ACommunist Party Congress is a significant event in Chinese politics since it nominally decides the leadership of the People's Republic of China. (The Politburo Standing Committee makes major policy decisions for the government to implement and theNational People's Congress in the following March will elevate its members to top government positions.)
Although the Congress formally elects the Central Committee and Politburo, in practice these positions are negotiated before the congress, and the Congress has never functioned as adeliberative assembly. Nominees to Party positions are invariably elected by wide margins, with a tightly controlled candidate-to-position ratio. There is room for symbolicprotest votes ("no" or "abstain" votes) that embarrass the party leadership. Despite its symbolic nature, it maintains an important role because it is the occasion at which the results of these deliberations are publicly announced, and in which the PRC leadership faces both domestic and foreign reporters in a press conference.
Since the mid-1980s, the Communist Party has attempted to maintain a smooth and orderly succession and avoid acult of personality, by having a major shift in personnel every ten years in even-number party congresses, and by promoting people in preparation for this shift in odd-number party congresses. These mechanisms have been institutionalized by mandatory retirement ages, and provisions in both the Party and state constitutions that limit the term of office of officials to two five-year terms.
The 17th National Congress introduced the idea of a "low-carboneco-city model" as part of a broader "eco-culture" framework, describing it as part of an effort to encourage sustained peace andcommon prosperity.[2]: 200–201
More interesting and unpredictable were the selection of the younger cadres who will be promoted to thePolitburo, China'sde facto ruling body. The youngest person currently on thePolitburo prior to the congress was only two years younger than Hu, and consequently, there was widespread speculation that Hu's successor would not come from the members serving on the Politburo prior to the congress but rather from the next generation of leaders. Prior to the congress, speculation was rife on who would be named as Hu's successor. Although the subject of succession speculation is largely taboo within the mainland Chinese media, Hong Kong and Taiwan media, as well as international media, predicted that the top candidates would beXi Jinping andLi Keqiang, then serving as party chief in Shanghai and Liaoning, respectively.[citation needed]
In addition, as people at the top level of the party retire, there is room for younger members of the party to move up one level. Hence the party congress is a time of a general personnel reshuffle, and the climax of negotiations that involve not only the top leadership but practically all significant political positions in Mainland China. Notably, fifth-generation leadership hopefuls Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will leave vacancies in the top leadership position of Shanghai andLiaoning. In addition,Hubei,Guangdong,Chongqing and possiblyTianjin will all go through regional leadership changes. Because of the pyramid structure of the party and the existence of mandatory retirement ages, cadres who are not promoted at a party congress are likely to face the end of their political careers. Current provincial-level officials see the Congress as a chance for promotion to Beijing. The Congress will also be significant in determining the amount of influence still held by former General secretaryJiang Zemin, as reflected by the personnel changes.[citation needed]
Although Hong Kong has its separate political system, Congress is being watched closely by theSpecial Administrative Region as well. Hong Kong media has often been very vocal in speculation and in reporting events of the Congress. The political direction set by the decisions will have a large impact on the direction of Hong Kong's development in the coming years as well.
2,213 delegates[citation needed] were elected as delegates to the Congress through a series of staggered elections in which one level of the party elects delegates to the next higher party congress. An additional 57 veteran (mostly retired) communist leaders were appointed directly as delegates. This system has the effect that the party leadership through theOrganization Department of the Chinese Communist Party can control elections and block the election of anyone it finds unacceptable.
The great majority of these arecadres, but about 30% are model workers, and there are about 20 private businesspeople.[4] The number of candidates shortlisted by local Central Committees was 15% more than the number of delegates required, allowing local Party Congress members some degree of choice in the election. State media claimed this was "an improvement over past practices" (5% more in 1997 and 10% more in 2002), but noted heavy supervision of the election process by national Party authorities.[5] In addition, elected delegates had to be approved by the 17th Delegate Status Inspection Committee, and the National Central Committee reserved the right to "select some veteran Party members who have quit their leading posts to attend the upcoming Party congress as specially-invited delegates".[6]
Two prominent delegates are known to have died since the election finished in April 2007, Major-General Wang Shaojun, and former Vice-PremierHuang Ju.[4]
Many party positions will be elected, including the following:
ThePolitburo (about two dozen members elected by the Central Committee;[4] expected to change about half its membership[7]), including itsStanding Committee
The election process was supervised by Secretariat SecretaryZeng Qinghong, although he himself was not part of the new Central Committee.[8] Most of those elected will take up the equivalent state positions after theNational People's Congress in 2001, although key positions and existing vacancies on theState Council may change before and during the Congress. In the Central Committee elections on 21 October 2008, the margin of dropped off candidates was 8.3%, a three-point percentage increase from last year. The increased percentage seems to signify greater "inner Party democracy", and increased power among the delegates (i.e., only 204 out of 221 candidates shortlisted for the Central Committee survived the electoral process).[9] In the new central committee, 107 of the 204 members are new members.
General Secretary Hu Jintao's keynote report was prepared byWen Jiabao.[8] It was delivered to the first session of the Congress on 15 October 2007, and lasted well over two hours, and was broadcast on all major television and radio stations in the country. The event marked the first major live public address by Hu since taking over power in 2002. It laid heavy emphasis on Hu'sScientific Outlook on Development as the current guiding ideology in succession to Deng Xiaoping Theory and theThree Represents, with the goal of continuingsocialism with Chinese characteristics and eventual socialist harmonious society. Hu also put forward thetheoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, which included Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development.[10]
Western media have generally concentrated on the lack of novelty with Hu's speech, citing that there was no references to political reform during the report. The Communist Party's grip on power is unlikely to waver for another period of time. Domestically, however, Hu's ideology is a novel addition to the current ideologies of the CCP, adding more of a populist focus, although the political rhetoric in the report was apparent. Hu stressed inner-party democracy, and repeated the word "democracy" 60 times in the speech according toXinhua. In addition, Hu received applause a total of over 40 times, well over Jiang's record of 16 five years earlier.[11]
During the speech, former General secretary Jiang Zemin seemed very tired, was constantly yawning, and was not paying much attention. Jiang seldom talked to Wen Jiabao, who was sitting to his left. Wen was paying full attention to Hu's speech for its entire length. Hong Kong media noted that Jiang left the Great Hall without shaking anyone's hand and that no one came up to shake his.[12] Surprisingly, Mao's successorHua Guofeng also attended the Congress as a delegate. All the surviving members of the 14th and 15th PSC's were present, including former PremiersLi Peng andZhu Rongji, but with the exception of Jiang rivalQiao Shi.
There were work reports from key party leaders and institutions, providing the Party's analysis of the previous quinquennium and its agenda for the next five years.[13] It is possible that the speech will also answer calls for inner-party democracy, i.e. decentralization within the one-party system.[4]
RegardingTaiwan, Hu emphasized cultural, economic, and blood ties between the island and the People's Republic of China.[14]: 170 In doing so, Hu used the slogan, "an entity of common destiny linked by blood."[14]: 170 This slogan was later adapted by Xi Jinping into the broader concept of thecommon destiny for humankind.[14]: 170
After the plenary sessions, there was a rare press conference by the Politburo Standing Committee. Newcomer Li Keqiang looked a bit stiff while Xi Jinping looked shy.[4]
The Seventeenth National Congress made the negotiation offree trade agreements a priority, which accelerated the pace of China's bilateral free trade agreement negotiations.[15]: 153
16 October: Xinhua carries an official commentary attacking "cliques" within the Party, perceived as a reference to the Shanghai clique.[16]
February 2007: Party elder Li Rui and retired academic Xie Tao published articles calling for the CCP to become a European-style socialist party; their remarks were condemned by the Party propaganda apparatus.[17]
15 March: Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told foreign journalists he supported further political reform. The remarks were initially omitted from the official transcript, allegedly on the orders of hardline propaganda chiefLi Changchun.[18]
28 April: AcademicWan Gang becomes the first non-CCP minister in half a century, on being appointed Minister of Science and Technology[17]
July: Chen Liangyu is formally convicted and expelled from the Party.
Mid-August: Top CCP leaders discussed the Congress' decisions at their annualBeidaihe retreat. Some Hong Kong sources claim they decided the shortlists for the new Central Committee and Politburo,[8] while others argued that basic PSC positions were still up for grabs.[21]
19 August: Five national newspapers run identical front pages (shown here), all giving prominence to General secretary Hu.[22]
28 August: A Politburo meeting decides dates of the 17th Party Congress, and the final meeting of the 16th Central Committee.[23]
6 September: Ma Wen gained a third role as head of a newly createdNational Bureau of Corruption Prevention. Unlike the CCDI, this does not investigate individual cases and is a government, rather than Party, organ.[5] This led to speculation that the Congress will highlight the Hu-Wen leadership's anti-corruption drive.[26]
19 September: Petitioners in Beijing'sFengtai District ordered to move from their homes due to construction work for the 17th Party Congress;[29] the work was completed by 26 September.[30]
19 September: In a move predicted by the Hong Kong press,[21]Ling Jihua, atuanpai member and Hu ally, replacedWang Gang as director of the Central Committee's General Office.[31]
21 September: APeople's Daily commentary heralded "new good tidings from Shanghai", adding to speculation that Shanghai chief Xi Jinping was headed for promotion, as the Shanghai Party emerged from the Chen Liangyu scandal.[32]
27 September: U.S.-basedDuowei reported thatWu Bangguo had undergone cancer surgery.[33] The same day, he made his first public appearance since 31 August.[34]
29 September: Wu Bangguo was noticeably not present at the Politburo meeting as broadcast byXinwen Lianbo, while all other Politburo Standing Committee members were given camera time. Also unconventional was the fact that no Politburo Standing Committee members were named except for Hu Jintao.[35]
1 October: Hu Jintao visits Shanghai duringNational Day, a day after all eight PSC members attended a National Day banquet in Beijing. The move is seen as an affirmation of Shanghai and symbolizes the unity between Shanghai and the central leadership. Hu is also to open theSpecial Olympics there.[36]
4 October:Duowei makes their final predictions on the nine members of the new politburo. Namely, in order ranking, they are Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun,Xi Jinping,Li Keqiang,He Guoqiang andZhou Yongkang.[37]
9 October: The 7th Plenum of the 16th Central Committee meets to finalize the agenda for the Congress. A key decision involving the entrenchment of Hu'sScientific Development Concept andSocialist Harmonious Society has taken place with discussions from delegates of the 16th Central Committee.[38]
14 October: Taiwan-basedChina Times announces their final speculative shortlist for the PSC. The list is identical to Duowei's shortlist 10 days earlier.[39]
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas media often speculate on the makeup of the leadership months before Congress takes place. During the16th Party Congress, the speculation two months prior to the Congress on the nine members of thePolitburo Standing Committee (PSC) were entirely accurate.[citation needed]
Zeng Qinghong, CCP Secretariat Secretary, Vice-President, ranked 5th in Politburo Standing Committee, is out of the 17th Central Committee, likely due to age. Zeng's departure also signals the solidification of Hu Jintao's power.
Wu Guanzheng, anti-corruption chief, ranked 7th in PSC, due to age.
Luo Gan, Political and Legislative Affairs Committee Secretary, ranked 9th in the PSC, due to age.
Wu Yi, Vice-Premier, China's "iron-lady", the only woman in the 16th Politburo, due to age.
Zeng Peiyan, Vice-Premier, ranked 3rd, due to age.
The Politburo is made of a wider range of cadres whose average age is generally younger than that of the PSC, some of whom slated for promotion at the18th Party Congress. It has been noted that the Politburo is a power balance between Hu'stuanpai, Jiang's Shanghai clique, and theCrown Prince Party.
Central Committee bureaucratWang Gang is expected to become a figurehead on the NPC or CPPCC (and implicitly a Politburo member), although he has an outside chance of a PSC place.[21]
Wang Zhaoguo is Wu Bangguo's deputy at the NPC and Hu's former boss in the CYL. He has recently been considered to have an outside chance of a PSC place, given his age.[21]
^"中国特色社会主义理论体系的概括提出有何重大意义？" [What is the significance of summarizing the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics?].Communist Party Member Network. 29 August 2022. Retrieved1 April 2025.
^"Chinesenewsnet.com".www6.chinesenewsnet.com.Archived from the original on 16 December 2018. Retrieved17 October 2007.
^Cheng, Wenting (2023).China in Global Governance of Intellectual Property: Implications for Global Distributive Justice. Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies series.Palgrave Macmillan.ISBN978-3-031-24369-1.
^Smith, Craig A. (2019). "Datong and Xiaokang". In Sorace, Christian; Franceschini, Ivan; Loubere, Nicholas (eds.).Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi. Acton, Australia:Australian National University Press.ISBN9781760462499.
