Kraków Army (Polish:Armia Kraków) was one of thePolish armies which took part in thePolish Defensive War of 1939. It was officially created on March 23, 1939, as the main pivot of Polish defence. It was commanded by Gen.Antoni Szylling. Originally, Kraków Army was to be made of seven infantry divisions, two cavalry brigades and one mountain brigade. On September 1, 1939, General Szylling had the force which consisted of five infantry divisions, two cavalry brigades and one brigade of mountain infantry. Altogether, the army was made of 59 battalions, 29 squadrons, 352 cannons, 90 tanks, two armoured trains and 44 planes. These forces were not enough to halt German advance, especially in the area north ofCzęstochowa, where Kraków Army connected withŁódź Army. Main thrust ofWehrmacht panzer units was directed there, and this area was defended only by the Polish 7th I.D., which was destroyed in the early days of September 1939, opening the way towards central Poland.
On March 15, 1939, units of theWehrmacht enteredPrague, and two days earlier atBerlin,Joachim von Ribbentrop in a conversation with Polish ambassadorJózef Lipski demanded definite answer to German demands ofFree City of Danzig and a highway through thePolish Corridor. On March 23, a number of officers of the Polish Army was ordered to come to theGeneral Inspector of the Armed Forces inWarsaw. Together with General Antoni Szylling, these officers (Colonel Jan Rzepecki, Major Władysław Steblik, Major Kazimierz Szpądrowski and Major Franciszek Chmura) were ordered to create staff of the newly created Kraków Army. The army itself was created upon written order ofEdward Rydz-Śmigły, which was handed to General Szylling on the same day, together with more detailed demands. On March 25, staff officers of Kraków Army arrived atKraków, staying at theJan III Sobieski barracks, where the 5th Military Police Unit was located. On the same day at noon, General Szylling met commanders of the divisions that came under his control, and on March 27, the officers took their oath.
Its main task was to delay advancing German troops and withdraw eastwards along the northern line of theCarpathians and defend theheavily industrializedUpper Silesia region, together with western counties ofLesser Poland and the Carpathian foothills. Altogether, Kraków Army defended southwestern border of Poland, fromKrzepice nearCzęstochowa, toCzorsztyn. In the area of Częstochowa, the 7th I.D. (GeneralJanusz Gąsiorowski) was placed, with its right wing supported by theKraków Cavalry Brigade of GeneralZygmunt Piasecki. The remaining units were divided into two operational groups.Operational Group Silesia (under GeneralJan Jagmin Sadowski) was made of the 23rd I.D. (ColonelWładysław Powierza), together with the 55th (reserve) I.D. (ColonelStanisław Kalabiński), and soldiers manning theFortified Area of Silesia.Operational Group Bielsko (under GeneralMieczysław Boruta-Spiechowicz) was made of the 21st I.D. (GeneralJózef Kustroń), and the 1st Brigade of Mountain Infantry (ColonelJanusz Gaładyk). This group was located in the area ofŻywiec,Chabówka, andBielsko-Biała. Furthermore, in the area ofPszczyna was the 6th I.D. (GeneralBernard Mond), and in the area ofKraków, the10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade (ColonelStanisław Maczek).
Kraków Army's tasks were as follows:
Kraków Army fought against GermanArmy Group South, whose units crossed the border on September 1, 1939, at 4 a.m. In central part of the front, German10th Army advanced, attacking in the sector fromTarnowskie Góry toWieluń. North of the 10th Army was the8th Army (advancing towardsSieradz andŁódź), and in the south was and the14th Army, advancing towardsKraków. On September 1, theWehrmacht failed to cause a breach Polish positions, but it was obvious that the Germans tried to bypassFortified Area of Silesia, attacking both north and south of the fortifications. As early as the night of September 1/2, Polish situation became difficult, as the 7th I.D., operating near Częstochowa, found it hard to halt the advance of the panzers of the XVI Panzer Corps, which fought their way into central Poland. This division was located some 40 kilometers away from other Polish units; close to it was theVolhynian Cavalry Brigade, which itself was attacked by the Germans in theBattle of Mokra.
