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Territory of the Islamic State – West Africa Province

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Not to be confused withTerritory of Boko Haram orTerritory of the Islamic State.
Province of the Islamic State
West Africa Province
ولاية غرب إفريقية
Wilāyat Garb Ifrīqīyā
West Africa Wilayah
Official seal of West Africa Province
Seal
Motto: 
لَا إِلَٰهَ إِلَّا ٱللَّٰهُ، مُحَمَّدٌ رَسُولُ ٱللَّٰهِ
lā ʾilāha ʾillā -llāh, muḥammadun rasūlu llāh
"There is no deity butGod,Muhammad is the messenger of God."
Anthem:أُمَّتِي قَدْ لَاحَ فَجْرٌ (Arabic)
Ummatī qad la-hā fajrūn
"My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared" (de facto)[1]
Area of control in 2026
Area of control in 2026
CountryIslamic State
CapitalUnknown (2014–January 24)
Gudumbali (January 24–26, 2022)
Unknown (January 26, 2022–Present)
Established2014
ReligionSunni Islam
Christianity (Persecuted minority)
CurrencyCFA franc
GDP$191 Million
Named afterWest Africa
Government
 • TypeRival government andprovince of theIslamic State[2]
 • BodyShura
 • WaliVacant
 • Head of Shura CouncilMalam Bako; allegedly killed in October of 2021
Population
 (2022)
 • Total
800,000–3,000,000[3]
Time zoneUTC+01:00 (West Africa Time)

Theterritory of theIslamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP) officially known asWilāyat Garb Ifrīqīyā,[4] refers to territory under the control or influence of theIslamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) in and around theChad Basin area.[5]

Background

[edit]

The Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP)[5] is a militant group andadministrative division of theIslamic State (IS), ISWAP is primarily active in theChad Basin, and fightsan extensive insurgency against the states ofNigeria,Cameroon,Chad andNiger. It is an offshoot ofBoko Haram with which it has a violent rivalry.[6][7][8]

Rise of Boko Haram and fracture of the group

[edit]

Boko Haram began to seize territory aggressively in late 2014, declaring northeast Nigeria to be acaliphate under their control. By the end of 2014, Boko Haram controlled an area roughly the size ofBelgium.[9] Following the2015 West African offensive Boko Haram lost most of its territory and was "technically defeated" according toMuhammadu Buhari, the President of Nigeria.[10]

In August 2016, ISWAP attempted to remove Shekau from his leadership role and replace him withAbu Musab al-Barnawi. ISWAP attempted to remove Shekau because he had disobeyedAbu Bakr al-Baghdadi's order to cease targeting Muslim civilians. Shekau rejected the move, leading to a split between the groups. As of 2017, there were three factions which were all Boko Haram in origin, all rejecting Western influence, and seeking to establish an Islamic state withsharia law. These were the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) which is part ofIS; Boko Haram, under Shekau's control; and "Ansaru which is loyal toal-Qaeda and rejected IS, however, it shares IS's disapproval of Shekau.[11][12]

Territorial control

[edit]

As of 2022,International Crisis Group researchers estimated that 800,000 to over 3 million civilians live under ISWAP's rule.[3] Despite not fully controlling the areas where it is present,[13] ISWAP maintains more control over large areas in the countryside than the Nigerian government.[14]

In 2021, ISWAPattacked and overran Boko Haram's bases in theSambisa Forest and Abubakar Shekau killed himself.[15] As a result, many Boko Haram fighters defected to ISWAP or fled south intoKaduna State,Nigeria.[16][17][18][19][20] A faction of Boko Haram led by four commanders of the Njimiya camp, rebelled and waged a low-levelinsurgency against IS in Sambisa Forest following theBattle of Sambisa in 2021. The dissidents eventually surrendered to security forces in December 2022, having been defeated by the Islamic State.[21][22]

On 24 January 2022, the small town ofGudumbali was captured and declared as ISWAP's capital. However, it was recaptured by Nigerian troops on 26 January.[23]

In late 2022, theBattles of Toumbun Allura Kurnawa and Toumbun Gini erupted between ISWAP and Boko Haram. By January 2023, these clashes had ended in a substantial Boko Haram victory and the loss of several ISWAP bases at Lake Chad, though heavy fighting continued during the next months.

Between November 5 and 8 2025, Boko Haram fighterslaunched a naval invasion againstISWAP bases across the various islands inLake Chad.[24] Clashes left at least 4 Boko Haram attackers dead and 200 ISWAP members killed.[25] Boko Haram successfully seized several ISWAP bases, surviving militants fled into their mainland hideouts around Ali Jillimari, Metele, Kangarwa, and Gudumbali in northern Borno.[25]

Governorates

[edit]
Map of ISWAP's Mantiqa (districts).

