The GKChP hardliners dispatchedKGB agents who detained Gorbachev at hisdacha but failed to detain the recently electedpresident ofRussia, Boris Yeltsin, who had been both an ally and critic of Gorbachev. The GKChP was poorly organized and met with effective resistance by both Yeltsin and a civilian campaign ofanti-authoritarian protesters, mainly inMoscow.[16] The coup collapsed in two days, and Gorbachev returned to office while the plotters all lost their posts. Yeltsin subsequently became the dominant leader and Gorbachev lost much of his influence. The failed coup led to both the immediate collapse of the CPSU and thedissolution of the USSR four months later.
Following the capitulation of the GKChP, popularly referred to as the "Gang of Eight", both the Supreme Court of theRussian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and President Gorbachev described its actions as a coup attempt.
Since assuming power asGeneral Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, Gorbachev had embarked on an ambitious reform program embodied in the twin concepts ofperestroika (economic and political restructuring) andglasnost (openness).[17] These moves prompted resistance and suspicion on the part of hard-line members of thenomenklatura. The reforms also causednationalist agitation on the part of theSoviet Union's non-Russian minorities to grow, and there were fears that some or all of theunion republics might secede. In 1991, the Soviet Union was in a severe economic and political crisis. Scarcity of food, medicine, and other consumables was widespread,[18] people had to stand in longlines to buy even essential goods,[19] fuel stocks were as much as 50% lower than the estimated amount needed for the approaching winter, and inflation exceeded 300% per year, with factories lacking the cash needed to pay salaries.[20]
British historianDan Stone wrote the following about the plotters' motivation:
The coup was the last gasp of those who were astonished at and felt betrayed by the precipitous collapse of theSoviet Union's empire inEastern Europe and the swift destruction of theWarsaw Pact andComecon that followed. Many feared the consequences of Gorbachev's German policies above all, not just for leaving officers unemployed but for sacrificing gains achieved in theGreat Patriotic War to Germanrevanchism andirredentism – after all, this had been the Kremlin's greatest fear since the end of the war.[27]
When Kryuchkov complained about the Soviet Union's growing instability to theCongress of People's Deputies, Gorbachev attempted to appease him by issuing a presidential decree enhancing the powers of the KGB and appointing Pugo to the Cabinet asMinister of Internal Affairs. Foreign SecretaryEduard Shevardnadze resigned in protest and rejected an offered appointment as vice president, warning that "a dictatorship is coming." Gorbachev was forced to appoint Yanayev in his place.[32]
On 17June 1991, Soviet premier Pavlov requested extraordinary powers from theSupreme Soviet. Several days later, Moscow MayorGavriil Popov informed U.S. ambassador to the Soviet UnionJack F. Matlock Jr. that a coup against Gorbachev was being planned. When Matlock tried to warn him, Gorbachev falsely assumed that his own Cabinet was not involved and underestimated the risk of a coup.[33] Gorbachev reversed Pavlov's request for more powers and jokingly told his Cabinet "The coup is over," remaining oblivious to their plans.[34]
On 23July 1991, several party functionaries and literati published a piece in the hardlineSovetskaya Rossiya newspaper, entitled "A Word to the People", that called for decisive action to prevent calamity.[35]
Six days later, on 29July, Gorbachev,Russian presidentBoris Yeltsin andKazakh presidentNursultan Nazarbayev discussed the possibility of replacing hardliners such as Pavlov, Yazov, Kryuchkov and Pugo with more liberal figures,[36] with Nazarbayev as Prime Minister (in Pavlov's place). Kryuchkov, who had placed Gorbachev under close surveillance as Subject 110 several months earlier, eventually got wind of the conversation from anelectronic bug planted by Gorbachev's bodyguard,Vladimir Medvedev.[2][37][38] Yeltsin also prepared for a coup by establishing a secret defense committee, ordering military and KGB commands to side with RSFSR authorities and establishing a "reserve government" about 70 kilometers fromSverdlovsk under Deputy Prime MinisterOleg Lobov.
On 4August, Gorbachev went on holiday to hisdacha inForos, Crimea.[36] He planned to return to Moscow in time for theNew Union Treaty signing on 20August. On 15August, the text of the draft treaty was published, which would have stripped the coup planners of much of their authority.[39][40]
On 17August, the members of the GKChP met at aKGB guesthouse in Moscow and studied the treaty document. Decisions were made to introduce a state of emergency from 19August, to form a State Emergency Committee, and require Gorbachev to sign the relevant decrees or to resign and transfer powers to Vice President Yanayev.[36] They believed the pact would pave the way for the Soviet Union's breakup, and decided it was time to act. The next day, Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin, and Soviet Deputy Defense Minister GeneralValentin Varennikov flew to Crimea for a meeting with Gorbachev. Yazov ordered GeneralPavel Grachev, commander of theSoviet Airborne Forces, to begin coordinating with KGB Deputy Chairmen Viktor Grushko and Genii Ageev to implementmartial law.[2]
At 4:32pm on 18August, the GKChP cut communications to Gorbachev's dacha, includingtelephone landlines and thenuclear command and control system.[36] Eight minutes later Lieutenant General Yuri Plekhanov, Head of theNinth Chief Directorate of the KGB, allowed the group into Gorbachev's dacha. Gorbachev realized what was happening after discovering the telephone outages. Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov demanded that Gorbachev either declare a state of emergency or resign and name Yanayev as acting president to allow the members of the GKChP "to restore order" to the country.[31][41][42][33]
Gorbachev has always claimed that he refused point-blank to accept the ultimatum.[41][43] Varennikov has insisted that Gorbachev said: "Damn you. Do what you want. But report my opinion!"[44] However, those present at the dacha at the time testified that Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov had been clearly disappointed and nervous after the meeting with Gorbachev.[41] Gorbachev is said to have insulted Varennikov by pretending to forget his name, and to have told his former trusted advisor Boldin "Shut up, you prick! How dare you give me lectures about the situation in the country!"[33] With Gorbachev's refusal, the conspirators ordered that he remain confined to the dacha. Additional KGB security guards were placed at the dacha gates with orders to stop anybody from leaving.[41]
At 7:30pm, Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov flew to Moscow, accompanied by Plekhanov. His deputy, Vyacheslav Generalov, remained "on the farm" in Foros.[36]
At 8:00pm, Yanayev, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo and Soviet Supreme Soviet ChairmanAnatoly Lukyanov gathered in the Kremlin cabinet of the Prime Minister, discussing and editing the documents of the State Emergency Committee.[36] At 10:15pm, they were joined by Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin, Varennikov and Plekhanov. It was decided to publicly declare Gorbachev ill. Yanayev hesitated, but the others convinced him that leadership and responsibility would be collective.[36]
At 11:25pm, Yanayev signed a decree entrusting himself with presidential powers.[36]
GKChP members ordered that 250,000 pairs of handcuffs from a factory inPskov be sent to Moscow,[45] also ordering 300,000 arrest forms. Kryuchkov doubled the pay of all KGB personnel, called them back from holiday, and placed them on alert.Lefortovo Prison was emptied to receive prisoners.[37]
The members of theGKChP met in theKremlin after Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov returned from Crimea. Yanayev (who had only just been persuaded to join the plot), Pavlov and Baklanov signed the so-called "Declaration of the Soviet Leadership", which declared a state of emergency in the entirety of the USSR and announced that the State Committee on the State of Emergency (Государственный Комитет по Чрезвычайному Положению, ГКЧП, orGosudarstvenniy Komitet po Chrezvichaynomu Polozheniyu,GKChP) had been created "to manage the country and effectively maintain the regime of the state of emergency". The GKChP included the following members:
Alexander Tizyakov, President of the Association of the State Enterprises and Objects of Industry, Transport, and Communications[42][46]
Yanayev signed the decree naming himself acting Soviet President, using the pretense of Gorbachev's inability to perform presidential duties due to "illness".[47] However, Russian investigators later identified Kryuchkov as the key planner of the coup.[2] Yanayev later claimed that he had been forced to participate in the coup under the threat of arrest.[48] The eight aforementioned GKChP members became known as the "Gang of Eight".