On September 2, German1st Panzer Division bypassed Częstochowa north of the city, and supported by theLuftwaffe, managed to cross theWarta river. At the same time,Kraków Cavalry Brigade was attacked by the2nd Light Division in the area ofWoźniki. After heavy fighting, it withdrew towardsZawiercie, which caused a breach in the defensive line, enabling the Germans both to bypass Polish fortifications in Upper Silesia, and to attack the 7th I.D. from the rear. As a result, the 7th I.D. was destroyed on Sept. 2, and its remaining units retreated to the forests nearKoniecpol. This defeat enabled German XVI Panzer Corps to move towardsKielce without any problems. Since Polish Army did not have any reserve units east of Częstochowa,Edward Śmigły-Rydz ordered a detachment of thePZL.23 Karaś bombers to attack the advancing panzers. The attack, however, did not result in a success, and the advance of the Wehrmacht continued.
In the south, the Wehrmacht attacked on Sept. 2 in two spots -Mikołów/Pszczyna, andWysoka/Rabka. Near Pszczyna, Polish 6th I.D. failed to halt the5th Panzer Division, and in the morning of the same day, the2nd Panzer Division was stopped in theBattle of Jordanów. At the same time, however, the Germans won theBattle of Węgierska Górka. In the afternoon of September 2, the situation of Kraków Army turned critical. German panzers attacked in large formations in the area ofKoziegłowy in the north, and in the area ofJordanów in the south. Furthermore, breach of the Polish lines near Pszczyna caused another problem, as it gave the Germans an opportunity to bypass the Upper Silesian fortifications. As a result, General Szylling, in a conversation with Marshall Śmigły-Rydz stated that it was necessary to withdraw from Upper Silesia andTrans-Olza, and to retreat towards Kraków. The Marshall gave tentative permission at 16:00 on Sept. 2, urging Szylling to press his soldiers to do their best. In the evening of September 2, the situation deteriorated further, as Kraków Cavalry Brigade was pushed behind the Warta, and the distance to the retreating remnants of the 7th I.D. was some 30 kilometres. German 2nd Light Division entered this gap, advancing towardsŻarki. The Luftwaffe bombed Polish towns and rail junctions, General Szylling was unable to locate the positions of his divisions, and to get in touch with their commandants. At 18:00, Szylling once again talked with Śmigły-Rydz, and 30 minutes later, the Marshall agreed to the withdrawal of Kraków Army to the line marked by theNida andDunajec rivers. It was a difficult decision, as it meant that the pre-war Polish defensive plan (seePlan West) was abandoned. Śmigły-Rydz, however, hoped that the retreat would save Kraków Army from complete destruction.
In the evening of Saturday, Sept. 2, the order to retreat reached Polish units. Kraków Cavalry Brigade, together with the 7th I.D. was to move towardsJędrzejów, halting the advance of the 2nd Light Division. 22nd Mountain I.D. was to withdraw towardsOlkusz, and to supportOperational Group Silesia (renamed intoOperational Group Jagmin), which itself was to retreat behind thePrzemsza.Operational Group Bielsko (renamed intoOperational Group Boruta) was to withdraw behind theSkawa, and to take positions betweenZator andWadowice. General retreat towards theDunajec and theNida was to begin in the night of September 2/3.. General Szylling specified that units located in the centre of the front were to retreat first, to avoid being surrounded by German panzers advancing fast both in the north and the south. This plan failed, as Polish 7th I.D. was completely destroyed in the morning of Sunday, September 3, by the14th Infantry Division, the4th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Light Division.