As of 2024, ISWAP's territory is divided into threeWilaya (provinces), which are further divided into smaller Mantiqa (districts). The three Wilaya areBuhaira Wilaya,Faruq Wilaya and one other Wilaya (Unofficially calledNigeria Wilaya[26]) that is located in an unknown area. The Buhaira Wilaya comprises three Mantiqa: the Buhaira Mantiqa, the Tumbuma Mantiqa and the Banki Mantiqa. The Faruq Wilaya comprises two Mantiqa only: the Faruq Mantiqa and the Sambisa Mantiqa.[26]

WilayaMantaq
Buhaira
  • Buhaira Mantiqa
  • Tunbuma Mantqa
  • Banki Mantiqa
[26]
Faruq
  • Faruq Mantiqa
  • Sambisa Mantiqa
UnknownNone

Government

[edit]

ISWAP's leadership is subordinate to IS's core group headed by itscaliph. Initially, ISWAP was headed by a single commander, termed thewali or governor. The group's first overall wali was Abubakar Shekau who was succeeded by Abu Musab al-Barnawi in 2016. Shekau was replaced by Ba Idrisa in March 2019 who was in turn purged and executed in 2020.[27][28] He was replaced by Ba Lawan.[28] In general, theshura, a consultative assembly,[29] holds great power within the group. This has led researcher Jacob Zenn to argue that the shura gives the group an element of "democracy". The shura's influence has allowed ISWAP to expand its popular support, yet has also made it more prone to leadership struggles.[30] Appointments to leadership positions such as the shura or the governorships are discussed internally and by IS's core group; IS's core group also has to approve new appointments.[29] In general, journalist Murtala Abdullahi argued that ISWAP mirrors the tendence of the IS core group to release little information on its leaders to the public, making even top commanders like Abu Musab al-Barnawi "elusive" figures.[31]

In May 2021, the shura was temporarily dissolved and Abu Musab al-Barnawi was appointed "caretaker" leader of ISWAP.[32][33] By July 2021, the shura had been restored,[29] and ISWAP's internal system had been reformed.[29][34] The regional central command now consists of theAmirul Jaish (military leader) and the shura. There is no longer an overall wali, and the shura's head instead serves as leader of ISWAP's governorates, while theAmirul Jaish acts as chief military commander. "Sa'ad" served as newAmirul Jaish, while Abu Musab al-Barnawi became head of the shura.[29] However, non-IS sources still claim that a position referred to as the overall "wali" or "leader of ISWAP" continues to exist.[34][35][36] This position was reportedly filled by ex-chief wali Ba Lawan (also "Abba Gana")[34][36] before passing to Abu-Dawud (also "Aba Ibrahim"), Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Malam Bako,Sani Shuwaram, Bako Gorgore, and Abu Ibrahim in quick succession in late 2021 and early 2022.[35][37][38]

The group makes considerable efforts to win localgrassroots support,[19] and has employed a "hearts and minds" policy toward the local communities.[20] It encourages locals to live inde facto rebel-held communities.[14] It has also massacred civilians who collaborate with the local governments or disobey ISWAP orders, as well as persecuted the Christian minority in its territory.[39] ISWAP also punishes its own fighters who commit unauthorized abuses toward civilians.[40]

Relations

[edit]

TheIslamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS) was put under ISWAP's command. ISWAP and IS-GS maintain logistical connections, but the former's actual influence on the latter is limited.[41][27] IS-GS was later separated from ISWAP, becoming its own province. Regardless, ISWAP and IS-GS continued to cooperate through the al-Furqan Office in the General Directorate of Provinces. The al-Furqan Office is located in IS-GS territory, but headed by ranking ISWAP commander Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Mainuki (alias "Abubakar Mainok").[42]

Economy

[edit]

In addition to funding delivered by IS-Central and supportive international businessmen,[43] ISWAP collects taxes on agriculture, fishing, and trade in its territories.[44][45][46]

ISWAP collects thezakat, a traditional Muslim tax and form ofalmsgiving which is used to provide for the poor. ISWAP'szakat has been featured in propaganda distributed by IS's newspaper,al-Naba.[6] ISWAP's "Zakat Office" is known to operate fairly systematically and effectively, raising substantial funds to support both ISWAP as well as local civilians. Experts Tricia Bacon and Jason Warner have described ISWAP's taxation system as being locally less corrupt and more fair than that of the Nigerian state; some local traders argue that ISWAP creates a better environment for trade in rice, fish, and dried pepper.[47] However, ISWAP militants are also known to kill those who refuse to pay taxes.[46]