The GKChP banned all Moscow newspapers except for nine party-controlled newspapers.[46][49] It also issued a populist declaration which stated that "the honour and dignity of theSoviet man must be restored."[46]
Reactions to the coup in Soviet regions: Red - support for the coup plotters, Blue - resistance to the coup attempt, Gray - neutrality or no reaction
At 1:00am, Yanayev signed documents on the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), consisting of himself, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, Baklanov, Tizyakov and Starodubtsev. Included in the documents was the "Appeal to the Soviet people".[36][50]
The GKChP members present signed GKChP Resolution No. 1, which introduced the following: a state of emergency "in certain areas of the USSR" lasting six months from 4:00am Moscow time on 19August; the prohibition of rallies, demonstrations and strikes; suspension of the activities of political parties, public organizations and mass movements that impede the normalization of the situation; and the allocation of up to 1,500 square metres (0.4 acres) of land to all interested city residents for personal use.[36][46]
At 4:00am, the Sevastopol regiment ofKGB border troops surrounded Gorbachev's presidential dacha in Foros. By order of Soviet Air Defense Chief of Staff Colonel-General Igor Maltsev, two tractors blocked the runway on which the President's aircraft were located: aTu-134 jet andMi-8 helicopter.[51]
Starting at 6:00am, all of the GKChP documents were broadcast over state radio and television.[36] The KGB immediately issued an arrest list that included newly elected Russian SFSR presidentBoris Yeltsin, his allies, and the leaders of the umbrella activist groupDemocratic Russia.[2] The Russian SFSR-controlledRadio Rossii andTelevidenie Rossii, plusEkho Moskvy, the only independent political radio station, were taken off the air. However, the latter station later resumed its broadcasts and became a source of reliable information during the coup. TheBBC World Service andVoice of America were also able to provide continuous coverage. Gorbachev and his family heard the news from a BBC bulletin on a smallSonytransistor radio that had not been seized. For the next several days, he refused to take food from outside the dacha to avoid beingpoisoned, and took long outdoor strolls to refute reports of his ill health.[52][33]
The GKChP conspirators considered detaining Yeltsin upon his return from a visit toKazakhstan on 17August but failed when Yeltsin redirected his flight fromChkalovsky Air Base northeast of Moscow toVnukovo Airport southwest of the city. Afterwards, they considered capturing him at hisdacha near Moscow. TheKGB Alpha Group surrounded his dacha withSpetsnaz, but for undisclosed reasons did not apprehend him. The commanding officer,Viktor Karpukhin, later alleged that he had received an order from Kryuchkov to arrest Yeltsin but disobeyed it, although his account has been questioned.[2] The failure to arrest Yeltsin proved fatal to the plotters' plans.[30][53][54] After the announcement of the coup at 6:30am, Yeltsin began inviting prominent Russian officials to his dacha, includingLeningrad MayorAnatoly Sobchak, Moscow Deputy Mayor Yury Luzhkov, Colonel-GeneralKonstantin Kobets, RSFSR Prime MinisterIvan Silayev, RSFSR Vice PresidentAlexander Rutskoy, and RSFSR Supreme Soviet ChairmanRuslan Khasbulatov.[2][36]
Yeltsin initially wanted to remain at the dacha and organize a rival government, but Kobets advised his group to travel to theWhite House, Russia's parliament building, to maintain communications with coup opponents. They arrived and occupied the building at 9:00am. Together with Silayev and Khasbulatov, Yeltsin issued a declaration "To the Citizens of Russia" that condemned the GKChP's actions as a reactionary anti-constitutional coup. The military was urged not to take part in the coup, and local authorities were asked to follow laws from the RSFSR president rather than the GKChP. Although he initially avoided the measure to avoid sparking acivil war, Yeltsin also subsequently took command of all Soviet military and security forces in the RSFSR.[2] The joint declaration called for ageneral strike, with the demand to let Gorbachev address the people.[55] This declaration was distributed around Moscow in the form offlyers, and disseminated nationwide throughmedium-wave radio andUsenet newsgroups via theRELCOM computer network.[56]Izvestia newspaper workers threatened to go on strike unless Yeltsin's proclamation was printed in the paper.[57]
The GKChP relied on regional and localsoviets, mostly still dominated by the Communist Party, to support the coup by forming emergency committees to repress dissidence. TheCPSU Secretariat under Boldin sent coded telegrams to local party committees to assist the coup. Yeltsin's authorities later discovered that nearly 70 percent of the committees either backed it or attempted to remain neutral. Within the RSFSR, theoblasts ofSamara,Lipetsk,Tambov,Saratov,Orenburg,Irkutsk, andTomsk and thekrai ofAltai andKrasnodar all supported the coup and pressuredraikom to do so as well, while only three oblasts aside fromMoscow andLeningrad opposed it. However, some of the soviets faced internal resistance against emergency rule. TheAutonomous Soviet Socialist Republics ofTatarstan,Checheno-Ingushetia, andAbkhazia all sided with the GKChP.[2]Soviet Armed Forces officers seized control of city halls and government buildings around the country claiming to be in control, as well as television stations in theBaltic states.[58]
The Soviet public was divided on the coup. A poll in the RSFSR by Mnenie on the morning of 19August showed that 23.6 percent of Russians believed the GKChP could improve living standards, while 41.9 percent had no opinion. However, separate polls byInterfax showed that many Russians, including 71 percent ofLeningrad residents, feared the return of mass repression. The GKChP enjoyed strong support in theRussian-majority regions of Estonia andTransnistria, while Yeltsin enjoyed strong support inSverdlovsk andNizhny Novgorod.[2]
At 10:00am, Rutskoy, Silayev, and Khasbulatov delivered a letter to Lukyanov demanding a medical exam of Gorbachev by theWorld Health Organization and a meeting between themselves, Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and Yanayev within 24 hours. Rutskoy later visitedPatriarch Alexy II of Moscow, spiritual leader of theRussian Orthodox Church, and convinced him to declare support for Yeltsin. Meanwhile, in Leningrad, Military District CommanderViktor Samsonov ordered the formation of an emergency committee for the city, chaired by Leningrad First Secretary Boris Gidaspov, to circumvent Sobchak's democratically elected municipal government. Samsonov's troops were ultimately blocked by hundreds of thousands of demonstrators supported by the police, which forcedLeningrad Television to broadcast a statement by Sobchak. Workers at theKirov Plant went on strike in support of Yeltsin. Moscow First Secretary Yuri Prokofev attempted a similar maneuver in the capital but was rebuffed when Boris Nikolskii refused to accept the office of Mayor of Moscow.[2] At 11:00am, RSFSR Foreign MinisterAndrei Kozyrev held a press conference for foreign journalists and diplomats, and gained the support of most of the West for Yeltsin.[2]
That afternoon, Moscow citizens began gathering around the White House, erecting barricades around it.[55] In response, Yanayev declared a state of emergency in Moscow at 4:00pm.[42][46] He declared at a 5:00pm press conference that Gorbachev was "resting". He said: "Over these years he has got very tired and needs some time to get his health back." Yanayev's shaking hands led some people to think he was drunk, and his trembling voice and weak posture made his words unconvincing. Victoria E. Bonnell and Gregory Frieden noted that the press conference allowed spontaneous questioning from journalists who openly accused the GKChP of carrying out a coup, as well as the lack of censorship by news crews, who did not hide Yanayev's erratic motions the way they had with past leaders such asLeonid Brezhnev, making the coup leaders appear more incompetent to Soviet audiences.[59] Gorbachev's security detail managed to construct a makeshifttelevision antenna so he and his family could watch the press conference.[42] After viewing the conference, Gorbachev expressed confidence that Yeltsin would be able to stop the coup. That night, his family smuggled out avideotape of Gorbachev condemning the coup.
