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'Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969 - June 1989'
by Brendan O'Duffy and Brendan O'Leary

The Future of Northern Ireland
edited by John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary

Published by:
Oxford University Press,
Walton Street
Oxford OX26DP
1990
ISBN 0 19 827329 0
Hardback 376pp

This material is copyright Brendan O'Duffy and Brendan O'Leary, 1990, and is included on the CAIN site by permission of Oxford University Press. You may not edit, adapt, or redistribute changed versions ofthis for other than your personal use without the express written permissionof the publishers. Redistribution for commercial purposes is not permitted.

OFFICIAL and independent data collections on violence in NorthernIreland are generally reliable even though different methodologiesare employed by the two principal monitors: the Northern Irelandpolice force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and the private organization,the Irish Information Partnership. All the data analysis and graphicsin this appendix are based on these two data bases. The RUC andIIP data differ very marginally in their aggregate figures ondeaths. In their annual death-tolls the difference is generallyless than 1 per cent (McKeown 1985: 4). The main difference betweenthe two data-sets is that the IIP is much more exhaustive andilluminating in categorizing the status of victims and in thecategorization of agents responsible for violent acts. The RUCdata by contrast is less helpful, and in some cases less credible.

The annual death-toll between 1969 and 1988 according to the RUCis presented in Table A3.1 (second column) and in Figure A3.1.As can be seen clearly in Table A3.1 , in Figure A3.1, and inFigure A3.2, which presents the cumulative annual death total'over a quarter of all deaths occurred in the first four yearsof the current wave of troubles, and nearly 61 per cent of alldeaths over the two decades occurred in the five years 1971-6.Since 1977 the annual average rate of death due to political violencehas been 85 persons per annum, and the numbers killed in the lastfive years (1984-8) have been 13.5 per cent of the total killedsince 1969. This picture suggests a dramatic fall-off in deathssince the early 1970s.

The death-toll after the Anglo-lrish Agreement (AIA) was signed(November 1985) confirms the overall downward trend since theearly and mid-1970sif one takes a long-term view. An averageof 82 deaths in the years 1986-8 compares with an average of 85deaths per annum since 1977. However, there is a perceptible upwardtrend in the death-toll after the AIAif one takes a short-termview and compares the death-toll in the three years 1986-8 (61,93, 93) with the toll in 1983-5 (77, 64, 54) - although we shalldiscuss below whether this upward trend was caused by the AIA.One way to put the apparent impact of the AIA in long-term perspectiveis by inspecting Figure A3.2, the cumulative annual death-toll.The post-AIA death-toll seems to have restored the post-1976 trendafter the brief fall in the years 1983-5.

There are three basic explanations for the fall-off in deathssince the early and mid-1970s. First, loyalist paramilitarieshave ceased to engage in sectarian killings of Catholics on thesame scale as they did in the years 1971-6. Many of them havebeen arrested and jailed, and their organizations have becomemore factionalized, corrupt, and directionless. Second, nationalistparamilitaries have also changed their strategies and organizationsin ways which have reduced the annual death-toll. Many of themhave also been arrested and jailed; and their organizations havebecome smaller and structured in cells or 'active service units'(Bishop and Mallie 1987). The 'cell structure' was partly adoptedin response to declining popularity in nationalist areas but alsofor strategic reasons - to avoid penetration by the security forces.The Provisional IRA have aimed primarily to attack 'military targets'(i.e. members of the security forces) since the mid-1970s, andhave consequently reduced their use of bombs in urban areas- atactic which killed many civilians, both Catholic and Protestant,in the early 1970s. Finally, more effective surveillance and knowledgeon the part of the security forces may have dampened the potentiallevels of violence. However, this final explanation has to bequalified in the light of firm evidence that the actions of thesecurity forces have frequently, if sometimes unintentionally,raised the levels of violence.

Time-series trends in deaths are available in a crude form fromRUC data. Figure A3.3 confirms the downward trend in civiliandeaths since the 1971-6 period - although RUC data do not enableus to follow victims by religions category over time. It alsoshows a dramatic falling off in the number of deaths sustainedby the British Army (excluding the Ulster Defence Regiment). Finally,since the early 1980s the local security forces (the RUC/RUC Reserveand the UDR) have suffered an increasing proportion of the deathssustained by the security forces. In part this trend reflects'Ulsterization'-the Northern Ireland Office's policy preferencefor local as opposed to British forces-but it also suggests aswitch in the targets chosen by nationalist paramilitaries. 'Ulsterization'and the rising death-toll of local security forces are naturallyand predictably related.

The IIP provide a detailed breakdown of the status of victims,as well as categorizing the agents responsible for deaths (seeTable A3.2), whereas the RUC merely record whether or not victimswere members of the security forces. We can only speculate asto the reasons the RUC fail to provide similarly detailed information.For the present the IIP data base is of much greater use in clarifyingthe distribution of victims and of responsibility for their deaths.

