Franz Brentano introduced the problem of intentionality.
Analytic philosophy was deeply influenced byAustrian realism in the former state ofAustria-Hungary, so much so thatMichael Dummett has remarked it is better characterized as Anglo-Austrian rather than the usual Anglo-American.[29]
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what theScholastics of theMiddle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.
Gottlob Frege was a Germangeometry professor at theUniversity of Jena, logician, and philosopher who is understood as the father of analytic philosophy.[39] He advocatedlogicism, the project of reducingarithmetic to pure logic; supportingLeibniz and opposingKant in the philosophy of mathematics.[40]
Neo-Kantianism dominated the late nineteenth century inGerman philosophy. Husserl's bookPhilosophie der Arithmetik (1891) argued the concept of acardinal number derived from mental acts of grouping objects and counting them.[42] In contrast to this "psychologism", Frege, inThe Foundations of Arithmetic (1884) andThe Basic Laws of Arithmetic (German:Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, 1893–1903), argued that mathematics and logic have their own public objects, independent of one's private judgments or mental states.[43] Following Frege, the logicists tended to advocate a kind ofmathematical Platonism.[44]
Frege also proved influential in the philosophy of language. Dummett traces the linguistic turn to Frege'sFoundations of Arithmetic and hiscontext principle.[47] Frege writes "never ... ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of aproposition."[48] As Dummett explains, in order to answer a Kantian question, "How are numbers given to us, granted that we have no idea or intuition of them?", Frege finds the solution in defining "the sense of a proposition in which a number word occurs."[49] Thus a problem, traditionally solved alongidealist lines, is instead solved alonglinguistic ones.[47]
Frege's paper "On Sense and Reference" (1892) is seminal, containingFrege's puzzles aboutidentity and advancing amediated reference theory.[50] Frege points out the reference of "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" is the same: both refer to the planetVenus.[k] Therefore, substituting one term for the other doesn't change thetruth value (salva veritate). However, they differ in what Frege calls cognitive value or the mode of presentation. One has to distinguish between two notions of meaning: thereference of a term and the sense of a term. As Frege points out, "the Morning Star is the Morning Star" is uninformative, but "the Morning Star is the Evening Star" is informative; thus, the two expressions must differ in a way other than reference.[50]
A related puzzle is also known as Frege's puzzle, concerning intensional contexts andpropositional attitude reports. Consider the statement "The ancients believed the morning star is the evening star." This statement might be false. However, the statement "The ancients believed the morning star is the morning star" is obviously true. Here again, the morning star and the evening star have different meanings, despite having the same reference.[50][52]
The paper "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry" (1918) reflects Frege's anti-idealism.[54] He argues for aPlatonist account of propositions or thoughts. Frege claims propositions are intangible, like ideas; yet publicly available, like an object. In addition to the physical, public "first realm" of objects and the private, mental "second realm" of ideas, Frege posits a "third realm" of Platonic propositions, such as thePythagorean theorem.[54]
Analytic philosophy in the narrower sense of twentieth-century anglophone philosophy is usually thought to begin withCambridge philosophers Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore's rejection of Hegelianism for being obscure; or the "revolt against idealism."[59][60][o] Russell summed up Moore'scommon sense influence:[p]
"G. E. Moore...took the lead in rebellion, and I followed, with a sense of emancipation. Bradley had argued that everything common sense believes in is mere appearance; we reverted to the opposite extreme, and that everything is real that common sense, uninfluenced by philosophy ortheology, supposes real. With a sense of escaping from prison, we allowed ourselves to think that grass is green, that the sun and stars would exist if no one was aware of them, and also that there is a pluralistic timeless world of Platonic ideas."[63]
An important aspect of Hegelianism and British idealism waslogical holism—the belief that aspects of the world can be known only by knowing the whole world. This is closely related to thedoctrine of internal relations, the belief thatrelations between items areinternal relations, oressentialproperties the items have by nature. Russell and Moore in response promulgatedlogical atomism and the doctrine ofexternal relations—the belief that the world consists ofindependent facts.[60][66][67][q]
During his early career, Russell adopted Frege's predicate logic as his primary philosophical method, thinking it could expose the underlying structure of philosophical problems. This was done most famously in histheory ofdefinite descriptions in "On Denoting", published inMind in 1905.[71] The essay has been called a "paradigm of philosophy."[72]
In this essay, Russell responds to both Meinong and Frege. Russell uses his analysis of descriptions to solve ascriptions of nonexistence, such as with "the presentKing of France". He argues allproper names (aside fromdemonstratives likethis orthat) are disguised definite descriptions; for example, "Walter Scott" can be replaced with "the author ofWaverley".[r] This position came to be calleddescriptivism.[74]
Russell presents his own version of Frege's second puzzle.