ISWAP generates an estimated $191 millionUnited States dollars yearly, 10 times the amount earned by theBorno State government.[48]

In 2022, Nigeria announced its intention to redesign itscurrency in an effort to combat corruption and the financing of terrorism. ISWAP responded by declaring that from then on, people should pay their taxes to the group in theCFA franc.[46]

Public services

[edit]

ISWAP provides various health services, builds public toilets andboreholes, and has implementedits own education system based on Jihadist literature.[49][50] At the same time, ISWAP is known for targeting agencies providinghumanitarian aid, thereby depriving locals of basic necessities in government-held areas.[14][51] ISWAP also has law enforcement and appoints its ownpolice chiefs, and its police also enforces thehisbah.[52]

In ISWAP-held areas, thesharia law is enforced, including severe punishments such as the amputation of hands of thieves and the execution of adulterers. The sharia courts also offer to settle disputes over cattle rustling and various other crimes, winning some acceptance among the rural population.[40]

ISWAP had also established a "Khilafah Cadet School" for 8-16 year old boys. They are carefully selected, indoctrinated and given physical and military training. Thechild soldiers were featured in an ISWAP propaganda video titled "The Empowerment Generation", showing them executing captured Nigerian soldiers.[53]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^Marshall, Alex (9 November 2014)."How Isis got its anthem".The Guardian.ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved8 September 2020.
  2. ^https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lake-chad-basin-s-military-bases-in-iswap-s-crosshairs
  3. ^abCrisis Group 2022, p. 12.
  4. ^Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (2021-05-28)."The Islamic State's Imposition of Zakat in West Africa".Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. Retrieved2025-09-16.
  5. ^abDefence Technology News (18 May 2021)."Who are Boko Haram and what are their goals?".Medium.com. Retrieved20 October 2023.
  6. ^abAymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (28 March 2021)."The Islamic State's Imposition of Zakat in West Africa". Retrieved28 July 2021.
  7. ^"Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province"(PDF).Congressional Research Service. 26 March 2021. Retrieved28 July 2021.
  8. ^Bacon & Warner 2021, p. 80.
  9. ^Ardo Abdallaha (April 23, 2015)."Nigeria military says still in Boko Haram stronghold despite mines".Reuters. RetrievedMay 2, 2015.
  10. ^"Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants 'technically defeated' – Buhari".BBC News. 24 December 2015. Retrieved24 December 2015.
  11. ^Zenna, Jacob; Pierib, Zacharias (Summer 2017)."How much Takfir is too much Takfir? The Evolution of Boko Haram's Factionalization".Journal for Deradicalization (11):283–4.ISSN 2363-9849. Retrieved6 March 2021.
  12. ^Zenna, Jacob; Pierib, Zacharias (Summer 2017)."How much Takfir is too much Takfir? The Evolution of Boko Haram's Factionalization".Journal for Deradicalization (11): 282.ISSN 2363-9849. Retrieved6 March 2021.
  13. ^"Death of Boko Haram's leader spells trouble for Nigeria and its neighbors".DW. 8 June 2021. Retrieved10 June 2021.
  14. ^abcDulue Mbachu (17 June 2021)."Death of Boko Haram leader doesn't end northeast Nigeria's humanitarian crisis".The New Humanitarian. Retrieved18 June 2021.
  15. ^"ISWAP militant group says Nigeria's Boko Haram leader is dead".Reuters. 7 June 2021. Retrieved8 June 2021.
  16. ^"DSS: Boko Haram relocating from Sambisa forest to Kaduna". 15 September 2021.
  17. ^"Leaked DSS memo shows fleeing Boko Haram terrorists are moving to Kaduna".Legit.ng. 15 September 2021.
  18. ^Parkinson, Drew Hinshaw and Joe (2021-05-21)."Boko Haram Leader, Responsible for Chibok Schoolgirl Kidnappings, Dies".The Wall Street Journal.ISSN 0099-9660. Retrieved2021-05-21.
  19. ^abJason Burke; Emmanuel Akinwotu (20 May 2021)."Boko Haram leader tried to kill himself during clash with rivals, officials claim".Guardian. Retrieved26 May 2021.