The retreat itself did not improve the situation of Kraków Army, as it lost its fortified defensive positions, together with heavy equipment, which was abandoned. Polish historians Czesław Grzelak and Henryk Stańczyk in their book "Kampania polska 1939 roku" write that several historians question the decision of General Szylling, as in their opinion the decision to withdraw eastwards on the second day of the war was premature. Tadeusz Jurga wrote: "To remain in defensive positions would result in halting the advance of the German 10th Army, which later destroyedPrusy Army (...) Furthermore, defensive positions of Kraków Army were based on fortifications, which had been built before the war. These fortifications eliminated technological superiority of the Wehrmacht. To abandon them and to fight in the open lowered defensive abilities of Kraków Army".[1]
The decision to abandon southwestern Poland had far-reaching consequences, as Kraków Army was the centre point of the defensive plan. Its new line of defence along the Dunajec and the Nida was ill-prepared, and the retreat itself turned out to be very difficult, as Polish units were under constant pressure of the Luftwaffe and German motorized divisions. In the morning of September 3, General Szylling ordered general retreat east of Kraków, dividing his army intoOperational Group Jagmin (north of the Vistula, consisting of the 23rd, the 55th and the 22th[clarification needed] I.D.'s, together with Kraków Cavalry Brigade, and soldiers of Fortified Group Silesia), andOperational Group Boruta (south of the Vistula, consisting of the 6th and the 21st I.D.'s, the 10th Motorized Brigade, and the 1st Mountain Brigade). Szylling hoped to reach the defensive line by September 7, and first days of retreat were relatively calm, as the Wehrmacht concentrated its efforts in the area ofPiotrków Trybunalski.
On September 5, German 2nd Panzer Division, together with the3rd Mountain Division and the7th Infantry Division broke through Polish lines nearPcim, capturingMyślenice,Bochnia andWiśnicz, thus positioning themselves in the rear of the retreating units ofOperational Group Boruta. On the same day,Fall 5 September instruction was issued by theOberkommando der Wehrmacht, ordering German divisions to continue their advance towardsTarnów andRzeszów. On September 6, German4th Light Division attacked Polish 24th I.D. near Tarnów, crossing the Dunajec south ofZakliczyn. Polish unit managed to halt the Germans, and its commandant, ColonelBolesław Krzyżanowski hoped to keep the line of the Dunajec forOperational Group Boruta. In the evening of September 6, GeneralKazimierz Fabrycy ordered him to retreat to theWisłoka river. On the same day, Polish units abandoned Kraków.
On September 6, Marshall Śmigły-Rydz reorganized the units fighting in southernLesser Poland.Operational Group Boruta was moved toKarpaty Army, and soon afterwards, Karpaty Army was merged withOperational Group Jagmin, creatingMałopolska Army, under General Fabrycy. Śmigły-Rydz was well aware of the fact that it was impossible to hold the line of the Dunajec and the Nida, and that further retreat towards theSan was the only option.
The Army was commanded by generalAntoni Szylling; his chief of staff was ColonelStanisław Wiloch. It consisted of five infantry divisions, one motorized cavalry brigade, one mountain brigade and one cavalry brigade. The22nd Mountain Infantry Division (ColonelLeopold Endel-Ragis) was supposed to be the reserve ofŁódź Army, but due to destruction of rail connections, this division never reached its destination in central Poland. It concentrated nearKrzeszowice andTrzebinia, and on September 2 joined Kraków Army, replacing the 7th I.D., which had been destroyed near Częstochowa.
| Kraków Army | Unit | Polish name | Commander | Remarks | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army units - gen.Antoni Szylling | |||||||||||||
| 6th Infantry Division | 6 Dywizja Piechoty | Bernard Mond | |||||||||||
| 7th Infantry Division | 7 Dywizja Piechoty | gen. bryg.Janusz Gąsiorowski | |||||||||||
| Krakowska Cavalry Brigade | Krakowska Brygada Kawalerii | gen.bryg.Zygmunt Piasecki | |||||||||||
| 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade | 10 Brygada Kawalerii | płk.Stanisław Maczek | |||||||||||
| 22nd Mountain Infantry Division | 22. Dywizja Piechoty Górskiej | col.Leopold Endel-Ragis | joined Kraków Army on September 2 | ||||||||||
| ŚląskOperational Group - gen.Jan Jagmin-Sadowski | |||||||||||||
| 23rd Infantry Division | 23 Dywizja Piechoty | płk.Władysław Powierza | Upper Silesian | ||||||||||
| 55th Infantry Division | 55 Dywizja Piechoty | płk.Stanisław Kalabiński | reserve | ||||||||||
| Bielsko Operational Group - gen.Mieczysław Boruta-Spiechowicz | |||||||||||||
| 21st Mountain Infantry Division | 21 Dywizja Piechoty Górskiej | gen.Józef Kustroń | |||||||||||
| 1st Mountain Brigade | 1 Brygada Górska | płkJanusz Gaładyk | mostly eliteKOP troops | ||||||||||