"If a is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. NowGeorge IV wished to know whether Scott was the author ofWaverley; and in fact Scott was the author ofWaverley. Hence we may substitute “Scott” for “the author ofWaverley” and thereby prove that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Yet an interest in thelaw of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe.”[71]
The essay also illustrates the concept ofscopeambiguity by showing how denying "The present King of France is bald" can mean either "There is no King of France" or "The present King of France is not bald". Russell quips "Hegelians, who love asynthesis, will probably conclude that he wears a wig."[71] For Russell, there was knowledge by description and, from sense-data theory,knowledge by acquaintance.[75]
Russell claimed the problems of philosophy can be solved by showing the simple constituents of complex notions.[5]Logical form would be made clear bysyntax. For example, the English wordis has three distinct meanings, which predicate logic can express as follows:
For the sentence 'the catis asleep', theis ofpredication means that "x is P" (denoted as P(x)).
For the sentence 'thereis a cat', theis ofexistence means that "there is an x" (∃x).
For the sentence 'threeis half of six', theis of identity means that "x is the same as y" (x=y).
From about 1910 to 1930, analytic philosophers emphasized creating anideal language for philosophical analysis, which would be free from the ambiguities of ordinary language that, in their opinion, often led philosophers astray.[80]
The book starts "The world is all that is the case."[84] Wittgenstein claims the universe is the totality of actualstates of affairs and that these states of affairs can be expressed and mirrored by the language of first-order predicate logic. Thus, apicture of the universe can be constructed by expressing facts in the form ofatomic propositions and linking them usinglogical operators.[85][86][87]
TheTractatus introduced philosophers to the termstautology,truth conditions, and to thetruth table method.[88][86] Wittgenstein believed tautologies orlogical truthssay nothing, butshow the logical structure of the world,[89][90] and has been labeled amystic who believed in theineffable by some readers.[91] TheTractatus further ultimately concludes that all of its propositions aremeaningless, illustrated with aladder one must toss away after climbing up it.[92] The book ends, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."[93]
Logical positivists used formal logical methods to develop anempiricist account of knowledge. They adopted theverification principle, according to which every meaningful statement is eitheranalytic or synthetic.[99] The truths of logic and mathematics were tautologies, and those of science were verifiable empirical claims. These two constituted the entire universe of meaningful judgments; anything else was nonsense. Thus the principle rejected statements of metaphysics, theology,ethics, andaesthetics ascognitively meaningless.[92]
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.[100][101]
This led the logical positivists to reject many traditional problems of philosophy. They typically considered philosophy to have a minimal function, concerning the clarification of thoughts, rather than having a distinct subject matter of its own.
Friedrich Waismann introduced the concept ofopen texture to describe the universal possibility ofvagueness in empirical statements.[104] Waismann never finished a book titledLogik, Sprache, Philosophie intended to present the ideas of logical positivism to a wider audience.[105]
Carnap and Reichenbach started the journalErkenntnis.[106] Carnap advocated solving problems by "semantic ascent", talkingabout language instead of its objects.[107] Carnap also distinguished between trivialinternal questions and meaningless external questions.[108] He is best known for works likeDer logische Aufbau der Welt (translated asThe Logical Structure of the World, 1967) andThe Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language (1959).[109][110][u]
AfterWorld War II, analytic philosophy became interested in ordinary language philosophy, in contrast to ideal language philosophy. Rather than rely on logical constructions, philosophers emphasized the use ofnatural language. There were two strains of ordinary language philosophy: the later Wittgenstein and Oxford philosophies.
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, from the posthumousPhilosophical Investigations (1953), differed dramatically from his early work of theTractatus.[116] Philosophers refer to them like two different philosophers: "early Wittgenstein" and "later Wittgenstein".
The criticisms ofFrank Ramsey on the "color-exclusion problem" led to some of Wittgenstein's first doubts with regard to his early philosophy.[117] Wittgenstein in theTractatus thought the only necessity is logical necessity; yet that no point in space can have two different colors at the same time seems anecessary truth but not a logical one.[83][118] Wittgenstein responded to Ramsey in "Some Remarks on Logical Form" (1929), the only academic paper he ever published.[119][120] Ramsey died ofjaundice the next year at the age of 26.[121]
Norman Malcolm also famously creditsPiero Sraffa for providing Wittgenstein with the conceptual break from his earlier philosophy, by means of a rude gesture:[122][123]
Wittgenstein was insisting that a proposition and what it describes must have the same 'logical form', the same 'logical multiplicity'. Sraffa made a gesture, familiar to Neapolitans as meaning something like disgust or contempt, of brushing the underneath of his chin with an outward sweep of the fingertips of one hand. And he asked: 'What is the logical form of that?'