Yanayev and the rest of the State Committee ordered theCabinet of Ministers to alter thefive-year plan of the time to relieve the housing shortage. All city dwellers were each given 1,000 square metres (1⁄3 acre) to combat winter shortages by growing fruits and vegetables. Due to the illness of Valentin Pavlov, the duties of the Soviet head of the government were entrusted to First Deputy Prime MinisterVitaly Doguzhiyev.[60][36]
Meanwhile, the Soviet forces carrying out the coup began to suffer from mass defections to the RSFSR as well as soldiers refusing to obey orders to shoot civilians. Yeltsin asked his followers not to harass the soldiers and offered amnesty for any military servicemen who defected to oppose the coup.[61] Major Evdokimov, chief of staff of a tank battalion of theTamanskaya Division guarding the White House, declared his loyalty to the leadership of theRussian SFSR.[55][62] Yeltsin climbed one of the tanks and addressed the crowd. Unexpectedly, this episode was included in the state media's evening news.[63] Soviet Armed Forces officers loyal to the GKChP tried to prevent defections by confining soldiers to their barracks, but this only limited the availability of forces to carry out the coup.[64]
At 8:00am, theSoviet General Staff ordered that theCheget briefcase controllingSoviet nuclear weapons be returned to Moscow. Although Gorbachev discovered that the GKChP's actions had cut off communications with the nuclear duty officers, the Cheget was returned to the capital by 2:00pm. However,Soviet Air Force Commander-in-ChiefYevgeny Shaposhnikov opposed the coup and claimed in his memoirs that he and the commanders of theSoviet Navy and theStrategic Rocket Forces told Yazov that they would not follow orders for a nuclear launch. After the coup, Gorbachev refused to admit that he had lost control of the country's nuclear weapons.[33]
In the afternoon, Kryuchkov, Yazov and Pugo finally decided to attack the White House. This decision was supported by other GKChP members (with the exception of Pavlov, who had been sent to his dacha due to drunkenness). Kryuchkov's and Yazov's deputies, KGB general Gennady Ageyev and Army generalVladislav Achalov, planned the assault, codenamed "Operation Grom" (Thunder), which would gather elements of theAlpha Group andVympel elite special forces units, supported by paratroopers, MoscowOMON,Internal Troops of theODON, three tank companies and a helicopter squadron. Alpha Group commander GeneralViktor Karpukhin and other senior unit officers, together with Airborne deputy commander Gen.Alexander Lebed mingled with the crowds near the White House and assessed the possibility of such an operation. Afterwards, Karpukhin and Vympel commander Colonel Boris Beskov tried to convince Ageyev that the operation would result in bloodshed and should be cancelled.[30][31][36][69] Lebed, with the consent of his superiorPavel Grachev, returned to the White House and secretly informed the defense headquarters that the attack would begin at 2:00am the following morning.[36][69]
While the events were unfolding in the capital,Estonia'sSupreme Council declared at 11:03pm the full reinstatement of the independent status of the Republic of Estonia after 51 years.
State-controlled TASS dispatches from 20August emphasize a hardline approach against crime, especially economic crimes and theRussian mafia, which the GKChP blamed on increasing trade with the West. Draft decrees were later discovered which would have allowed military and police patrols to shoot "hooligans," including pro-democracy demonstrators.[2]
At about 1:00am, not far from theWhite House,trolleybuses and street cleaning machines were used to barricade a tunnel against arriving Taman Guardsinfantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), commanded by CaptainSergey Surovikin,[70] who years later rose to army general and commander of Russian forces in the2022 invasion of Ukraine.[71] Three men were killed in the ensuing clash: Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov, and Ilya Krichevsky; several others were wounded. Komar, a 22-year-oldSoviet-Afghan War veteran, was shot and crushed trying to cover a moving IFV's observation slit. Usov, a 37-year-old economist, was killed by a stray bullet while coming to Komar's aid. The crowd set fire to an IFV and Krichevsky, a 28-year-old architect, was shot dead as the troops pulled back. The three men were posthumously awarded the titleHero of the Soviet Union.[42][67][72][73] According to journalist and democracy campaignerSergey Parkhomenko, who was in the crowd defending the White House, "those deaths played a crucial role: both sides were so horrified that it brought a halt to everything."[74] Alpha Group and Vympel did not move to the White House as planned, and Yazov ordered the troops to pull out of Moscow. Reports also surfaced that Gorbachev had been placed underhouse arrest in Crimea.[75][76] During the final day of her family's exile,Raisa Gorbacheva suffered a minorstroke.[33]
At 10:00am, the session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR opened in the White House, at which President Yeltsin spoke.[36]
At 1:00pm, the Soviet Cabinet of Ministers circulated a statement about its non-involvement in the putsch.[36] At 1:20pm, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov, Tizyakov, Lukyanov and CPSU Central Committee Deputy General Secretary Vladimir Ivashko left for the airport, getting stuck in a traffic jam created by the Taman Division armored vehicles returning to their base.[36]
At 2:00pm, the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat issued a statement demanding that the GKChP clarify the fate of the head of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev.[36]
At 2:30pm, Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo signed the last GKChP order – a cypher telegram to the regional departments of internal affairs with a demand to strengthen the security of television and radio organizations and report on all violations of the GKChP Resolution on information control.[36]
At 4:08pm, the plane with the GKChP delegation landed in Crimea.[36] Around 4:00pm, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, chaired by the heads of the chambers of the union parliament,[77] adopted a resolution in which it declared illegal the removal of the Soviet president from his duties and their transfer to the Vice President,[78] and in this vein demanded that Yanayev cancel the decrees and emergency orders based on them[79] as legally invalid from the moment they were signed.[80]
At 4:52pm, a group of Russian deputies and public figures led by RSFSR Vice PresidentAlexander Rutskoy, as well as Soviet Security Council members Yevgeny Primakov and Vadim Bakatin, flew to Gorbachev's dacha in Foros. They were accompanied by 36 officers of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs armed with machine guns, under the command of RSFSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Andrei Dunaev.[36]
Eight minutes later, at 5:00pm, the GKChP delegation arrived at the presidential dacha. President Gorbachev refused to receive it and demanded that communication to the outside world be restored.[36] At the same time, Yanayev signed a decree dissolving the State Emergency Committee[81][82] and declaring all of its decisions invalid.[83][79]
At 7:16pm, the plane of the Russian delegation led by Rutskoy landed in Crimea.[36]
At 8:10pm, Rutskoy and his delegation went to see Gorbachev. According to eyewitnesses, the meeting was cordial and joyful, allowing them to momentarily forget divisions between Soviet and Russian authorities.[36]
From 9:40 to 10:10pm, Gorbachev received Lukyanov and Ivashko in the presence of Rutskoy and Primakov, accusing the USSR Supreme Soviet Speaker oftreason, and the party deputy of inaction during the putsch.[36]
Around 10:00pm, RSFSR Prosecutor General Valentin Stepankov signed an arrest warrant for the Emergency Committee members.[36]
That day, theSupreme Council of theRepublic of Latvia declared its sovereignty officially completed with a law passed by its deputies, confirming the independence restoration act of 4May as an official act.[84] InEstonia, just a day after the restitution of the country's full independence, theTallinn TV Tower was taken over bySoviet Russian airborne troops. But while television broadcasts were cut for a time, the radio signal was kept on the air after a handful ofEstonian Defence League (the unifiedparamilitary forces of Estonia) members barricaded themselves in the tower's broadcasting studio.[85] That evening, as news from Moscow about the coup's failure reached Tallinn, the Russian paratroopers left the TV tower and the Estonian capital.
