 | This articlerelies excessively onreferences toprimary sources. Please improve this article by addingsecondary or tertiary sources. Find sources: "Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña" – news ·newspapers ·books ·scholar ·JSTOR(November 2019) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
| Adarand Constructors v. Peña | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued January 17, 1995 Decided June 12, 1995 | |
| Full case name | Adarand Constructors, Incorporated, Petitioner v. Federico Peña, Secretary of Transportation, et al. |
| Citations | 515U.S.200 (more) 115 S. Ct. 2097; 132L. Ed. 2d 158; 1995U.S. LEXIS 4037; 63 U.S.L.W. 4523; 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1828; 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 43,556; 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 357; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4381; 95 Daily Journal DAR 7503; 40 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) ¶ 76,756 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790F. Supp.240 (D. Colo. 1992); affirmedsub. nom.,Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16F.3d1537 (10th Cir. 1994);cert. granted,512 U.S. 1288 (1994). |
| Subsequent | On remand, 965 F. Supp.1556 (D. Colo. 1997); vacated,sub. nom.Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d1292 (10th Cir. 1999); rev'd,528 U.S. 216 (2000); affirmed in part, 228 F.3d1147 (10th Cir. 2000);cert. granted,532 U.S. 941 (2001);cert. dismissed, sub nom.Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta,534 U.S. 103 (2001). |
| Holding | |
| All racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under a standard of "strict scrutiny", the highest level of Supreme Court review (such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests). | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | O'Connor, joined by Kennedy; Rehnquist, Thomas (all but Part III–C); Scalia (as consistent with his concurrence) |
| Concurrence | Scalia (in part and in judgment) |
| Concurrence | Thomas (in part and in judgment) |
| Dissent | Stevens, joined by Ginsburg |
| Dissent | Souter, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer |
| Dissent | Ginsburg, joined by Breyer |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amends. V,XIV | |
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings | |
| Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980) (in part) &Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC (1990) | |
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), was alandmarkUnited States Supreme Court case which held thatracial classifications, imposed by the federalgovernment, must be analyzed under a standard of "strict scrutiny", the most stringent level of review which requires that racial classifications benarrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.[1]JusticeSandra Day O'Connor wrote the majority opinion of the Court, which effectively overturnedMetro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,[2] in which the Court had created a two tiered system for analyzing racial classifications.Adarand held the federal government to the same standards as the state and local governments through a process of "reverse incorporation," in which the 5th Amendment's Due Process Clause was held to bind the federal government to the same standards as state and local governments are bound under the14th Amendment.
At the time this case was litigated, manycontracts led byagencies of theUnited States federalgovernment containedfinancialincentives for theprime contractor to employsubcontractors that were owned or controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."[3] The USSmall Business Administration would certify certain businesses asdisadvantaged. That usually meant that the business was owned by racial or ethnic minority groups or by women. In this particular case the contract stated that
"the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...."[4]
In 1989, theUS Department of Transportation (DOT) awarded a highway construction contract in Colorado to Mountain Gravel and Construction Company.[3] Mountain Gravel solicited bids for a subcontract for guardrails along the highway. The lowest bid was submitted by Adarand Constructors, with a higher bid being submitted by Gonzales Construction. However, Gonzales Construction had been certified by the Small Business Administration as a disadvantaged business and so Mountain Gravel awarded the subcontract to Gonzales because of financial incentives in the Mountain Gravel's contract for employing disadvantaged businesses. Adarand filed suit in federal court against DOT by arguing that the subcontracting incentive clause, or bonus, that caused Adarand to lose a subcontract was unconstitutional. The federal district court and circuit court ruled in favor of DOT and against Adarand, which then appealed to the US Supreme Court. The case was docketed asAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Federico Peña, Secretary of Transportation, et al. becauseFederico Peña was the USSecretary of Transportation at that time.Mountain States Legal Foundation represented Adarand Constructors.
The questions before the Court was primarily whether the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, as well as the consequent allocation of favored treatment, was a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment as well as the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment.
In a 5–4 decision, JusticeO'Connor wrote for the majority joined in full only by JusticeKennedy while JusticeRehnquist, JusticeThomas and JusticeScalia also joined in part.[5] Justice O'Connor found that while reviewing the process of "reverse incorporation", there is congruency between the 5th and 14th amendment.[6] Justice O'Connor held that regardless of the motive, strict scrutiny analysis applied to all race-based classification for both the State and Federal governments.[7] The court specifically noted thatMetro Broadcasting departed from prior cases by holding "benign" racial classifications need only satisfyintermediate scrutiny, which goes against the congruency of the 5th and 14th amendment.[8]
JusticeStevens, joined by JusticeGinsburg and JusticeBreyer, dissented from the majority regarding the congruency between the 5th and 14th amendment. Justice Stevens argues that the concept of congruence "ignores important practical and legal differences between federal and state or local decisionmakers...a rule of 'congruence' that ignores a 'purposeful incongruity' so fundamental to our system of government is unacceptable."[6]
On September 5, 2005, theU.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued areport finding that, ten years after theAdarand decision, federal agencies still largely fail to comply with the rule inAdarand.[9] Specifically, the Commission found that the Departments ofDefense,Transportation,United States Department of Education,Energy,Housing and Urban Development,State, and the Small Business Administration, do not seriously consider race-neutral alternatives before implementing race-conscious federal procurement programs. The Commission found that such consideration is required by the strict scrutiny standard underAdarand and other Supreme Court decisions. CommissionerMichael Yaki dissented from the commission's report, arguing that the commission was taking a "radical step backwards" from the "race-progressive policies" of the past.[9]