationalists had wanted, the best way to engage the superiornationalist naval fleet was to utilize the long range shore batteries, and the much weaker naval force would act as auxiliary to the shore batteries.
On June 5, 1950, the communist force adopted the leapfrog tactic under the cover of shore batteries on adjacent islands and islets close by, succeeding in taking Dong'ao (东澳) Island, Greater Ten-thousand Mountain (Da Wanshan, 大万山) Island, and Lesser Ten-thousand Mountain (Xiao Wanshan, 小万山) Island, forcing thenationalist to withdraw to Outer Linding (Wailinding, 外伶仃) Island, Burden Pole (Dangan, 担杆) Island and other outlying islands. On the night of June 26, 1950, the communists had secretly set up the long-range shore batteries on Tri-gate (Sanmen, 三门) Island under the cover of darkness, and the communistgunboats were also deployed accordingly.
Unaware the communist's plan, thenationalist naval fleet carried out their original plan with the help of three more warships newly arrived fromTaiwan, includingdestroyers. More than a dozen nationalist warships were deployed in waters near Outer Linding (Wailinding, 外伶仃) Island, Burden Pole (Dangan, 担杆) Islands, attempting to lure out the communist naval units. In the early morning of June 27, 1950, the hidden communist shore batteries suddenly opened up on the unsuspecting nationalist fleet, and defenders on the nationalist-held islands, the fierce fight lasted for more than five hours.
After numerous extraordinarily brave but completely futile attempts[citation needed] to approach the shore to support the nationalist defenders on land which resulted in onegunboat sunk, onedestroyer, two largepatrol craft twominesweepers and twogunboats damaged, it was painfully clear that the outgunned nationalist fleet must withdraw to the open waters further away in order to avoid annihilation by the superior communist artillery on land. The communist's tactic of using numerically superior land artilleries with greater range than that of nationalist naval guns proved to be a great success and prevented any nationalist naval attempt to support their comrades-in-arms on lands. With the cover of superior firepower from the lands, the communist was able to deploy the leapfrog tactic to take the remaining islands in thenationalist hands. By July 1, 1950, the Outer Linding (Wailinding, 外伶仃) Island fell into the communist hands, and by August 3, 1950, Burden Pole (Dangan, 担杆) Islands also fell. On August 4, 1950, Direct Bay (Zhiwan, 直湾), Northern Sharp (Beijian, 北尖), and Temple Bay (Miaowan, 庙湾) and other islands fell into the communist hands. Finally, on August 7, 1950, thecommunist campaign to take the Wanshan Archipelago ended in total victory after taking the Mosquito Tail Islet (Wenwei Zhou, 蚊尾洲)
Thecommunist takeover of the Wanshan Archipelago eliminated thenationalist threat to its vital shipping lines toHong Kong andMacau and crushednationalist blockade of mouth of thePearl River. The Wanshan Archipelago Campaign was the first combined army and naval operation for thecommunists and in addition to damaging and sinking nationalist ships, eleven nationalist ships were captured and they provided valuable local defense asset once they were completely repaired and returned to the active service in thecommunist fleet. One of the major contributor to the success was the correct tactics of not engaging the overwhelmingly superior opposing naval fleet, but instead, utilizing the numerically and technically superior shore batteries that thecommunists did enjoy to engage opposing naval targets that were outgunned. The largest island, the Trash Tail (Lajiwei, 垃圾尾) Island, was renamed Laurel Mountain (Guishan, 桂山) Island, in honor of thelanding ship Laurel Mountain (Guishan, 桂山), the largestcommunist naval vessel participated in the conflict.
Thenationalist control of the Wanshan Archipelago was mostly symbolic for political propaganda and the battle for the control of thearchipelago was destined to fail for the same simple reason just like the earlierBattle of Nan'ao Island: the location was just too far away from any friendly bases and thus it was difficult to support in war, and when the support was available, it was rather costly. Although the largest island provided a relatively good anchorage, there was just not enough land to build any comprehensive facilities and infrastructures to support a fleet. As a result, many of the repairs that could be done locally had the comprehensive facilities and infrastructures been available would require traveling back to the distant friendly bases, thus greatly increased cost. When a major damage occurred, tugs were needed to tow the damaged vessel, and in the event of war when tugs could not be available, the damaged vessels had to be abandoned. In contrast, the communists had comprehensive facilities and infrastructures on the mainland and since thearchipelago at the communist's doorstep, they could simply recover the abandonednationalist vessels and repair them after taking them back to the mainland, and put them back into service to fight against the former owners of these vessels, as the case of the eleven naval vessels abandoned by thenationalists after the battle.
As for the blockade of the mouth of the Pearl River, it certainly caused difficulties for the communists. However, these difficulties could be overcome because there were and still are link between the mainland andHong Kong, andMacau via land, and for the maritime traffic, thenationalist naval force could only cover the coastal region outside the effective range of the communist's land batteries and the communist could simply move a little deeper into the Pearl River to avoid thenationalist naval force. Though this did indeed increased the cost for the communist, the price tag for the operation of the naval task force performing this duty so far away from any support base was far greater comparatively speaking, because communist transportation was mostly by woodenjunks that only required wind, while the modernnationalist navy required much more, such as fuel and maintenance supplies. Manynationalist strategist and naval commanders had pointed out this disadvantage and along with the geographically disadvantage (i.e. the lack of comprehensive facilities and infrastructures), wisely and correctly suggest to withdraw from the Wanshan Archipelago in order to strengthen the defense elsewhere, but their requests were denied because holding on something at the enemy's door step would have a significant symbolic meaning of great political propaganda value, but when the inevitable fall had finally occurred, the resulting disaster had negated any previous gains in political and psychological propaganda.
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