At one minute past midnight, Gorbachev, his family and assistants flew to Moscow on Rutskoy's plane. The GKChP members were sent back on a different plane; onlyKryuchkov flew in the presidential plane, under police custody (according to Rutskoy, "they [would] definitely not be shot down with him on board"). Upon arrival, Kryuchkov, Yazov and Tizyakov were arrested on the airfield, which was illegal under Soviet law as officials representing the central government could only be arrested and tried under Soviet law, which prevailed over the laws of the constituent republics.[86][36]
At 2:00am, when Gorbachev arrived at Moscow'sVnukovo Airport, television showed live footage of him walking down theairstairs wearing a knitted sweater. Later, he would be criticized for not going to the White House, but to rest at his dacha.[36]
At 6:00am, Soviet Vice President Yanayev was arrested in his office.[36][87]
Boris Pugo and his wife died by suicide after being contacted by the RSFSR for a meeting over his role in the coup attempt.[88]
On the night of 24August, theFelix Dzerzhinsky statue in front of theKGB building at Dzerzhinskiy Square (Lubianka) was dismantled, while thousands of Moscow citizens took part in the funeral of Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov and Ilya Krichevsky, the three citizens who had died in the tunnel incident. Gorbachev posthumously awarded them with the title ofHero of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin asked their relatives to forgive him for not being able to prevent their deaths.[36]
Gorbachev initially tried to defend theCPSU, proclaiming at a 22August press conference that it still represented a "progressive force" despite its leaders' participation in the coup.[33] Gorbachev resigned as CPSUgeneral secretary on24August.[91][36]Vladimir Ivashko replaced him as acting General Secretary, but resigned on 29August when theSupreme Soviet of the USSR suspended the activities of the party throughout the Soviet Union.[92][93]
In a decree, Yeltsin ordered the transfer of the CPSU archives to the state archive authorities,[94] andnationalized all CPSU assets in the Russian SFSR[95] (these included not only party committee headquarters but also assets such as educational institutions and hotels).[citation needed] The party'sCentral Committee headquarters were handed over to theGovernment of Moscow.[33] On 6November, Yeltsin issued a decree banning the party in Russia.[96]
Estonia had declared re-independence on 20August, Latvia the following day, while Lithuania had already done so on 11March the previous year.
On 24August 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev created the so-called "Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy" (Комитет по оперативному управлению народным хозяйством СССР), to replace theUSSR Cabinet of Ministers[97] headed byValentin Pavlov, a GKChP member. Russian prime ministerIvan Silayev headed the committee.
On 28August, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dismissed Prime Minister Pavlov[100] and entrusted the functions of the Soviet government to the Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy.[101] The next day, Supreme Soviet ChairmanAnatoly Lukyanov was arrested.[36]
On 5September, theCongress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union adopted Soviet Law No. 2392-1 "On the Authorities of the Soviet Union in the Transitional Period", replacing itself with theSupreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Two new legislative chambers – the Soviet of the Union (Совет Союза) and the Soviet of Republics (Совет Республик) – replaced theSoviet of the Union and theSoviet of Nationalities (both elected by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies). The Soviet of the Union was to be formed by the popularly electedUSSR people's deputies and would only consider issues concerning civil rights and freedoms and other issues which did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Soviet of Republics. Its decisions would have to be reviewed by the Soviet of Republics. The Soviet of Republics was to include 20 deputies from each union republic and one deputy to represent eachautonomous region of each union republic (both Soviet people's deputies andrepublics' people's deputies) delegated by the legislatures of the union republic. Russia, with 52 delegates, was an exception. However, the delegation of each union republic was to have only one vote in the Soviet of Republics. The laws were to be first adopted by the Soviet of the Union and then by the Soviet of Republics, which would set procedures for the central government, approve the appointment of central ministers and consider inter-republic agreements.[103] Also created was theSoviet State Council (Государственный совет СССР), which included theSoviet president and the presidents of union republics. The "Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy" was replaced by the USSR Inter-republic Economic Committee (Межреспубликанский экономический комитет СССР),[103] also headed byIvan Silayev.
On 6September, the newly created Soviet State Council recognized the independence ofEstonia,Latvia andLithuania.[102] On 9September, theSupreme Soviet of Tajikistan declared the independence ofTajikistan from the Soviet Union. Also in September, over 99% percent of voters inArmenia voted for independence of the republic in areferendum. The immediate aftermath of the vote was theArmenian Supreme Soviet's declaration of independence on 21September. On27 October, theSupreme Soviet of Turkmenistan declared the independence ofTurkmenistan from the Soviet Union. On 1December, Ukraine held areferendum, in which more than 90% of residents supported the Act of Independence of Ukraine.
By November, the only Soviet Republics that had not declared independence were Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. That same month, seven republics (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) agreed to a new union treaty that would form aconfederation called the Union of Sovereign States. However, this confederation never materialized.
On 8December,Boris Yeltsin,Leonid Kravchuk andStanislav Shushkevich – the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, andBelarus (which had adopted the name in August 1991) – as well as the prime ministers of the three republics, met inMinsk, Belarus, to sign theBelovezha Accords. The accords declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist "as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality". It repudiated the1922 union treaty that established the Soviet Union and established theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the Union's place. On 12December, theSupreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR ratified the accords and recalled the Russian deputies from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Although this has been interpreted as the moment that Russia seceded from the union, Russia took the position that it was not possible to secede from a state that no longer existed. The lower chamber of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of the Union, was forced to halt its operations, as the departure of the Russian deputies left it without a quorum.
Doubts remained about the legitimacy of the 8December accords, since only three republics took part. Thus, on 21December inAlma-Ata, theAlma-Ata Protocol expanded the CIS to includeArmenia,Azerbaijan,Moldova and the five republics ofCentral Asia. They also preemptively accepted Gorbachev's resignation. With 11 of the 12 remaining republics (all exceptGeorgia) having agreed that the Union no longer existed, Gorbachev bowed to the inevitable and said he would resign as soon as the CIS became a reality (Georgia joined the CIS in 1993, only to withdraw in 2008 afterits war with Russia; the three Baltic states were never a part of the commonwealth, instead joining both theEuropean Union andNATO in 2004.)
On 24December 1991, the Russian SFSR – now renamed the Russian Federation – with the concurrence of the other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, informed theUnited Nations that it wouldinherit the Soviet Union's membership in the UN – including the Soviet Union's permanent seat on theUnited Nations Security Council.[104] No member state of the UN formally objected to this step. The legitimacy of this act has beenquestioned by some legal scholars as the Soviet Union itself was not constitutionally succeeded by the Russian Federation, but merely dissolved. Others argued that the international community had already established the precedent of recognizing the Soviet Union as the legal successor of theRussian Empire, and so recognizingthe Russian Federation as the Soviet Union'ssuccessor state was valid.
On 25December, Gorbachev announced his resignation as President of the Soviet Union. The red hammer and sickle flag of the Soviet Union was lowered from the Senate building in theKremlin and replaced with the tricolour flag of Russia. The next day, 26 December, theSoviet of Republics, the upper chamber of the Supreme Soviet, formally voted the Soviet Union out of existence (the lower chamber, the Council of the Union, had been left without a quorum after the Russian deputies withdrew), thus ending the life of the world's first and oldest socialist state. All former Soviet embassies became Russian embassies, and Russia received all nuclear weapons located in other former republics by 1996. Aconstitutional crisis in late 1993 escalated into violence, and the newRussian constitution that came into force at the end of the year abolished the last vestiges of theSoviet political system.