Prior to the publication of thePhilosophical Investigations, philosophers likeJohn Wisdom andRush Rhees were some of the few sources of information about Wittgenstein's later philosophy; for example, Wisdom's workOther minds (1952) on theproblem of other minds.[114][124][125][v] One notion found in both early and later Wittgenstein is that "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."[126] Philosophers had been misusing language and asking meaningless questions, and it was Wittgenstein's job "to show the fly the way out of thefly bottle."[127][87]
The later Wittgenstein develops atherapeutic approach. He introduces the concept of a "language-game" as a "form of life". By "language-game", he meant a language simpler than an entire language.[128] Wittgenstein argued that a word or sentence has meaning only as a result of the "rule" of the "game" being played. Depending on the context, for example, the utterance "Water!" could be an order, the answer to a question, or some other form of communication. Rather than his prior picture theory of meaning, the later Wittgenstein advocates a theory ofmeaning as use, according to which words are defined by how they are used within the language-game.[116]
Theduck-rabbit illusion became famous when Wittgenstein used it to distinguish "seeing that" from "seeing as".
The notion offamily resemblance thinks things thought to be connected by one essential, common feature may in fact be connected by a series of overlappingsimilarities, where no one feature is common to all of them.Games, which Wittgenstein used as an example to explain the notion, have become the classic example of a group that is related by family resemblance.[116]
Philosophical Investigations also contains theprivate language argument. Another point Wittgenstein makes against the possibility of a private language involves thebeetle-in-a-box thought experiment.[129] He asks the reader to imagine that each person has a box, inside which is something that everyone intends to refer to with the wordbeetle. Further, suppose that no one can look inside another's box. Under such a situation, Wittgenstein says the word beetle is meaningless.
The other trend of ordinary language philosophy was known as "Oxford philosophy", in contrast to the earlier analytic Cambridge philosophers. Influenced by Moore's common sense and the later Wittgenstein'squietism, the Oxford philosophers claimed ordinary language already represented many subtle distinctions not recognized in traditional philosophy. The most prominent Oxford philosophers wereGilbert Ryle,Peter Strawson, andJohn L. Austin.[130]
Ryle, inThe Concept of Mind (1949), criticizedCartesiandualism, arguing in favor of disposing of "Descartes' myth" of theghost in the machine by recognizing "category errors".[131] Ryle sees Descartes' error as similar to saying one sees the campus, buildings, faculty, students, and so on, but still goes on to ask "Where is the university?"[131]
Strawson first became well known with his article "On Referring" (1950), a criticism of Russell's theory of descriptions.[132] On Strawson's account, the use of a descriptionpresupposes the existence of the object fitting the description.[132] In his bookIndividuals (1959), Strawson examines our conceptions of basicparticulars.[133]
Chinese philosopherZhang Shenfu first introduced Russell's ideas toChina, and later translated theTractatus.[145] In 1920, Russell visited China at the invitation ofLiang Qichao.[145][x] This begins the first phase of analytic philosophy in China.[147] Tscha Hung then introduced logical positivism to China withThe Philosophy of the Vienna Circle (1945).[148][149] During the second phase, scholars such asJin Yuelin and Hong Qian spread analytic philosophy, untilCommunist political pressure sidelined research.[145][y]
After thereform and opening up of the 1970s, analytic philosophy in China is now in its third phase, and is an active and growing area of study.[145][147][z]
During the second half of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy saw the demise of logical positivism and a revival of metaphysical theorizing.[151]
Kant scholarWilfrid Sellars, the son ofRoy Wood Sellars, "revolutionized both the content and the method of philosophy in the United States".[152] Sellars's criticism of the "Myth of the Given", inEmpiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956), challenged logical positivism by arguing against sense-data theories and knowledge by acquaintance.[153] In his "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" (1962), Sellars'scritical realism distinguishes between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" of the world.[154] Sellars's goal of asynoptic philosophy uniting the everyday and scientific views of reality is the basis of what is sometimes called the Pittsburgh School, whose members includeRobert Brandom,John McDowell, andJohn Haugeland.[155]
