Sir Archibald Murray | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Nickname | "Old Archie" |
| Born | (1860-04-23)23 April 1860 |
| Died | 21 January 1945(1945-01-21) (aged 84) |
| Allegiance | United Kingdom |
| Branch | British Army |
| Service years | 1879–1922 |
| Rank | General |
| Unit | Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers |
| Commands | Aldershot Command Egyptian Expeditionary Force Chief of the Imperial General Staff 2nd Division 2nd BattalionRoyal Inniskilling Fusiliers |
| Conflicts | Second Boer War First World War |
| Awards | Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George Commander of the Royal Victorian Order Distinguished Service Order Mentioned in Despatches |
GeneralSir Archibald James Murray,GCB, GCMG, CVO, DSO (23 April 1860 – 21 January 1945) was aBritish Army officer who served in theSecond Boer War and theFirst World War. He was chief of staff to theBritish Expeditionary Force (BEF) in August 1914 but appears to have suffered a physical breakdown in theretreat fromMons, and was required to step down from that position in January 1915. After serving asDeputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff for much of 1915, he was brieflyChief of the Imperial General Staff from September to December 1915. He was subsequently Commander-in-Chief of theEgyptian Expeditionary Force from January 1916 to June 1917, in which role he laid the military foundation for the defeat and destruction of theOttoman Empire in theArabian Peninsula and theLevant.
Archibald James Murray was "the fourth child and second son of nine children" of Charles Murray and his wife Anne Graves. He was educated atCheltenham College and it was from here, in 1877, that he went to theRoyal Military College, Sandhurst, intent on starting a military career, despite there being "no evidence of a family military connection or any indication of how free Murray was to choose his own career".[1] He wascommissioned as asecond lieutenant into the 27th Regiment of Foot, later theRoyal Inniskilling Fusiliers, "an unfashionable regiment", on 13 August 1879.[2][1]
He was appointedadjutant of his regiment on 12 February 1886.[3] After promotion tocaptain on 1 July 1887[4] and taking part in the suppression of aZulu uprising in 1888,[5] he became adjutant of the 4th Battalion, theBedfordshire Regiment on 15 December 1890.[6]
Murray attended theStaff College, Camberley from 1897 to 1898[5][7] and was promoted while there tomajor on 1 June 1898.[8] While at the college he encountered several men with whom he would later encounter in the years leading up to theFirst World War, most notablyDouglas Haig andEdmund Allenby, who attended from the years 1896 to 1897, andWilliam Robertson. It was also here where Murray gained his nickname of "Old Archie".[7]
He served in theSecond Boer War as deputy assistant adjutant general forintelligence inNatal from 9 October 1899[9] and then aschief of staff to the commander there.[5] He took part in the withdrawal fromDundee[10] and then thesiege of Ladysmith in late 1899 and became senior staff officer to SirArchibald Hunter,general officer commanding of the 10th Division, early in 1900.[5] He was appointed an assistant adjutant general on 6 March 1900,[11] promoted tolieutenant-colonel on 29 October 1900[12] and awarded theDistinguished Service Order on 29 November 1900.[13] He was againmentioned in despatches in February 1901.[14]
Murray was appointedcommanding officer of the 2nd Battalion,Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, stationed inIndia, in October 1901, but never took up this position. He was deployed to NorthernTransvaal in February 1902[5] where he was seriously wounded in April[15] and mentioned in despatches once more in July.[16]
After the end of hostilities in South Africa, he returned to England in June 1902,[17] and became assistant adjutant general at Headquarters1st Division atAldershot on 3 November 1902.[18] Promoted tocolonel on 29 October 1903,[19] he was appointed aCompanion of the Order of the Bath in the1904 Birthday Honours[20] and, promoted in November 1905 to the temporary rank ofbrigadier general,[21] upon being made BGGS ofAldershot Command, became a Commander of theRoyal Victorian Order on 12 June 1907.[22]
Murray became director of military training, "a key posting in an army that was undergoing substantive reform",[23] at theWar Office, in succession to Major-GeneralDouglas Haig, on 9 November 1907[24] and, having been promoted tomajor-general on 13 July 1910,[25] he was advanced toKnight Commander of the Order of the Bath in the June1911 Coronation Honours.[26] He also took part in the procession for the coronation of KingGeorge V on 22 June 1911.[27] Murray became inspector of infantry on 9 December 1912.[28] At the General Staff Conference in January 1914 he rejected proposals to adopt what he saw as a stereotyped French fire-and-movement doctrine.[29] He then served asGeneral officer commanding (GOC) of the2nd Division from 1 February 1914, taking over this post from Major-GeneralHenry Merrick Lawson.[30][23]