On 1November 1991, theRSFSR Congress of People's Deputies issued Decision No. 1831-1 "On the Legal Support of the Economic Reform" whereby the Russian president (Boris Yeltsin) was granted the right to issue decrees required for economic reform even if they contravened existing laws. Such decrees entered into force if they were not repealed within 7 days by theSupreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR or its Presidium.[105] Five days later, Boris Yeltsin, in addition to his duties as president, assumed those of the prime minister.Yegor Gaidar became deputy prime minister and simultaneously economic and finance minister. On 15November 1991, Boris Yeltsin issued Decree No. 213 "On the Liberalization of Foreign Economic Activity on the Territory of the RSFSR", whereby all Russian companies were allowed to import and export goods and acquire foreign currency (all foreign trade had previously been tightly controlled by the state).[105] Following the issuance of Decree No. 213, on 3 December 1991 Boris Yeltsin issued Decree No. 297 "On the Measures to Liberalize Prices", whereby from 2January 1992, most previously existingprice controls were abolished.[105]
TheGKChP members and their accomplices were charged withtreason in the form of a conspiracy aimed at capturing power. However, by January 1993, they had all been released from custody pending trial.[106][107] The trial in the Military Chamber of theRussian Supreme Court began on 14 April 1993.[108] On 23February 1994, theState Duma declaredamnesty for all GKChP members and their accomplices, along with the participants of theOctober 1993 crisis.[109] They all accepted the amnesty, except for General Varennikov, who demanded the continuation of the trial and who was finally acquitted on 11August 1994.[36] The RussianProcuracy also wanted to charge former Deputy Defense MinisterVladislav Achalov, but the Russian Supreme Soviet refused to lift his immunity.[2] Additionally, the Procuracy refrained from charging numerous other individuals accused of complicity in the coup, including the Army Chief of Staff.
Soviet stamps commemorating (from left to right) Ilya Krichevsky, Dmitry Komar and Vladimir Usov
Thousands of people attended the funeral of Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky, and Vladimir Usov on 24August 1991. Gorbachev posthumously made the threeHeroes of the Soviet Union for their bravery in "blocking the way to those who wanted to strangle democracy.".[110]
In 1991, a parliamentary commission tasked with investigating causes for the attempted coup was established underLev Ponomaryov, but was dissolved in 1992 atRuslan Khasbulatov's insistence.
On 24 August 1991, Sergey Akhromeyev was found dead in his office, serving as the Advisor to the president of USSR.
On 26 August, Nikolay Kruchina was found dead near his residence in the morning, having jumped from the window of his apartment a few hours prior. He served as the Managing Director of the Central Committee of the CPSU. His predecessor, Georgiy Pavlov, followed the same fate on 6 October of the same year.
On 17 October, former Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU Dmitriy Lisovolik was found dead, having also jumped from the window of his apartment.[111]
Said deaths have faced extensive scrutiny by historians and contemporaries, who noted the similarities with which these people died.
George H. W. Bush, left, is seen with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Bush condemned the coup and the actions of the "Gang of Eight".
Australia:Prime Minister of AustraliaBob Hawke said that "The developments in the Soviet Union ... raise the question as to whether the purpose is to reverse the political and economic reforms which have been taking place. Australia does not want to see repression, persecution or vindictive actions against Gorbachev or those associated with him."[11]
Canada: Several government members quickly reacted to the coup;Prime MinisterBrian Mulroney huddled with top advisers over the toppling of Mikhail Gorbachev, but officials said the Prime Minister would likely react cautiously to the stunning development. Mulroney condemned the coup and suspended food aid and other assistance to the Soviet Union.[112] External Affairs MinisterBarbara McDougall suggested on 20August 1991 that "Canada could work with any Soviet junta that promises to carry on Gorbachev's legacy".Lloyd Axworthy andLiberal LeaderJean Chretien said Canada must join with other Western governments to back Russian President Boris Yeltsin, former Soviet Foreign Minister and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and others fighting for Soviet democracy." McDougall met with thechargé d'affaires of theSoviet embassy, Vasily Sredin.[113] As part of theNORAD defense network, the government acknowledged that any US-Soviet nuclear confrontation would directly impact Canada as well. Canadian leaders believed both the US and Canada would be treated as a single set of targets.[114]
Israel: Israeli officials said they hoped Gorbachev's attempted removal would not derail the1991 Israeli-Palestinian peace conference in Madrid (co-sponsored by the US and USSR) or slowSoviet Jewish immigration. The quasi-governmentalJewish Agency, which coordinated the massive flow ofJews arriving from the Soviet Union, called an emergency meeting to assess how the coup would affect Jewish immigration. "We are closely following what is happening in the Soviet Union with concern," Foreign MinisterDavid Levy said. "One might say that this is an internal issue of the Soviet Union, but in the Soviet Union ... everything internal has an influence for the entire world."[11] The Soviet Union restored ties with Israel on 26December 1991.
Japan:Prime MinisterToshiki Kaifu ordered theForeign Ministry to analyze developments. Kaifu himself said that it was highly likely that the coup was unconstitutional. Chief Cabinet SecretaryMisoji Sakamoto said, "I strongly hope that the leadership change will not influence the positive policies of Perestroika and new-thinking diplomacy."[11] In addition, Japanese aid and technical loans to the Soviet Union were frozen.[13] Japan left open the question of the coup's legitimacy; government spokesman Taizo Watanabe said that "[the Soviet government has] the right to decide whether it is constitutional or unconstitutional. Japan notably differed from western states by not announcing an outright condemnation of the coup. "[115]
South Korea:PresidentRoh Tae-woo welcomed the coup's collapse as a symbolic victory for the Soviet people. He said "It was a triumph of the courage and resolve of the Soviet citizens towards freedom and democracy."[13]
United Kingdom:Prime MinisterJohn Major met with hiscabinet on 19August to deal with the crisis and said "There seems little doubt that President Gorbachev has been removed from power by an unconstitutional seizure of power. There are constitutional ways of removing the president of the Soviet Union; they have not been used. I believe that the whole world has a very serious stake in the events currently taking place in the Soviet Union. The reform process there is of vital importance to the world and of most vital importance of course to the Soviet people themselves and I hope that is fully clear. There is a great deal of information we don't yet have, but I would like to make clear above all that we would expect the Soviet Union to respect and honor all the commitments that President Gorbachev has made on its behalf."[11] The British Government froze $80 million in economic aid to Moscow, while theEuropean Community scheduled an emergency meeting to suspend a $1.5 billion aid program.[116] In a 1991 interview, Major said he thought that "there are many reasons why [the coup] failed and a great deal of time and trouble will be spent on analysing that later. There were, I think, a number of things that were significant. I don't think it was terribly well-handled from the point of view of those organising the coup. I think the enormous and unanimous condemnation of the rest of the world publicly of the coup was of immense encouragement to the people resisting it. That is not just my view; that is the view that has been expressed to me by Mr. Shevardnadze,Mr. Yakovlev, President Yeltsin and many others as well to whom I have spoken to the last 48 hours. The moral pressure from the West and the fact that we were prepared to state unequivocally that the coup was illegal and that we wanted the legal government restored, was of immense help in the Soviet Union. I think that did play a part."
United States: During his vacation inWalker's Point Estate inKennebunkport, Maine,U.S. PresidentGeorge H. W. Bush made a blunt demand for Gorbachev's restoration to power and said the United States did not accept the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed new Soviet government. Bush rushed to the White House from his vacation home, receiving a letter from Kozyrev aboardAir Force One. He then issued a strongly-worded statement that followed a day of consultations with other Western alliance leaders amid a concerted effort to squeeze the new Soviet leadership by freezing economic aid programs. Bush decried the coup as a "misguided and illegitimate effort" that "bypasses both Soviet law and the will of theSoviet peoples." He called the overthrow "very disturbing" and put a hold on U.S. aid to the Soviet Union until the coup was ended.[11][116] The Bush statement, drafted after a series of meetings with top aides, was much more forceful than the President's initial reaction that morning in Maine. It was in keeping with a Western effort to apply both diplomatic and economic pressure on the Soviet officials seeking to gain control of the country. On 2September, the United States re-recognized the independence ofEstonia,Latvia andLithuania when Bush delivered the press conference in Kennebunkport.[117] Secretary of StateJames Baker issued a statement warning "The whole world is watching. Legitimacy in 1991 flows not from the barrel of a gun but from the will of the people. History cannot be reversed. Sooner or later your effort will fail."[118] The coup also led several members of Congress such asSam Nunn,Les Aspin, andRichard Lugar to become concerned about the security ofSoviet weapons of mass destruction and the potential fornuclear proliferation in existing unstable conditions. Despite public opposition to further aid to the Soviet Union and ambivalence from the Bush administration, they oversaw the ratification of theSoviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, authorizing theNunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and providing funding topost-Soviet states for the decommissioning of WMD stockpiles.[33][119] Former presidentRonald Reagan said:
"I can't believe that the Soviet people will allow a reversal in the progress that they have recently made toward economic and political freedom. Based on my extensive meetings and conversations with him, I am convinced that President Gorbachev had the best interest of the Soviet people in mind. I have always felt that his opposition came from the communist bureaucracy, and I can only hope that enough progress was made that a movement toward democracy will be unstoppable."[11]
Meanwhile,CPUSA ChairmanGus Hall supported the coup, causing division within an already shrinking party. The CPSU had broken ties with the CPUSA in 1989 over the latter's condemnation of Perestroika.
Denmark:Foreign MinisterUffe Ellemann-Jensen said the process of change in the Soviet Union could not be reversed. In a statement, he said "So much has happened and so many people have been involved in the changes in Soviet Union that I cannot see a total reversal."[11]
France:PresidentFrançois Mitterrand called on the new Soviet rulers to guarantee thelife and liberty of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who was "Gorbachev's rival in the changing Soviet Union." Mitterrand added that "France attaches a high price to the life and liberty of Messrs. Gorbachev and Yeltsin being guaranteed by the new Moscow leaders. These will be judged by their acts, especially on the fashion in which the two high personalities in question will be treated."[11] After the coup ended, Mitterrand was criticized for his hesitant reaction; this may have helped right wing opposition parties win the1993 French legislative election.[120]
Germany:ChancellorHelmut Kohl cut his Austrian vacation short and returned toBonn for an emergency meeting. He said he was sure Moscow would withdraw its remaining 272,000 troops from theformer East Germany on schedule.[121]Björn Engholm, leader of Germany's oppositionSocial Democratic Party, urged member states of theEuropean Community "to speak with one voice" on the situation and said, "the West should not exclude the possibility of imposing economic and political sanctions on the Soviet Union to avoid a jolt to the right, in Moscow."[11]
Greece: Greece described the situation in the Soviet Union as "alarming". The Greek left was divided- the Alliance of the Left and former Socialist Prime MinisterAndreas Papandreou issued statements condemning the coup. However, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece condemned Gorbachev for dismantling the Soviet State and reestablishing Capitalism.[122][11]
Italy:Prime MinisterGiulio Andreotti released a statement saying, "I'm surprised, embittered and worried. We all know the difficulties that Gorbachev encountered. But I don't know how a new president, who, at least for now, doesn't have (Gorbachev's) prestige and international connections, can overcome the obstacles."Achille Occhetto, head of theDemocratic Party of the Left, the direct heir of theItalian Communist Party, called the ouster of Gorbachev "a most dramatic event of world proportions (which) will have immense repercussions on international life. I am personally and strongly struck, not only for the incalculable burden of this event, but also for the fate of comrade Gorbachev."[11]
A Soviet Stamp promoting Perestroika. For some Communist States, Gorbachev's reforms resulted in a drastic cutting of Soviet Aid. The coup's failure led to the abrupt end of any remaining Russian support for its former Communist allies.
Many but not all of states still officiallyMarxist–Leninist (not former Warsaw Pact members that had begun transitioning to amulti-party system) had supported the coup, while others left ambivalent or unofficial support and reversed their position when the coup failed.
Afghanistan: The failure of the coup resulted in the removal of Soviet political and military officers that favored continued aid to thePeople's Democratic Party government in Afghanistan. At the time, the Afghan regime was still completely dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival in the ongoingAfghan Civil War. The last Soviet military assistance arrived in October, with all Russian aid being halted byBoris Yeltsin in January 1992. Yeltsin hoped to repatriate Sovietprisoners of war still being held by theMujahideen and was not interested in protecting a 'Soviet Legacy'.[123] In the aftermath of the coup,Mohammad Najibullah came to resent the Soviets for abandoning him, writing to former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze "I didn't want to be president, you talked me into it, insisted on it, and promised support. Now you are throwing me and the Republic of Afghanistan to its fate." In the winter of 1992, newly independentTajikistan,Uzbekistan andTurkmenistan provided food aid to Mohammad Najibullah's of their own accord in an attempt to save the regime, also establishing contacts with the Mujahideen. The end of Soviet weapons deliveries caused the defection of militia leaderAbdul Rashid Dostum fromMohammad Najibullah toAhmad Shah Massoud, spelling the end of the DRA in April 1992.[124]
Angola: In December 1991, the rulingMPLA, in its party congress changed its ideology from Marxism–Leninism toSocial Democracy and committed to multi-party democracy.Angola–Russia relations became less relevant to both countries after the coup. Angola's ability to enforce its rule on some of its territories diminished due to the end of Soviet weapons deliveries and departures of Cuban personnel.[123]
China: The Chinese government appeared to tacitly support the coup when it issued a statement saying the move was an internal affair of the Soviet Union and when theChinese Communist Party (CCP) released no immediate comment. Confidential Chinese documents have indicated that China's hardline leaders strongly disapproved of Gorbachev's program of political liberalization, blaming him for "the loss of Eastern Europe to capitalism." Western scholarship has alleged that Beijing had foreknowledge of the planned coup. This hypothesis is supported by two events: firstly, GeneralChi Haotian's Moscow visit between August5 and August12 to see GKChP memberDmitry Yazov, and secondly, the rapid and mostly positive coverage of the coup inChinese media, which ignored the activities of Boris Yeltsin. When the coup began, top CCP leaders had gathered to celebrateparamount leaderDeng Xiaoping's birthday. Upon hearing the news, CCP elderBo Yibo cursed Gorbachev. Deng then said "The Soviet coup is a good thing but we must not visibly be pleased but only delighted at the bottom of our hearts." China pronounced a policy of non-interference but hoped 'stability' (i.e. a restoration of Communist rule) would return to the Soviet Union. Behind closed doors, theChinese Politburo agreed the coup should be recognized as a 'Marxist' act and thatSino-Soviet relations should be strengthened. However, Deng also encouraged CCP General SecretaryJiang Zemin to be cautious because the coup could fail. The GKChP was also interested in resolving theSino-Soviet split and improvingdiplomatic relations, dispatching Vice Foreign Affairs MinisterAlexander Belonogov toBeijing to request full recognition and support.[2] Deng met with Belonogov and asked "what do you plan to do with Gorbachev" to measure the probability of the coup's success. After hesitating for a day, China was moments away from an official declaration of support for the GKChP when news of its end arrived. After the coup failed, Gorbachev suspended exchanges with China; allegedly the coup plotters attempted to flee to China, but this was flatly denied by both governments.[125] Several Chinese people said that a key difference between the Soviet coup leaders' failed attempts to use tanks to crush dissent in Moscow and the hardline Chinese leaders' successful use of tank-ledPeople's Liberation Army forces during the1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre was that the Soviet people had a powerful leader like Russian president Boris Yeltsin to rally around, whereas the Chinese protesters did not. The Soviet coup collapsed in three days without any major violence by the Soviet Army against civilians in June 1989, thePeople's Liberation Army killed thousands of people to crush the democracy movement.[11][126]Fidel Castro at East Berlin 1972. Cuba relied upon the Soviet Union and throughout the Cold War was a steadfast ally. Castro systemically opposed Gorbachev's perestroika but he did not publicly support the August Coup in 1991.
Congo: Congo was already moving away from Marxism–Leninism and had organized a democratic conference in June.[127] All references to Communism were removed from the Congolese Constitution in April 1992, yet former Soviet protégéDenis Sassou Nguesso would later regain power and ruleCongo through to the present day.
Cuba: On August20, the Cuban Government issued a statement insisting on its neutrality, saying that the conflict was "not Cuba's to judge". In the same statement, Cuba also criticized the West for inciting divisions within the Soviet Union. A Western diplomat alleged that in private, Cuba's officials hoped the coup would succeed because the plotters would continue thespecial Soviet relationship with their country. In September 1991, three-quarters of Cuba's consumer goods came from the USSR, underlining the importance of Soviet events to Cuba's leaders.[128] As the Soviet coup unfolded, Cuban officials did not believe its leaders would prevail. While Gorbachev was in power,Fidel Castro never agreed with Perestroika and in July 1991 had reiterated his position that there would be no changes in Cuba, saying "In this revolution there will be no changes of name or ideas."[129] The end of Soviet assistance sparked theSpecial Period crisis that would last ten years.
North Korea: As the coup began, newspapers published documents from the GKChP without comment or statements of support. Privately, the regime instructed its officials to support the coup to "defend Socialist achievements". North Korean diplomats were present in Moscow and kept informal contacts with Russians as events unfolded, including soldiers on the ground. By the end of the first day,North Korea's embassy in Moscow reported toPyongyang that the coup would not succeed. At the time, there were changing attitudes in the north toward South Korea and a brief shootout at theDMZ border.[130] After the coup's failure, Vice PresidentPak Song-chol said "The invincible might of our own style of socialism is being highly demonstrated," and the "North is basically stable" in a reference toJuche.[131] Pyongyang would later blame Perestroika for the fall of the USSR, calling "Gorbachev's wrong anti-socialist policy" a "revisionist" one.[132] The end of Soviet assistance was a direct cause of theArduous March that began in 1994.
Vietnam: The coup came at a time when promised Soviet aid was being slowed and later halted. Vietnamese Communists decided to not embrace a multi-party system in Vietnam due to the experience of Perestroika. An unnamed official said that "Vietnam would probably not feel sorry to see [the end of the Soviet president's career] because Gorbachev has made many mistakes... too many compromises with the West. He has also made the position and the role of the Soviet Union in the world weaker." The official also said that Vietnam would benefit from a return to Communist rule in the Soviet Union. "These changes would also affect positively Vietnam's economy because the West would carry out a hard policy towards the Soviet Union, then the latter would look for trade relations with such countries as Vietnam and China."[115] After the coup, top Communist Party official Thai Ninh was asked by foreign press if Vietnam felt betrayed by Gorbachev and Yeltsin. He answered, "It's better to let the Soviet people decide that".[133] The failed coup prompted Vietnam tonormalize relations with China in November, ending theSino-Vietnamese conflicts of the 1980s. In a major political victory for China, Vietnam recognized theState of Cambodia (SOC). Increasingly,Beijing andHanoi felt an ideological affinity with one another and a mutual desire to resist American-ledPeaceful Evolution. Vietnam would look toASEAN for new trading partners in the aftermath of theSoviet dissolution.[134]
Yugoslavia: The Coup was a profound event for all of Yugoslavia,United Press International reported reactions from ordinary Yugoslavs including economist Dragan Radic who said "Gorbachev has done a lot for world peace and helped replace hard-line communist regimes in the past few years.Yet, the West failed to support Gorbachev financially and economically and he was forced to step down because he could not feed the Soviet people." Officially, PresidentSlobodan Milošević, in charge ofSerbia, was silent. Unofficially, there were numerous interactions between Yugoslavia and the USSR leading up to the start of the coup. The violentbreakup of Yugoslavia had begun the previous year. Political actors in both nations realized the similarities of their political situations. On the anti-communist side, separatists in the USSR were building relations with Yugoslavia's breakaway republics. At the end of July, Lithuania recognized Slovenia and in August, Georgia recognized Slovenia and Croatia's independence. On the side of hardliners, both nations had factions embracing ared-brown coalition between traditional communists and ultranationalists to maintain the territorial integrity of both the USSR and Yugoslavia. In the weeks leading up to the coup, conservatives in the USSR were using the precedence of Yugoslavia as an excuse to violently suppress uprisings of non-Russians. In fact, Yugoslavia may have been a major cause for the Gang of Eight to believe their actions were necessary to prevent the USSR's collapse. When Yugoslav Prime MinisterAnte Marković visited Moscow in early August, Gorbachev pointed out the parallels between problems looming in both countries. Croatian presidentFranjo Tuđman claimed in October that "Communist Yugoslav Generals" had openly supported the coup and that they had received instructions from Moscow. The victory of the democrats in the USSR had major implications for Yugoslavia. Yeltsin knew that Milošević had secretly supported Soviet conservatives and relations between the two were dismal. By the time the USSR collapsed, the problem of Yugoslavia had become a part of the Russian political landscape. Yeltsin and liberal elites would publicly take an even-handed approach and encourage international cooperation to solve the crisis. In contrast, post-Soviet conservatives looked to create advantages for Russia by supporting Orthodox Serbs in their struggle to control the remaining Yugoslav nations. Sociology Professor Veljko Vujačić assessed the similarities and differences between the breakup of Yugoslavia and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both nations were multi-national Marxist–Leninist states with Slavic rulers facing major secessionist movements. In Serbia, patriotism was linked with statehood. Milošević told his nationalist followers that every generation of Serbs has had their own "Kosovo battle", dating back to the 14th century. In contrast, Russian nationalists includingAleksandr Solzhenitsyn drew a distinction between 'patriotic' Russian people and the 'oppressive' Russian state. Boris Yeltsin and his followers saw the USSR as an oppressor of Russia, thereby accelerating the mostly peaceful division of the former Soviet Union.[135] On 27April 1992, Yugoslavia formally disintegrated and with it vanished any mention of Marxist–Leninism in itsSerbian and Montenegrin successor state.[136]
TheWarsaw Pact had dissolved in July, and its members had rapidly changed, withMarxist–Leninist pro-Soviet governments deposed or elected out of office. As a result, all criticized or expressed weary sentiments about events in Moscow. Some former Warsaw Pact members deployed armed forces to strategically important areas.
Bulgaria:PresidentZhelyu Zhelev stated that "Such anti-democratic methods can never lead to anything good neither for the Soviet Union, nor for Eastern Europe, nor for the democratic developments in the world."[11]
Czechoslovakia:PresidentVáclav Havel warned that his nation could potentially face a "wave of refugees" crossing itsborder with theUkrainian SSR. However, Havel said "It is not possible to reverse the changes that have already happened in the Soviet Union. We believe democracy will eventually prevail in the Soviet Union."[11] Interior Ministry spokesman Martin Fendrych said an unspecified number of additional troops had been moved to reinforce the Czechoslovak border with the Soviet Union.[11]
Hungary: Deputy Speaker of ParliamentMátyás Szűrös said, "Undoubtedly, theSoviet economy has collapsed but this has not been the result of Gorbachev's policy but of the paralyzing influence of conservatives," adding, "Suddenly, the likelihood of a civil war in the Soviet Union has increased."[11]
Poland: A statement released by thepresidentLech Wałęsa, whoseSolidarity union helped prompt the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, appealed for calm. "May unity and responsibility for our state gain the upper hand." The statement, read on Polish radio by spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski, continued, "The situation in the USSR is significant for our country. It can affect our bilateral relations. We want them to be friendly." But Wałęsa emphasized that Poland would keep its hard-won sovereignty while pursuing economic and political reforms.[11]
El Salvador: The end of theSalvadoran Civil War with the CommunistFMLN was being negotiated.PresidentAlfredo Cristiani voiced concern that the coup could encourage the FMLN to end negotiations, or that Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union would be restored. Cuba had long been a supplier to the FMLN. Ernesto Altschul, Cristiani's deputy chief of staff, said, "Obviously, this can affect our situation." After the coup failed, theChapultepec Peace Accords were signed in January 1992, ending twelve years of brutal conflict.[137]
India: As the coup was ongoing, Indian leaders indicated a degree of sympathy for Soviet hardliners.Prime MinisterP. V. Narasimha Rao said "Mr. Gorbachev's ouster was a warning to people who favored reforms without controls." Likewise, India's ambassador in Moscow remarked that Gorbachev had "brought about the disintegration of the [Communist] party".Chief Minister of West Bengal andCommunist Party of India (Marxist) cofounderJyoti Basu wholeheartedly endorsed the coup. When the coup failed, India's government changed course, celebrating "the reassertion of democratic values and a triumph for the will of the people." Despite official support for Yeltsin's victory, Indian politicians feared that a spill-over effect from thedissolution of the Soviet Union would encourage secessionist movements at home. The loss of an economic partner and ideological friend upset the Rao Administration and India's leftist movement, as theIndian National Congress felt it shared some of the CPSU's values. TheChristian Science Monitor wrote that "India feels orphaned – ideologically, strategically, economically"[138]
Iraq:Saddam Hussein was a close ally of the Soviet Union until Gorbachev denounced theinvasion of Kuwait that preceded theGulf War, and relations between the two countries had grown tense. One Iraqi spokesman quoted by the officialIraqi News Agency said that "Iraq's right and steadfastness was one of the main reasons behind the fall [of Gorbachev]... because [Iraq] exposed [his] policy of treason and conspiracy. It is natural that we welcome such change like the states and people who were affected by the policies of the former regime." In other words, Hussein seemingly took credit for inspiring the coup. This position was echoed by the Jordanian NewspaperAl Ra'i.[11][115]
Libya: Government radio quoted leaderMuammar Gaddafi praising the coup leaders for their "brave historical action."[115]
Philippines:PresidentCorazon Aquino expressed "grave concern" saying, "We hope that the progress toward world peace... achieved under the leadership of President Gorbachev will continue to be preserved and enhanced further."[11]
South Africa:Foreign MinisterPik Botha said, "I very much hope that [Soviet developments] will neither give rise to large-scale turbulence within the Soviet Union itself or more widely in Europe, nor jeopardize the era of hard-won international cooperation upon which the world has embarked."[11]
Holy See: While celebrating Mass inBudapest,Pope John Paul II said in scripted remarks that he hoped the Soviet Union's reforms would survive Gorbachev's fall. "I particularly appreciated the sincere desire that guided him and the lofty inspiration that animated him in the promotion of human rights and dignity, as well as in his commitment for the well-being of the country and of the international community. May the process initiated by him not fall into decline." The Pope also prayed for the Soviet Union itself, asking that "our prayers become even more intense to ask God that that great country may be spared further tragedy."[115]
NATO: The alliance held an emergency meeting in Brussels condemning the Soviet coup. "If indeed this coup did fail, it will be a great victory for the courageous Soviet people who have tasted freedom and who are not prepared to have it taken away from them," said United States Secretary of StateJames A. Baker III. Baker also stated, "[i]t will also, to some extent, be a victory, too, for the international community and for all those governments who reacted strongly to these events." NATO Secretary-GeneralManfred Wörner also said, "We should see how the situation in the Soviet Union develops. Our own plans will take into account what happens there."[11][139]
Gennadiy Yanayev, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, went on to head the Department of History and International Relations for the Russian International Academy of Tourism[140] and died in 2010.
Valentin Pavlov, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, subsequently served as a financial expert for several banks and other financial institutions and became chairman ofFree Economic Society,[141] dying in 2003.
Vladimir Kryuchkov, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, died in 2007.
Dmitriy Yazov, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, became adviser to the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Academy of General Staff;[142] he died in 2020.
Boris Pugo died from a gunshot to the head on 22August 1991. His death was ruled as a suicide.[143]
Oleg Baklanov, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, later served as chairman of the board of directors for "Rosobshchemash"; he died in 2021.
The Event (Событие) is a 2015 Russiandocumentary bySergei Loznitsa that uses footage shot 19–24August 1991 bycamera operators of the Saint Petersburg Documentary film studio to tell the story of the coup as it unfolded in Leningrad.
^Mark Kramer, "The Dialectics of Empire: Soviet Leaders and the Challenge of Civil Resistance in East-Central Europe, 1968–91", inAdam Roberts andTimothy Garton Ash (eds.),Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, Oxford University Press, 2009pp. 108–109Archived 20 March 2017 at theWayback Machine.
^Dan Stone, Goodbye to all that? The story of Europe since 1945 (Oxford University Press, 2014) p. 23.
^Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick.The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia – Past, Present, and Future. 1994.ISBN0-374-52738-5, pp. 276–293.
^KGB Maj. Gen. Vyacheslav Zhizhin and KGB Col. Alexei Yegorov,The State Within a State, pp. 276–277.
^abcdefghijHoffman, David E. (2009).The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Deadly Legacy (1 ed.). New York: Doubleday.ISBN978-0-385-52437-7.OCLC320432478.
^The KGB surveillance logbook included every move of Gorbachev and his wifeRaisa Gorbacheva,Subject 111, such as "18:30. 111 is in the bathtub."The State Within a State, pp. 276–277
Gibson, James L. (September 1997). "Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991: Collective Action, Rational Choice, and Democratic Values in the Former Soviet Union".American Political Science Review.91 (3):671–684.doi:10.2307/2952082.ISSN0003-0554.JSTOR2952082.
Hamburg, Roger (1992). "After the Abortive Soviet Coup and 'What Is To Be Done?' The Post Soviet Military".Journal of Political & Military Sociology.20 (2):305–322.JSTOR45294287.
McNair, Brian (1996). "Reform and restructuring in the Soviet media before and after the August 1991 coup". In Eldridge, John; Eldridge, John Eric (eds.).Getting the message: news, truth and power. Communication and society (1. publ., repr ed.). London New York:Routledge. pp. 53–72.ISBN978-0-415-07984-6.
Ōgushi, Atsushi (2008).The demise of the Soviet Communist Party. BASEES/Routledge series on Russian and East European studies. London; New York:Routledge.ISBN978-0-415-43439-3.OCLC144769250.
Saar, Andrus; Joe, Liivi (1992). "Polling, Under the Gun: Political Attitudes in Estonia, Surveyed at the Height of the Soviet Coup Attempt, August 1991".Public Opinion Quarterly.56 (4): 519.doi:10.1086/269341.
Voices From An Attempted Soviet Coup. first person accounts and documents from both sides of the barricades. Compiled and edited by Anya Chernyakhovskaya, Dr John Jirik and Nikolai Lamm.
IRC logs: Transcript of internet chat from the time of the coup
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