W. V. O. Quine helped to undermine logical positivism.
Harvard philosopher W. V. O. Quine shaped much of subsequent philosophy and is recognized as "one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century".[156] He is regularly cited as the greatest philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century,[157] or the next great philosopher after Wittgenstein.[158]
Quine was a student of Carnap.[113] He was an empiricist who sought tonaturalize philosophy and saw philosophy as continuous with science, distinguished only by philosophy being the most general science.[159] However, Quine doubted usual theories of meaning, and, instead of logical positivism, advocated a kind ofsemantic holism andontological relativity, which explained that every term in any statement has its meaning contingent on a vast network of knowledge and belief, the speaker's conception of the entire world.[160][161]
In hismagnum opusWord and Object (1960), Quine introduces the idea ofradical translation, an introduction to his theory of theindeterminacy of translation, and specifically to prove theinscrutability of reference.[162] Thegavagaithought experiment tells about a linguist, who tries to find out what the expressiongavagai means when uttered by a speaker of a yet-unknown native language upon seeing arabbit. At first glance, it seems thatgavagai simply translates withrabbit. Quine points out there is no way to tell that the speaker did not mean, for instance, "undetached rabbit-part" (such as its ear) as well as several other scenarios.[163]
Quine's essay on ontology, "On What There Is" (1948) elucidates Russell's theory of descriptions.[44] Quine usesPegasus instead of "the present King of France" and dubs the problem of nonexistencePlato's beard. The essay contains Quine's famous dictum ofontological commitment, "To be is to be the value of avariable". One is committed to the entities his theory posits by use of theexistential quantifier, like "There are some so-and-sos".[44] Other parts of speech do not commit one to entities and so for Quine aresyncategorematic.[164]
Also among the developments that resulted in the decline of logical positivism and the revival of metaphysics was Quine's attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951), published inThe Philosophical Review,[165][166] a paper "sometimes regarded as the most important in all of twentieth-century philosophy".[167][aa] The paper made Quine the most dominant philosopher in America before Kripke.[169]
Saul Kripke helped to revive interest in metaphysics among analytic philosophers.
Saul Kripke is widely regarded as having revived theories ofessence and identity as respectable topics of philosophical discussion.[170] He was influential in arguing that flaws in common theories of descriptions and proper names are indicative of larger misunderstandings of the metaphysics of modality, or of necessity andpossibility.[170]
Especially important was Kripke's bookNaming and Necessity (1980). According to one author,Naming and Necessity "played a large role in the implicit, but widespread, rejection of the view—so popular among ordinary language philosophers—that philosophy is nothing more than the analysis of language."[175] Kripke argued proper names arerigid designators, or designate the same thing in allpossible worlds, unlike descriptions. For example, an election may have turned out differently, so the description "winner of the1968 US presidential election" might have designatedHubert Humphrey instead ofRichard Nixon. However, the name "Richard Nixon" designates the man Richard Nixon, regardless of the election results.[176]
David Lewis defended a number of elaborate metaphysical theories. In works such asOn the Plurality of Worlds (1986) andCounterfactuals (1973), Lewis argued formodal realism andcounterpart theory – the belief in real, concrete possible worlds, and argued against any "ersatz" conception of possibility.[182][183] According to Lewis, "actual" is merely anindexical label we give a world when we are in it. Lewis applied Quine's dictum of ontological commitment to the statement "There are other ways things could have been;" committing Lewis (by his lights) to the real existence of other ways things could have been.[184] He also defended what he called Humeansupervenience, and acounterfactual theory ofcausation, another view of Hume's.[185]
Frege questioned standard theories oftruth, and sometimes advocated adeflationary,redundancy theory of truth, i. e. that the predicate "is true" does not express anything above and beyond the statement to which it is attributed.[54] Frank Ramsey also advocated a redundancy theory.[186]
Polish philosopherStanisław Leśniewski, along withNelson Goodman, establishedmereology, the formal study of parts and wholes. Mereology was originally a variant of nominalism arguing one should dispense with set theory, but the now broader subject of parts and wholes arguably goes back to the time of thepre-Socratics.[191]
Derek Parfit inReasons and Persons (1984) defends a kind ofbundle theory of personal identity.[199] Parfit issues the thought experiment of a case offission, where one person splits into two, say surviving with half of their brain, while the other half is put into a new body.[200] David Lewis defendsperdurantism, where people arefour-dimensional, so a person at any one time is only apart or slice of the whole person.[182]
Eternalism holds that past, present, and future are equally real. In contrast,presentism holds that only entities in the present exist.[210] Themoving spotlight theory is a kind of hybrid view where all moments exist, but only one moment is present.[211]Growing block, advocated by Charlie Broad, holds that only the past and present exist, but the future does not (yet) exist (there is also the reverse, a shrinking block).[211][212]
Edmund Gettier helped to revitalize analytic epistemology.
Owing largely toEdmund Gettier's paper "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" (1963)[215] and the so-calledGettier problem, epistemology has since enjoyed a resurgence as a topic of analytic philosophy. Usingepistemic luck, Gettier provided counterexamples to the "justified true belief" (JTB) definition of knowledge, found as early asPlato's dialogueTheaetetus.[216] Philosophers give alternatives to the JTB account or developtheories of justification to deal with Gettier's examples. For example,Timothy Williamson argues inKnowledge and Its Limits (2000) that knowledge issui generis and indefinable.[217]
Discussed since antiquity, Chisholm, in hisTheory of Knowledge (1966), details theproblem of the criterion with two sets of questions:
What do we know? or What is the extent of our knowledge?
How do we know? or What is the criterion for deciding whether we have knowledge in any particular case?[226]
Answering the former question first is calledparticularism, whereas answering the latter first is calledmethodism. A third solution isskepticism, or doubting there is such a thing as knowledge.[226][227]
Epistemic closure is the claim that knowledge is closed underentailment; in other words, epistemic closure is a property or theprinciple that if a subject knows, and knows that entails, then can thereby come to know.[228] Most epistemological theories involve a closure principle, as do many skeptical arguments (e. g. thedream argument). InProof of An External World (1939), G. E. Moore uses closure in his famous anti-skeptical "here is one hand" argument.[229] Shortly before his death, Wittgenstein wrote the posthumously publishedOn Certainty (1969) in response to Moore.[230][231]
In his bookFact, Fiction, and Forecast (1955), Nelson Goodman introduced the "new riddle of induction", so-called by analogy with Hume's classicalproblem of induction.[235] Goodman's famous example was to introduce the predicatesgrue and bleen. "Grue" applies to all things before a certain arbitrary timet, just in case they are green, but also just in case they are blue after timet; and "bleen" applies to all things before timet, just in the case they are blue, but also just in case they are green after timet. So the inductive inference "All emeralds are grue" will be true before timet but "All emeralds are bleen" will be true aftert.[235]
Other, related topics of research include debates over cases of knowledge, the value of knowledge, the nature ofevidence, the role ofintuitions in justification, andabduction.[236]
Early analytic philosophers often thought ethics could not be made rigorous enough to merit any attention.[237] It was only with the emergence of ordinary-language philosophers that ethics started to become acceptable.[237] Analytic philosophers have gradually come to distinguish three major types of moral philosophy.
Meta-ethics, which investigates moral terms and concepts;
Normative ethics, which examines and produces ethical judgments;
Applied ethics, which applies normative principles to specific, practical issues.[238]
After Moore's work, not much was done in analytic philosophy with ethics until the 1950s and 1960s, when there was a renewed interest in traditional moral philosophy.[237]Philippa Foot defendednaturalist moral realism and contributed several essays attacking other theories.[ac] Foot introduced the famous "trolley problem" into the ethical discourse.[244] A student and friend of Wittgenstein,Elizabeth Anscombe, wrote a monographIntention (1957) with an influential treatment ofaction.[245] Her article "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) called the is–ought problem into question.[246]J. O. Urmson's article "On Grading" also did so.[247]
The second strain is founded on logical positivism and its attitude that unverifiable statements are meaningless. As a result, they avoided normative ethics and instead pursued meta-ethics. The logical positivists thought statements aboutvalue—including all ethical and aesthetic judgments—arenon-cognitive. As a result, they adopted anemotivist theory, also known as the hurrah/boo theory, valuing judgments expressed the attitude of the speaker.[248] On this view, saying, "Murder is wrong", is equivalent to saying, "Boo to murder", or saying the word "murder" with a particular tone of disapproval.
As the influence of logical positivism declined, analytic philosophers had a renewed interest in normative ethics. Contemporary normative ethics is dominated by three schools:consequentialism,deontology, andvirtue ethics.
Current analytic political philosophy owes much toJohn Rawls, who in a series of papers (most notably "Two Concepts of Rules" (1955) and "Justice as Fairness" (1958)) and his bookA Theory of Justice (1971) produced a sophisticated defense of a generally liberalegalitarian account of distributive justice.[273][274][255] Rawls introduced the thought experiment of theveil of ignorance.
[W]hy isn't mixing what I own with what I don't own a way of losing what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don't? If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?[278]
Another development was the school ofanalytical Marxism, which applies analytic techniques to the theories ofKarl Marx and his successors. The best-known member isG. A. Cohen, whose bookKarl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (1978) defends Marx'shistorical materialism, and is generally considered the genesis of the school.[279] Other prominent analytical Marxists include the economistJohn Roemer, the social scientistJon Elster, and the sociologistErik Olin Wright. The work of these later philosophers has furthered Cohen's work by bringing to bear modern social science methods, such asrational choice theory.[280] Although a continental philosopher,Jürgen Habermas is another influential—if controversial—author in contemporary analytic political philosophy, whose social theory is a blend of social science, Marxism, neo-Kantianism, and pragmatism.[281]
Communitarians such as Alasdair MacIntyre,Charles Taylor,Michael Walzer, and Michael Sandel use analytic techniques to challenge liberal assumptions.[257] In particular, communitarians challenge whether the individual can be considered apart from the community in which he is brought up and lives. While in the analytic tradition, its major exponents often also engage at length with figures generally considered continental, notably Hegel andFriedrich Nietzsche.
Sibley, Weitz, and Goodman were anti-essentialists. In "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics" (1956), Weitz famously arguesnecessary and sufficient conditions will never exist for the concept 'art' because it is an "open concept".[286] Goodman thought art is not so different from science, and is another branch of epistemology.[287]
Arthur Danto argued for an "institutional definition of art" in the essay "The Artworld" (1964) in which Danto coined the term "artworld" (as opposed to the existing "art world", though they mean the same), by which he meant cultural context or "an atmosphere ofart theory".[288][289]George Dickie similarly states "a work of art in the classificatory sense is 1) an artifact 2) on which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld) has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation."[290] Dickie's studentNoël Carroll is a leading philosopher of art contributing to thephilosophy of film.
There is also the historical definition, best exemplified byJerrold Levinson. For Levinson, "a work of art is a thing intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art: regard in any of the ways works of art existing prior to it have been correctly regarded."[291] In the opinion of historian of aesthetics Władysław Tatarkiewicz, there are six conditions for the presentation of art: beauty, form, representation, reproduction of reality, artistic expression, and innovation.[292] Nicholas Wolterstorff emphasizes the social aspect of art, not as mere contemplation but as action.[293] Langer, Levinson and Wolterstorff have all contributed to thephilosophy of music.
Guy Sircello's work resulted in new analytic theories of love,[294] sublimity,[295] and beauty.[296] For Sircello, beauty is an objective,qualitative property. One author claims Sircello's theory is similar to Hume's.[297]Mary Mothersill sought to restore earlier conceptions of beauty inBeauty Restored (1984).[298]Roger Scruton also advanced theories of beauty. According to Kant scholarPaul Guyer, "AfterWollheim, the most significant British aesthetician has been Roger Scruton."[299] Scruton contributed to thephilosophy of architecture.
Colin Radford and Michael Weston introduced theparadox of fiction in their paper "How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?" (1975)[300] The paper discusses emotional responses to fiction, such asLeo Tolstoy's novelAnna Karenina.[300] Their question is how people can be moved by things that do not exist. The paper concluded people's emotional responses to fiction are irrational.[300] American philosopherKendall Walton's paper "Fearing Fictions" (1978) addresses the paradox.[301][302] This paper served as the impetus formake-believe theory.
Kripke inWittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) provides a skeptical, rule-following paradox, undermining the possibility of our ever following rules, and so calls into question the idea of meaning. Kripke writes this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date".[309] Theportmanteau "Kripkenstein" has been coined as a term for a fictional person who holds the views expressed by Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein.
Analytic philosophy's interest in philosophy of language has arguably been superseded by an interest in the philosophy of mind.[13] Two common notions in analytic philosophy of mind are intentionality, as above, andqualia, a term introduced by C. I. Lewis.[315]
Emergent materialism holds that mental properties emerge as novel properties of complex material systems.[316] It can be divided into emergence which deniesmental causation and emergence which allows for causal effect. A version of the latter type was advocated by John Searle, calledbiological naturalism.[ae] The other main group of materialist views in the philosophy of mind can be labeled non-emergent (or non-emergentist) materialism, and includes philosophicalbehaviorism,typeidentity theory (reductive materialism),functionalism, and pure physicalism (eliminative materialism).
