Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities signed byPaul Bremer on behalf of theCoalition Provisional Authority on 23 May 2003, disbanded theIraqi military, security, and intelligence infrastructure of PresidentSaddam Hussein.[1] Around 400,000 Iraqi soldiers were made unemployed by the order.[2]
It has since become an object of controversy, cited by some critics as the biggest American mistake made in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein[3] and as one of the main causes of theIraqi insurgency and the rise of theIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS).[4]
Before the United States andcoalition partners launched theinvasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003, former US ArmyLieutenant GeneralJay Garner and the US military had already laid out several plans for what to do with Iraqi security forces once they were defeated. Recognizing the danger posed by complete demobilization in an environment of high unemployment, poor security, and social unrest, the plan called for the dissolution of theIraqi Republican Guard, the engagement of soldiers in the Iraqi Army in reconstruction efforts, and the foundation of a new army from three to five existing Iraqi divisions; this plan was presented toPresidentGeorge W. Bush byUnder Secretary of Defense for PolicyDouglas Feith during aNational Security Council (NSC) meeting on 12 May 2003.[4] The NSC unanimously favored keeping and utilizing the Iraqi army.[3]
On 11 May 2003, General Garner was replaced as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) by AmbassadorPaul Bremer. Bremer's first order as CPA administrator, issued 16 May, disestablished the IraqiBaath Party and began a process of "de-Ba'athification."[5]
Upon arrival in Baghdad, Bremer and his senior advisor,Walter B. Slocombe, came to favor the dissolution of the Iraqi Army.[4] This view was based on the belief that the Iraqi Army had already demobilized itself and could not be practically reconstituted, e.g., the Iraqi conscripts would not return, and in any case Iraqi military facilities had been destroyed.[6] In the words of Slocombe, "There was no intact Iraqi force to 'disband.'"[6] As to who originally proposed the idea, it has been sometimes attributed to Slocombe; Feith stated that it was Bremer's idea, but Bremer has denied that and said he could not remember who had initially come up with the idea.[4]
According to Bremer in his bookMy Year in Iraq, the CPA and thePentagon jointly coordinated the drafting of the order to disband the Iraqi defense and security services. Bremer, highlighting that such an order would be critical in eliminating the foundations of the previous Iraqi regime and demonstrating "to the Iraqi people that...neither Saddam nor his gang is coming back," sent a proposal for the disbandment to thenSecretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld on 19 May, along with a recommendation that all former troops save some top intelligence, security, and Baathist leaders be given severance payments. Under Secretary of Defense Feith requested some editing of the text on 22 May, and that night Rumsfeld chief of staffLawrence Di Rita and CPA spokespersonDan Senor coordinated plans for the actual announcement. After receiving permission from Secretary Rumsfeld, Bremer briefed President Bush by video conference and subsequently signed the order on 23 May.[7]
However, Bush said in a later interview that the initial plan was to maintain the Iraqi Army, and he was not sure why that did not occur.[8] In response to this report, Bremer providedThe New York Times with a letter sent by him on 22 May through the Secretary of Defense to the President that described the measure, to which the President sent a thank you letter.[9] Furthermore, Bremer stated that even before he arrived in Iraq, he sent a draft of the order on 9 May to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and thenCFLCC Commander, Lieutenant GeneralDavid McKiernan.[9] TheTimes quoted an anonymous White House official that the original plan to maintain the army could not be carried out and that Bush understood that.[9]
GeneralPeter Pace later stated that theJoint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted for advice or a recommendation with regard to the order.[9]Secretary of StateColin Powell has also said he was never consulted on the matter, which he believed was a major mistake, and thenNational Security AdvisorCondoleezza Rice was said to have been surprised by the decision.[4] According toFranklin Miller, who helped formulate post-war plans of theNational Security Council for Iraq:
The most portentous decision of the occupation, disbanding the Iraqi army, was carried out stealthily and without giving the president’s principal advisors an opportunity to consider it and give the president their views.”[10]
Paul Bremer has said that instructions to disband the Iraqi army were given to him by Undersecretary of Defense Feith who told Bremer, “We’ve got to show all the Iraqis that we’re serious about building a new Iraq….And that means that Saddam’s instruments of repression have no role in that new nation.”[3] Feith’s boss, Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld, has said that the order to disband the Iraqi army was not formulated in the Pentagon, but rather came from “elsewhere”.[3] The CIA Director at that time,George Tenet, has said the decision was made “above Rumsfeld’s pay grade”.[10]
A different set of events was portrayed byBob Woodward in his bookState of Denial. According to him, the decision never came back to Washington for input except for a lawyer from the National Security Council, who gave legal opinions on the first two CPA orders. Rumsfeld said he spoke only rarely with Bremer, no NSC meeting had been convened on the matter, and that he "would be surprised" if eitherDeputy Secretary of DefensePaul Wolfowitz or Under Secretary Feith had told Bremer to carry out the two CPA orders.[11]
A 2023 article in the journalForeign Affairs declared that, “a more complete origin story is finally available”, regarding the order that disbanded the Iraqi army.[12] The initial draft apparently originated in the Pentagon’sOffice of Special Plans led byAbram Shulsky, who recounted that, “There was not a real interagency process….It would have been informal at that point”. When Bremer presented it during a video conference with the president and NSC on May 22, 2003, no NSC members spoke up, and after a long period of silence Bush said to Bremer, “you’re the guy on the ground”. Bush thus deferred to Bremer, and Bremer issued the order the next day.[12][13]
Several British generals later said that they raised concern about the disbandment and were personally against it, though Bremer responded that no UK officials voiced concerns in their meetings and that they regarded the effective demobilization of the Iraqi military as a "fait accompli".[14] These claims were disputed by senior British officers.[14] A 2004 report inThe Guardian cited senior UK military and intelligence sources saying that British AdmiralMichael Boyce told his commanders to negotiate with senior Iraqi Army and Republican Guard officers to switch sides and operate under UK guidance to uphold law and order, but that CPA orders 1 and 2 effectively destroyed any chance to regroup the Iraqi forces for such a plan.[15]
CPA Order 2 led to protests and rioting from former Iraqi soldiers with some threatening attacks on coalition forces if their demands were not met. At a protest in Baghdad on June 18th, 2003, two former Iraqi soldiers were shot dead by US soldiers as they were allegedly throwing rocks.[16][17]
On 13 September Bremer amended the order through CPA order number 34, which stated that the Board of Supreme Audit was no longer to be considered a dissolved entity and should continue operations.[18]
In 2004, Iraq's interim presidentGhazi Al Yawer blamed the deteriorating security situation in the country on the disbanding of the Iraqi military, saying that "We blame the United States 100 percent for the security in Iraq, they occupied the country, disbanded the security agencies and for 10 months left Iraq's borders open for anyone to come in without a visa or even a passport."[19]
lIn an interview with PBS's Frontline, Bremer went on record saying, "I think the decision not to recall Saddam's army, from a political point of view, is the single most important correct decision that we made in the 14 months we were there." President Bush however took a different view, writing in his memoir "Decision points" that "Thousands of armed men had just been told they were not wanted. Instead of signing up for the new military, many joined the insurgency".[20]
Entities affiliated with Hussein bodyguards:
