Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Jump to content
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia
Search

A series and B series

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected fromA-theory of time)
Philosophical descriptions of the temporal ordering of events
icon
This articleneeds additional citations forverification. Please helpimprove this article byadding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
Find sources: "A series and B series" – news ·newspapers ·books ·scholar ·JSTOR
(June 2015) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Inmetaphysics, theA series and theB series are two different descriptions of the temporal ordering relation amongevents. The two series differ principally in their use oftense to describe the temporal relation between events and the resultingontological implications regarding time.

John McTaggart introduced these terms in 1908, in an argument forthe unreality of time. They are now commonly used by contemporaryphilosophers of time.

History

[edit]

Metaphysical debate about temporal orderings reaches back to the ancient Greek philosophersHeraclitus andParmenides. Parmenides thought thatreality is timeless and unchanging.[further explanation needed] Heraclitus, in contrast, believed that the world is a process of ceaselesschange, flux and decay. Reality for Heraclitus is dynamic andephemeral, in a state of constant flux, as in his famous statement that it is impossible to step twice into the same river (since the river is flowing).

McTaggart's series

[edit]

McTaggart distinguished the ancient conceptions as a set of relations. According to McTaggart, there are two distinct modes in which all events can be ordered in time.

A series

[edit]

In the first mode, events are ordered asfuture,present, andpast. Futurity and pastness allow of degrees, while the present does not. When we speak of time in this way, we are speaking in terms of a series of positions which run from the remote past through the recent past to the present, and from the present through the near future all the way to the remote future. The essential characteristic of this descriptive modality is that one must think of theseries of temporal positions as being incontinual transformation, in the sense that an event is first part of the future, then part of the present, and then part of the past. Moreover, the assertions made according to this modality correspond to the temporal perspective of the person who utters them. This is the A series of temporal events.

Although originally McTaggart defined tenses as relational qualities, i.e. qualities that events possess by standing in a certain relation to something outside of time (that does not change its position in time),[1] today it is popularly believed that he treated tenses asmonadic properties. Later philosophers[clarification needed] have independently inferred that McTaggart must have understoodtense as monadic because English tenses are normally expressed by the non-relational singular predicates "is past", "is present" and "is future", as noted by R. D. Ingthorsson.[2]

B series

[edit]
Main article:B-theory of time

From a second point of view,events can be ordered according to a different series of temporal positions by way of two-term relations that areasymmetric,irreflexive andtransitive (forming astrict partial order): "earlier than" (or precedes) and "later than" (or follows).

An important difference between the two series is that while events continuously change their position in the A series, their position in the B series does not. If an event ever is earlier than some events and later than the rest, it is always earlier than and later than those very events. Furthermore, while events acquire their A series determinations through a relation to something outside of time, their B series determinations hold between the events that constitutes the B series. This is the B series, and the philosophy that says all truths about time can be reduced to B series statements is theB-theory of time.

Distinctions

[edit]

Thelogic and thelinguistic expression of the two series are radically different. The A series istensed and the B series istenseless. For example, the assertion "today it is raining" is a tensed assertion because it depends on the temporal perspective—the present—of the person who utters it, while the assertion "It rained on 14 February 2026" is tenseless because it does not so depend. From the point of view of theirtruth-values, the two propositions are identical (both true or both false) if the first assertion is made on 14 February 2026. The non-temporal relation of precedence between two events, say "E precedes F", does not change over time(excluding from this discussion the issue of the relativity of temporal order of causally disconnected events in the theory of relativity). On the other hand, the character of being "past, present or future" of the events "E" or "F" does change with time. In the image of McTaggart the passage of time consists in the fact that terms ever further in the future pass into the present...or that the present advances toward terms ever farther in the future. If we assume the first point of view, we speak as if the B series slides along a fixed A series. If we assume the second point of view, we speak as if the A series slides along a fixed B series.

Relation to other ideas in the philosophy of time

[edit]

There are two principal varieties of the A-theory,presentism and thegrowing block universe.[3] Both assume an objective present, but presentism assumes that only present objects exist, while the growing block universe assumes both present and past objects exist, but not future ones. Views that assume no objective present and are therefore versions of the B-theory includeeternalism andfour-dimensionalism.

Vincent Conitzer argues that A-theory is related to Benj Hellie'svertiginous question and Caspar Hare's ideas ofegocentric presentism andperspectival realism. He argues that A-theory being true and "now" being metaphysically distinguished from other moments of time implies that the "I" is also metaphysically distinguished from other first-person perspectives.[4]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^McTaggart, J. M. E. (1927).The Nature of Existence, Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. § 326.It seems quite clear to me that [tenses] are not qualities but relations, though of course, like other relations, they will generate relational qualities in each of their terms
  2. ^Ingthorsson, R. D. (2016).McTaggart's Paradox. New York: Routledge. p. 45.ISBN 978-1-138-67724-1.
  3. ^Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold by Dean Zimmerman, p. 7
  4. ^Conitzer, Vincent (30 Aug 2020). "The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective".arXiv:2008.13207v1 [physics.hist-ph].

References

[edit]
  • Craig, William Lane,The Tensed Theory of Time, Springer, 2000.
  • Craig, William Lane,The Tenseless Theory of Time, Springer, 2010.
  • Ingthorsson, R. D., "McTaggart's Paradox", Routledge, 2016.
  • McTaggart, J. E., 'The Unreality of Time',Mind, 1908.
  • McTaggart, J. E.,The Nature of Existence, vols. 1-2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968.
  • Bradley, F. H.,The Principles of Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1922.

External links

[edit]
Key concepts
Measurement
andstandards
Chronometry
Measurement
systems
Calendars
Clocks
Philosophy of time
Human experience
anduse of time
Time inscience
Geology
Physics
Other fields
Related
Concepts in time
Theories of time
Related articles
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=A_series_and_B_series&oldid=1296370971#Relation_to_other_ideas_in_the_philosophy_of_time"
Categories:
Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2026 Movatter.jp