Motivated by the logical positivists, behaviorism was the most prominent theory of mind in analytic philosophy for the first half of the twentieth century.[318] Behaviorists believed either that statements about the mind were equivalent tostatements about behavior anddispositions to behave in particular ways; or that mental states were directly equivalent to behavior and dispositions to behave. Hilary Putnam criticized behaviorism by arguing that it confuses the symptoms of mental states with the mental states themselves, positing "super Spartans" who never display signs of pain.[319]
Behaviorism later became much less popular in favor of either type identity theory or functionalism.[320] Type identity theory or type physicalism identified mental states with brain states. Former students of Ryle at theUniversity of AdelaideJack Smart andUllin Place argued for type physicalism.[321][322] Type identity was criticized by Putnam and others usingmultiple realizability.[323] The criticism spawnedanomalous monism.[324]
Functionalism remains the dominant theory.[af]Computationalism is a kind of functionalism. The view was first associated with Sellars.[326] Putnam was also a functionalist.[323] Another functionalist wasJerry Fodor, who is known for proposing themodularity of mind, a theory ofinnateness.[327] He also introduced thelanguage of thought hypothesis, which describes thought as possessing syntax or compositional structure (sometimes known as mentalese).[328] Searle'sChinese room argument criticized functionalism and holds that while a computer can understand syntax, it could never understand semantics.[329] A similar idea isNed Block'sChina brain.[330]
Finally, analytic philosophy has featured a certain number of philosophers who were dualists, and recently forms ofproperty dualism have had a resurgence; the most prominent representative isDavid Chalmers.[339] Chalmers introduced the notion of thehard problem of consciousness. He has criticizedinteractionism and shown sympathy withneutral monism. Kripke also makes a notable argument for dualism.[340][341]Epiphenomenalism, the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain but do not cause anything else in return, is sometimes classed as a kind of property dualism.[337][342]
Yet another view ispanpsychism, or the view that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world.[343] Panpsychism can be contrasted withidealism by still believing in matter.[ag]
In recent years, a central focus of research in the philosophy of mind has been consciousness and the philosophy of perception. Thehomunculus argument is an objection raised against many older theories of perception.[345] While there is now a general consensus for the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness,[346] there are many opinions as to the specifics. The best known theories in analytic philosophy are Searle's naive realism, Fred Dretske andMichael Tye'srepresentationalism, Dennett'sheterophenomenology, and thehigher-order theories of eitherDavid M. Rosenthal—who advocates a higher-order thought (HOT) model—or David Armstrong andWilliam Lycan—who advocate a higher-order perception (HOP) model.[347][ah]
Akin to the medieval debate on universals, between realists, idealists, and nominalists; the philosophy of mathematics has the debate between logicists or platonists, conceptualists orintuitionists, andformalists.[44]
StructuralistPaul Benacerraf has two well-known objections to mathematical platonism; one is aboutidentification,[358] and the otherepistemological.[359] In the latter, Benacerraf argues that while platonism explains mathematical semantics, it does not simultaneously explain mathematical knowledge. It is hard to know anything about a far-removed, platonic object.[359]Predicativism is another alternative to platonism, utilizingHenri Poincaré's response to Russell's paradox.[69] There are alsoAristotelians in mathematics, such asDale Jacquette.[360]
...analytic philosophy has been a very heterogeneous 'movement'.... some forms of analytic philosophy have proven very sympathetic to the philosophy of religion and have provided a philosophical mechanism for responding to other more radical and hostile forms of analytic philosophy.[363]
Analytic philosophy tended to avoid the study ofreligion, largely dismissing (as per the logical positivists) the subject as a part of metaphysics and therefore meaningless.[ai] The demise of logical positivism led to a renewed interest in the philosophy of religion, prompting philosophers not only to introduce new problems, but to re-study perennial topics such as theexistence of God, the rationality of belief, the nature ofmiracles, theproblem of evil, and several others.[367] TheSociety of Christian Philosophers was established in 1978.
Orthodox convertRichard Swinburne wrote a trilogy of books arguing for God,The Coherence of Theism (1977),The Existence of God (1979), andFaith and Reason (1981).[381][382][383] Swinburne is notable for his belief that God's existence is contingent rather than necessary (it is possible God does not exist), but that nonetheless He does exist as abrute fact.[384]
The analytic philosophy of religion has been preoccupied with Wittgenstein, as well as his interpretation ofSøren Kierkegaard.[385] Wittgenstein fought for the Austrian army inWorld War I and came upon a copy of Leo Tolstoy'sThe Gospel in Brief (1896). He subsequently underwent some kind of religious conversion.[386][387] "Swansea school" philosophers such as Rush Rhees,Peter Winch, andD. Z. Phillips, among others, founded a school of religious thought based on Wittgenstein. The name "contemplative philosophy" was coined by Phillips inPhilosophy's Cool Place (1999),[aj] after a passage quoted in Wittgenstein'sCulture and Value (1980).[390][ak]
Thephilosophy of social science has also received increased interest. Peter Winch takes a Wittgensteinian perspective inThe Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (1958).[406] Searle contributed tosocial ontology and the theory ofsocial constructs withThe Construction of Social Reality (1995).[407]
^"Without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers.[2]
^Sources differ on whether analytic philosophy is a school of thought,[6][7] or merely a style,[1][8] or even definable.[9] All emphasize clarity, rigor, and argument.[1][6][10] According to Brian Leiter, analytic philosophers "often identify, professionally and intellectually, more closely with the sciences and mathematics, than with the humanities."[1] According to Colin McGinn, "This kind of philosophy is more like science than religion, more like mathematics than poetry—though it is neither science nor mathematics."[6] According toScott Soames, it "aims at truth and knowledge, as opposed to moral or spiritual improvement [...] the goal in analytic philosophy is to discover what is true, not to provide a useful recipe for living one's life".[10]
^"The distinction (between analytic and continental philosophy) rests upon a confusion of geographical and methodological terms";[14] "it is like classifying cars intofront-wheel drive andJapanese."[15]
^Steven D. Hales describes the philosophical methods practiced in the West: "[i]n roughly reverse order by number of proponents, they are phenomenology, ideological philosophy, and analytic philosophy".[18]
^The analytic tradition has also been criticized for excessive formalism, ahistoricism,[19][20] and aloofness towards alternative disciplines and outsiders.[21][22] Some philosophers have tried to develop apostanalytic philosophy.