When theFirst World War started in July 1914 Murray was not appointed quartermaster general of theBritish Expeditionary Force (BEF) as was originally intended. Instead he becamechief of staff.[31][5] He was promoted to temporarylieutenant-general on 5 August.[32] Murray had already earned a high reputation as a staff officer in South Africa and underSir John French, the BEF's commander, at theWar Office.[33] It is sometimes claimed that Murray was given the position largely because French's initial choice for the post,Henry Hughes Wilson, was vetoed because of his role in theCurragh incident.[34] Although this claim was made after the war byJames Edward Edmonds,Walter Kirke (in his memoir ofGeorge Macdonogh) and Murray, there is no contemporary evidence, even in Wilson's diary, to confirm it (unlike January 1915, when Wilson was certainly blocked from succeeding Murray for political reasons).[33] J. M. Bourne, however, offers another explanation:
French offers no explanation in his memoirs for Murray's appointment. A CGS was urgently needed. Murray was to hand. He had the necessary seniority. He was staff trained. He had known Sir John French for ten years, working quite closely with him when French was GOC Aldershot and then CIGS. Unlike Wilson, Murray brought with him no political baggage and no professional enemies. His was a sensible, sound and safe appointment. Murray was, in short, unobjectionable.[35]
Wilson, Sir John French (British Expeditionary Force (BEF)Commander-in-Chief) and Murray crossed to France on 14 August.[36] The code books had been left behind in London, and LieutenantEdward Spears had to go back to London for another set. He returned to find Murray atRheims trying to "unravel" the strategic situation of theGerman Empire's armies' invasion of France on a set of large maps spread out upon the floor of his hotel room, on all fours, dressed only in his "pants" (underwear), whilst chambermaids came and went.[37][38]
During the retreat of August 1914 the BEF staff, who had not rehearsed their roles, performed poorly. French was a dynamic leader but no manager.[39]William Robertson andWalter Kirke recorded that Murray knew little of the plans which Wilson had drawn up with the French and had to work with a staff "almost entirely staffed from the (Military Operations) Directorate" who were used to working with Wilson. This staff included ColonelGeorge Harper.[31]
Murray summoned the Corps Chiefs of Staff at around 1am on 24 August (the night after theBattle of Mons), and ordered them to retreat, but gave them no detailed plans, leaving them to work out the details themselves.[40] French agreed toDouglas Haig's request thatI Corps retreat east of theForest of Mormal (Haig Diary, 24 August) without, apparently,Horace Smith-Dorrien (GOCII Corps) being asked or informed.[41] (Inept staffwork was not unique to GHQ – neither I nor II Corps staff had checked whether or not the Forest of Mormal was occupied by the enemy.[42]) On 24 August Harper refused to do anything for Murray, so thatLord Loch had to write messages even though it was not his job. Loch wrote in his diary for that day that Murray was "by nature petulant" and "difficult to work with".[31] Murray and his staff were working flat out in intense heat atBavay, and recorded (24 August) that he had passed 24 hours without undressing or sleeping. Smith-Dorrien visited GHQ to request detailed orders on the evening of 24 August, and had to bully Murray into issuing orders for II Corps to retreat toLe Cateau.[43]
Murray noted in his diary (25 August) that GHQ had moved back from Le Cateau toSt Quentin and thatI Corps was being heavily engaged by night – making no mention of what II Corps were up to.[41] When4th Division arrived (25 August)Thomas Snow's orders were to help prepare a defensive position on the Cambrai-Le Cateau position, as GHQ had no idea of the seriousness of the situation facing II Corps. 4th Division was eventually able to participate in theBattle of Le Cateau.[44] The news that Smith-Dorrien planned to stand and fight at Le Cateau reached GHQ at 5 am on 26 August – French was woken from his sleep, and insisting that Murray not be woken, sent Smith-Dorrien an ambiguous message that he had "a free hand as to the method" by which he fell back, which Smith-Dorrien took as permission to fight.[45]
Murray appears to have suffered some kind of physical collapse round about this time, although the details differ between different eyewitness accounts. Wilson recorded that Murray had "completely broken down", had been given "morphia or some other drug" which made him incapable of work and when told (7 am on 26 August) of Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand and fight "promptly got a fainting fit".[39] Spears' recollection (in 1930) was that Murray had collapsed with a weak pulse, but did not actually faint, when told earlier during the same night (the news later turned out to be exaggerated) that the Germans had fallen upon Haig's I Corps atLandrecies. Spears wrote that Murray was too ill to attend the meeting of Sir John French withJoseph Joffre andCharles Lanrezac on 26 August,[46] althoughJohn Terraine has him attending this meeting.[47]Nevil Macready later recorded that Murray fainted at his desk whilst working atNoyon (where GHQ was based on 27 August).[48]
Wilson returned to GHQ on 29 August from a visit to Joffre to find – he said – "a perfect debacle" with "Murray leading the fright".[39]
On 4 September Murray had an important meeting withJoseph Gallieni (military governor of Paris) andMichel Maunoury (commander,French Sixth Army) to discuss the planned Allied counterattack which would become theFirst Battle of the Marne. Murray had no idea when French, who was out visitingBritish I Corps, was to return and was unwilling to make any decision in his absence. After a three-hour meeting a provisional agreement was drawn up; the French came away with the impression that the British would not cooperate and that Murray had "une grande repugnance" for them, but he did in fact pass the plans along to French. Whilst this was going on, Wilson was negotiating separate plans withLouis Franchet d'Esperey (French Fifth Army, on the British right).[49][50]
Wilson noted (diary 6 Sep – the day on which the BEF began to advance as part of theBattle of the Marne) that French and Murray "were out motoring and playing the ass all day". He had to intercede to prevent French from sacking Harper (Wilson diary 7 Sep) but a week later recorded (Wilson diary 14 Sep), that Murray and Harper argued constantly. After a month Murray was still talking of "my men" and "(Wilson')s men" which Wilson thought "rather sad" and "deplorable" (Sidney Clive diary 18 Sep). Wilson thought French and Murray were "between them quite unable to size up a position or to act with constancy for 24 hours" (Wilson diary 28 Sep)[51]
Murray complained to Victor Huguet (a French liaison officer serving with the British) about Wilson (6 October), but also told Wilson that French was getting "more unreasonable" and asked Wilson whether he (Murray) should resign; Wilson informedWilliam Lambton, French's secretary, of both of these incidents. Murray also (4–5 November) complained and threatened to resign when Wilson amended one of his orders without telling him.[52][53] Murray later wrote (in 1930) "Why did I stay with (this) War Office clique when I knew I was not wanted? I wanted to see Sir John through. I had been so many years with him, and knew better than anyone how his health, temper and temperament rendered him unfit, in my opinion, for the crisis we had to face. ... the senior members (of GHQ staff) entirely ignored me, as far as possible, continually thwarted me, even altered my instructions." He also said that Wilson's disloyalty had left him the impossible job of managing French alone.[54][31]Henry Rawlinson noted in his diary that Murray became "a cipher at GHQ" (28 November 1914), was disliked by his subordinates (4 December) and that French often ignored his staff "chiefly because Murray is incapable of managing them and getting any good work out of them" (6 December 1914).[51]James Edward Edmonds later said that Murray sometimes falsified the timing of orders, but he was given away by the time stamp which the duty clerk placed on them.[55]
At the end of November and again in mid-December French told Wilson he was thinking of moving Murray to a corps command.Asquith andKitchener (20 December) forbade French to replace Murray with Wilson. Wilson claimed to have heard Joffre, on a visit to GHQ (27 December), complain that it was "a pity" that Murray had not been removed.[52][53]
Murray was sent off sick for a month (24 January 1915) and French demanded his resignation (25 January 1915), despite Murray insisting that he only needed to take a few days off. Wilson was widely suspected of having plotted for Murray's removal in the vain hope of replacing him, but the job went toRobertson.[52][53][56] Although a sore throat prevented him seeing Murray off, French wrote to him (29 January) saying he hoped to see him back as an army commander before long. Haig wrote (diary 26 January) that "Murray was a kindly fellow but not a practical man in the field".[53]
A staff officer, Brigadier GeneralPhilip Howell, wrote to his wife (27 February 1915) that Murray had been "incompetent, cantankerous, timid & quite useless".[31] The Official Historian Edmonds later described him as "a complete nonentity".Richard Holmes described him as "an intelligent, cultivated man" who had not yet recovered from a stomach wound in South Africa.[57]
He was madeDeputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff on 10 February 1915[58] and was appointed aKnight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George on 18 February 1915.[59][60] As deputy CIGS Murray's responsibility was training and organising theNew Armies, a job requiring much travel.[61][62]