  20. ^abJason Burke (22 May 2021)."Rise of Isis means Boko Haram's decline is no cause for celebration".Guardian. Retrieved26 May 2021.
  21. ^"Four Boko Haram Commanders Surrender To Nigerian Army In Borno After Years In Sambisa Forest".Sahara Reporters. 17 December 2022. Retrieved10 January 2023.
  22. ^"Abubakar Shekau's Boko Haram Faction Confirms Death Of Leader, Issues Fresh Threats".Sahara Reporters. 15 June 2021. Retrieved16 June 2021.
  23. ^Maina, Maina (26 January 2022)."Troops battle ISWAP in Borno, dislodge caliphate HQ, recover Gudumbali".Daily Post.
  24. ^Onje, Ojochenemi (2025-11-10)."Boko Haram, ISWAP in fierce battle over Lake Chad Islands".Businessday NG. Retrieved2025-11-10.
  25. ^ab"TRT Afrika - Clashes between rival terrorist groups in Nigeria leave at least 200 dead: Media reports".www.trtafrika.com. Retrieved2025-11-10.
  26. ^abc"Mapping an Evolution Armed Constellation"(PDF).
  27. ^abZenn 2020, p. 6.
  28. ^abBassim Al-Hussaini (3 March 2020)."New ISWAP boss slays five rebel leaders, silences clerical tones".Premium Times. Retrieved30 April 2020.
  29. ^abcdeMalik Samuel (13 July 2021)."Islamic State fortifies its position in the Lake Chad Basin".Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved25 July 2021.
  30. ^Zenn 2020, p. 7.
  31. ^Murtala Abdullahi (15 December 2022)."Counter Terrorism Operations Squeeze Islamic State Despite Elusive Leadership".Humangle. Retrieved10 January 2023.
  32. ^Zenn 2021, p. 1.
  33. ^Ahmad Salkida (21 May 2021)."What Shekau's Death Means For Security In Nigeria, Lake Chad".Humangle. Retrieved18 June 2021.
  34. ^abc"ISWAP-Boko Haram Reshuffles 'Cabinet', Imposes Levies On Agricultural, Trade Activities In Nigerian Communities".Sahara Reporters. 4 July 2021. Retrieved23 September 2021.
  35. ^abWale Odunsi (6 November 2021)."ISIS crowns Sani Shuwaram as new ISWAP leader".Daily Post. Retrieved8 November 2021.
  36. ^abWale Odunsi (18 August 2021)."ISWAP reshuffles Nigerian leaders after ISIS order".Daily Post. Retrieved23 September 2021.
  37. ^Maina Maina (14 May 2022)."ISWAP commanders, Bako Gorgore, Abu Ibrahim killed in airstrike in Borno".Daily Post. Retrieved10 June 2022.
  38. ^Murtala Abdullahi (8 December 2022)."ISWAP's Pledge To New ISIS Leader Shows Transformation".Humangle. Retrieved10 January 2023.
  39. ^Crisis Group 2022, p. 10.
  40. ^abCrisis Group 2022, pp. 10–11.
  41. ^"Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province"(PDF).Congressional Research Service. 26 March 2021. Retrieved28 July 2021.
  42. ^Zenn 2023c. sfn error: no target: CITEREFZenn2023c (help)
  43. ^Zenn 2023b.
  44. ^Danielle Paquette (21 May 2021)."Is Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau dead this time? The Nigerian military is investigating".Washington Post. Retrieved26 May 2021.
  45. ^"Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province"(PDF).Congressional Research Service. 26 March 2021. Retrieved28 July 2021.
  46. ^abcAbdulkareem Haruna (12 November 2022)."ISWAP Collects Taxes In CFA As Nigeria Government Plans Currency Redesign".Humangle. Retrieved10 January 2023.
  47. ^Bacon & Warner 2021, p. 81.
  48. ^ADF (2025-08-12)."ISWAP Assaults Target Military Bases in Lake Chad Region".Africa Defense Forum. Retrieved2025-12-21.
  49. ^Aliyu Dahiru (1 October 2022)."ISWAP Rebrands, Expands Scope Of Operations".Humangle. Retrieved10 January 2023.
  50. ^Aliyu Dahiru (1 October 2022)."ISWAP Rebrands, Expands Scope Of Operations".Humangle Media. Retrieved8 December 2022.
  51. ^"Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province"(PDF).Congressional Research Service. 26 March 2021. Retrieved28 July 2021.
  52. ^"Chaos as Boko Haram/ISWAP executes its own 'governor of Lake Chad' in power struggle".Reuben Abati Media. 28 July 2020. Archived fromthe original on 7 August 2021. Retrieved7 August 2021.
  53. ^Dass & Singh 2022, p. 3. sfn error: no target: CITEREFDassSingh2022 (help)

Bibliography

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