^"The distinction...has had many incarnations, from Plato's 'ancient quarrel betweenpoetry and philosophy'..."[24][25]
^Analytic philosophy is also characterized by resistance to "imprecise or cavalier discussions of broad topics".[8] Soames states that it is characterized by "a more piecemeal approach. There is, I think, a widespread presumption within the tradition that it is often possible to make philosophical progress by intensively investigating a small, circumscribed range of philosophical issues while holding broader, systematic questions in abeyance".[10]
^Dummett remarked that Bolzano is analytic philosophy's great-grandfather.[38]
^"Analytic philosophy opposed right from its beginning English neo-Hegelianism of Bradley's sort and similar ones. It did not only criticize the latter's denial of the existence of an external world (anyway an unjust criticism), but also the bombastic, obscure style of Hegel's writings."[61]
^Russell once explained, "Hegel had maintained that all separateness is illusory and that the universe is more like a pot oftreacle than a heap ofshot. I therefore said, "The universe is exactly like a heap of shot."'[68]
^TheWaverley novels were not acknowledged by Scott and penned anonymously saying only "by the author ofWaverley" on the title page.[73]
^Carnap famously criticized the continental philosopherHeidegger for saying "the nothing noths".[111]
^The first recorded use of the term "analytic philosophers" occurred in Wisdom's 1931 work, "Interpretation and Analysis in Relation to Bentham's Theory of Definition", which expounded onBentham's concept of "paraphrasis": "that sort of exposition which may be afforded by transmuting into a proposition, having for its subject some real entity, a proposition which has not for its subject any other than a fictitious entity".[22] According to Michael Beaney, "the explicit articulation of the idea of paraphrasis in the work of both Wisdom in Cambridge and Ryle in Oxford represents a definite stage in the construction of analytic philosophy as a tradition".[22]
^John's elder brother was William Anderson, Professor of Philosophy atAuckland University College from 1921 to his death in 1955, who was described as "the most dominant figure in New Zealand philosophy."[138]
^Communist ideology claimed to have won "an absolute victory" over analytic philosophy, as well as traditional Chinese philosophy.[147]
^In 2024, the School of Philosophy atShanxi University launched the Center for Analytic Chinese Philosophy. The center held both the first philosophical forum on analytic Chinese philosophy, and the first international conference on the history of analytic Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century.[150]
^On What There Is and Two Dogmas of Empiricism were republished in Quine's bookFrom A Logical Point of View (1953).[168]
^Problems of personal identity are analogous to theShip of Theseus and talks of identity going back even further.[195]
^In a 2020PhilPapers survey, 33% of respondents were accepting or leaning towards it.[325]
^While analytic idealism remains a minority position, one notable example is the work ofBernardo Kastrup.[344] It seeks to resolve the so-called hard problem of consciousness by taking experience as ontologically fundamental.[344]
^An alternative higher-order theory, the higher-order global states (HOGS) model, is offered byRobert van Gulick.[348]
^A notable exception is the series ofMichael B. Foster's 1934–36Mind articles involving the Christian doctrine of creation and the rise of modern science.[364][365][366]
^This interpretation was first labeled "WittgensteinianFideism" byKai Nielsen, but those who consider themselves members of the Swansea school rejected this construal as a caricature of Wittgenstein's position; this is especially true of Phillips.[388] Nielsen and Phillips subsequently became two of the most prominent interpreters of Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion.[389]
^"My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them."[391]
^Longworth, Guy (2017),"John Langshaw Austin", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved21 July 2020
^Bird, Alexander; Tobin, Emma (2024),"Natural Kinds", in Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.),The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved22 April 2024
^Carter, Ian (18 November 2022). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).Positive and Negative Liberty. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
^Korta, Kepa; Perry, John (2024),"Pragmatics", in Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.),The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2024 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved7 June 2025
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