Murray becameChief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) on 26 September 1915.[63] He was promoted to substantive lieutenant general on 28 October 1915.[64] After the war he wrote to GeneralSir Ian Hamilton, criticisingKitchener in harsh terms, writing that "He seldom told the absolute the truth and the whole truth" and that it was not until Kitchener left for his inspection of theDardanelles that Murray was able to inform the Cabinet that volunteering had fallen far below the level needed to maintain a BEF of 70 divisions, requiring the introduction ofconscription. The Cabinet insisted on proper General Staff papers being presented in Kitchener's absence. Murray wrote that "I have never in my forty years' service done better work than I did during the three months I was CIGS".Cabinet SecretaryMaurice Hankey praised Murray highly as a real "StJohn the Baptist" to Sir William Robertson, his successor as CIGS.[61]
HoweverH. H. Asquith, the prime minister, sought changes in senior military positions. Haig, about to be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the BEF (3 December 1915), rejected Kitchener's suggestion that Murray be reappointed as Chief of Staff BEF (the job which Robertson was vacating to become CIGS).[65] In his final days in office Murray issued a paper urging concentration of effort on the Western Front (16 December 1915) which was described by Robertson as the "Bible of the war".[61] Murray was forced out as CIGS on 23 December 1915[66] and replaced by Robertson, a strong advocate of the single (Western) front strategy.[67]
Murray's advice had been met with dismay from someLiberal members of thecoalition Cabinet, who were unhappy at the realignment of Britain's war effort towards total war and a massive commitment of troops to the Western Front.Augustine Birrell (Chief Secretary for Ireland), along withReginald McKenna (Chancellor of the Exchequer),Walter Runciman (President of the Board of Trade) andSir Edward Grey (Foreign Secretary) had contemplated joiningSir John Simon (Home Secretary) in resigning in protest at the conscription of bachelors, due to beenacted in January 1916. Birrell wrote to the Prime Minister (29 December) that he and Runciman agreed that finance and "strategic policy as expounded in Murray's long, unconvincing and frightening paper" were more important than conscription.[68]
In January 1916, Murray was given command of theBritish Troops in Egypt and theEgyptian Expeditionary Force.[69] Egypt was a base for theSalonika andGallipoli Fronts. In January 1916 Murray was relieved of operational command of (though not logistical responsibility for) British troops at Salonika, which was given to the French GeneralMaurice Sarrail. Initially GeneralJohn Maxwell still had command of Western Egypt (facing theSenussi Revolt) until he was sent to Ireland to suppress theEaster Rising.[70]
Murray wrote to Robertson (18 March 1916) that the Australians were "from a physical point of view a magnificent body of men" but had "no idea of ordinary decency or self control".[71]
Britain had 300,000 men in Egypt, many of them ANZACs or Gallipoli evacuees, supposedly to guard against a Turkish attack across the Sinai, which Robertson thought logistically unlikely. By July 1916, on Robertson's orders, Murray had shipped out 240,000 of them, including 9 infantry divisions, three independent infantry brigades and 9 heavy artillery batteries, most of them going to France, leaving him with four Territorial divisions and some mounted troops.[72] 11,000 Indian troops were shipped out, and another division toMesopotamia and an eleventh to France early in 1917, leaving him with three under-strength infantry divisions and the elements of two more, and two cavalry divisions.[70]
Trying to prevent another Turkish attack against theSuez Canal, Murray reorganized his troops and led acounterattack, winning a victory atRomani in August 1916. He now had to advance over theSinai Peninsula, which consisted of sand in the north, gravel and clay in the centre and mountains in the south. 400 miles of railway, 300 miles of metalled and wire-meshed roads and 300 miles of pipes had to be laid. Drinking water had to be pumped underneath the Suez Canal from theSweet Water Canal in theNile Delta, requiring the construction of filtration plants, reservoirs and pumping stations. The line on the frontier was 45 miles in width, half the width of the 80–90-mile front on the Canal. Murray captured ElArish in December andRafa on thePalestine frontier in January 1917.[70][5]
Lloyd George wanted to make the destruction of Turkey a major British war aim, and two days after becoming Prime Minister told Robertson that he wanted a major victory, preferably the capture ofJerusalem, to impress British public opinion. Robertson thought the capture ofBeersheba should suffice as more divisions were needed in France. However, Robertson was not entirely hostile to efforts in Palestine, telling Murray (31 January 1917) he wanted him to launch a Palestine Offensive in autumn and winter 1917, if the war was still going on then. The object was to sustain public morale and, with a compromise peace leaving Germany in control of the Balkans increasingly possible, to captureAleppo. Aleppo was more easily reached from Palestine than from Mesopotamia, and her capture would make untenable Turkey's hold on both regions. At this stageRussia was still pinning down many Turkish troops, although theAdmiralty were not enthused about suggestions that theRoyal Navy make amphibious landings in Palestine. It was agreed to build up Murray's forces to 6 infantry divisions and 2 mounted divisions by the autumn, as well as 16 Imperial Camel Companies and possibly some Indian cavalry from France.[73]
Murray was advanced toKnight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George on 20 January 1917.[74]
It was Murray who authorizedT. E. Lawrence's expedition to join theArab Revolt against the Turks in Arabia, providing monetary and limited military support for Lawrence's attack onAqaba: initially skeptical of the Revolt's potential, Murray became an ardent supporter of it later in his tenure in Cairo, largely through Lawrence's persuasion.[75] By early 1917 the Turks had also withdrawn from Persia and had pulled back fromMedina, which wasbesieged by the Arabs.[76]
Murray completed the defeat of the Senussi (takingSiwa in February 1917).[70]
In March 1917 at theFirst Battle of Gaza a British force under Murray's command comprising52nd (Lowland) Division reinforced by an infantrybrigade from Eastern Force attackedGaza. While theImperial Mounted Division held off the Turkish reinforcements, the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (Anzac Mounted Division) reinforced the infantry attack and together, they succeeded in entering Gaza from the north and capturing the adjoining hill of Ali Muntar. However the determination of the Turkish defenders and the threat from large Turkish reinforcements approaching from the north and north east ultimately led to decision to withdraw.[77] The First Battle of Gaza had been described as "most successful" by understating British and exaggerating enemy casualties. This led to loss of political confidence in Murray.[78]
At theSecond Battle of Gaza in April 1917 Murray assembled a larger force comprising the 52nd (Lowland) Division,53rd (Welsh) Division, the54th (East Anglian) Division and the recently formed74th (Yeomanry) Division which was made up of brigades of dismountedyeomanry serving as infantry. However the six British tanks, the British heavy guns and naval gunfire from the Frenchcoastal defence shipRequin and two Britishmonitors (M21 andM31) did little damage and only served to warn the Turks of the imminent British attack which faltered at all points. Again Murray decided to withdraw.[79] The Second Battle of Gaza failed due to lack of artillery.[78]
The Second Battle of Gaza coincided with the failure of theNivelle Offensive, reports of unrest among Russian troops after theFebruary Revolution andan escalation of the U-Boat War (it was thought that loss of shipping might make Egypt untenable) causing Robertson to prefer a return to a defensive policy in the Middle East, although this was not Lloyd George's view.[76]
Despite laying the plans for the ultimate defeat of the Turks, Murray was relieved of command and replaced byEdmund Allenby on 29 June 1917.[5] Murray was mentioned in despatches again on 3 November 1917.[80]
Murray was reassigned, becomingGeneral Officer Commanding-in-Chief forAldershot Command in October 1917, in succession to General SirArchibald Hunter,[81] and having been promoted to fullgeneral, "for distinguished service in connection with military operations in the Field", on 25 August 1919,[82] remained in post until 15 November 1919.[83]
After retiring from the British Army on 15 November 1922,[84] he was advanced toKnight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath in the1928 New Year Honours.[85]
He was also colonel of theRoyal Inniskilling Fusiliers from 22 August 1911.[86]
Murray died at his home "Makepeace" atReigate inSurrey on 21 January 1945 and was buried in a family vault on the west side ofHighgate Cemetery.[5]
In 1890 he married Caroline Helen Sweet; they had one son.[5] Following the death of his first wife he married Mildred Georgina Dooner in 1912.[5]
Murray was unsympathetically portrayed byDonald Wolfit in the cinema filmLawrence of Arabia as a stereotypicalblimpish British general, obsessed with artillery.[87]Mount Murray in the Canadian Rockies was named in his honor in 1918.[88]
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Despatches of General Murray
Other
| Military offices | ||
|---|---|---|
| Preceded by | GOC 2nd Division February–August 1914 | Succeeded by |
| Preceded by | Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff February–September 1915 | Succeeded by |
| Preceded by | Chief of the Imperial General Staff September–December 1915 | Succeeded by |
| Preceded by Sir Charles Monro | GOC British Troops in Egypt and theEgyptian Expeditionary Force 1916–1917 | Succeeded by |
| Preceded by | GOC-in-C Aldershot Command 1917–1919 | Succeeded by |
| Honorary titles | ||
| Preceded by | Colonel of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 1911–1923 | Succeeded by |
| International | |
|---|---|
| National | |
| People | |
| Other | |