What is also clear from Figure A3.4 is that nationalist paramilitaryviolence is primarily strategic rather than simply sectarian -especially after 1972-3. More members of the security forces (862)are killed than Protestant civilians (575), and since the formerare overwhelmingly killed by nationalist paramilitaries (834,and see Figure A3.8 below), it follows that nationalist paramilitariespartially fulfill their objective of fighting 'a war of nationalliberation', as opposed to a mere sectarian war. However, Protestantsunderstandablyinterpret killings of Protestant membersof the local security forces as sectarian, and, as we shall seenationalist paramilitaries have also killed a very considerablenumber of Protestant civilians (377, and see Figure A3.12 below).

Figure A3.4 also shows that nationalist (10.7 per cent) and loyalistparamilitaries (2.5 per cent) combined (13.2 per cent) have sufferedfewer deaths than either religious category of civilian. Theyhave also sustained fewer deaths than the security forces. Theparamilitaries' low share of the overall death-toll presumablyexplains why their activities are relatively easily sustained-althoughit is also clear that nationalist paramilitaries have died morethan four times as frequently as loyalist paramilitaries.

However, a slightly different picture emerges if we remove deathssuffered by the security forces in order to examine the agentsresponsible for civilian deaths. The pie-chart shown in FigureA3.6 reveals that loyalist paramilitaries have killed slightlymore civilians than nationalist paramilitaries (623 compared to572,), and that both sets of paramilitaries have been responsiblefor nearly 80 per cent of all civilian deaths. Moreover, a verylarge share of the deaths due to other or unidentified agents(8.9 per cent) can reasonably be attributed to loyalist and nationalistparamilitaries.

Figure A3.7 shows 'Civilian Deaths as a Proportion of Deaths byAgency'. It is perhaps the most revealing bar-chart. It showsthat the security forces kill a civilian 1 time in 2, i.e. theyare 'efficient and effective'-if not always law-abiding - only1 time in 2. This demonstrable evidence of incompetence, error,or malevolence (depending upon one's point of view) is made somewhatmore palatable by the low overall share of the death-toll attributableto the security forces. However, the low ratio of 'appropriate'to 'wrongful' killings - especially the disproportionate wrongfulkillings of Catholics - helps explain why the security forcesare poorly regarded by Northern Ireland Catholics.

Nationalist paramilitaries (the IRAs (both Official and Provisional),INLA, and IPLO), as Figure A3.7 also shows, by far exceed allother agents in responsibility for killings. Moreover, they killnon-civilians just over 3 times in 5, a 'kill ratio' which alsoindicates a high degree of incompetence, error, or malevolencewith respect to civilians. Although they are more likely to killtheir declared targets than the security forces it is also truethat the absolute level of civilian deaths which they have caused(572) is very close to the number of civilians killed by loyalistparamilitaries (623). Although nationalist paramilitary killingsare primarily 'non-sectarian' it is obvious that they also killa very high number of Protestant civilians. Time-series data (inthe IIP database) do show, however, that nationalists have killedproportionately higher numbers of non-civilians in the last decade.

The final striking feature of Figure A3.7 is that loyalist paramilitarieskill civilians almost exclusively. This feature of their activitieshas been consistent since their first eruption (Boulton 1973;Dillon and I,ehane 1973). It is also easy to explain. Catholiccivilians are easier to identify than nationalist paramilitaries.They are also softer targets. They are therefore killed in actsof 'representative violence' (Wright 1987) which are meant todeter Catholics from supporting the IRA or other nationalist organizations.Thus although loyalist killing appears more random and less instrumentalthan nationalist killing it too is generally 'rational', i.e.goal-governed behaviour based upon attention to the consequencesof action. This point is reinforced by considerable event-dataevidence which shows that loyalists have engaged in systematically'retributive' rather than purely random killing. However, therehave also been a high number of psychopathic killings by supposedlypolitically motivated loyalists. (The same psychopathic propensityis also true-although to a lesser extent-of nationalist paramilitants.)The most barbaric of these activities were carried out by the'Shankill butchers' (Dillon 1989).

The next set of Figures (A3.8-12) displays the agents responsiblefor the deaths of the five main groupings to have sustained highdeath-tolls (nationalist paramilitaries, members of the securityforces, Catholic civilians, Protestant civilians, and loyalistparamilitaries). Figure A3.8 demonstrates a very striking featureof the deaths of nationalist paramilitaries. Nationalist paramilitariesthemselves kill almost as many nationalist paramilitaries (146)as all other agencies combined (149). There are three explanationsfor this surprising fact. First, nationalist paramilitary organizations,like all guerrilla and terrorist organizations, engage in a highdegree of 'internal disciplinary' killing, i.e. the executionof (often merely alleged) informants and wayward (or unreliable)members. Second, there has been a high degree of faction-fightingwithin nationalist organizations. The Provisional IRA and theOfficial IRA fought one another in the early 1970s. The OfficialIRA and the breakaway Irish National Liberation Army killed eachother's members in 1975, and more recently in the spring of 1987INLA imploded in an internal feud which accompanied the formationof IPLO. Third, in the racist language of the British securityforces, many of the deaths of nationalist paramilitaries havebeen due to 'Paddy factors', i.e. bungled actions, such as blowingthemselves up by mistake. Such actions were especially commonin the Provisional IRA's early days. Since the completion of theirorganizational 'learning curve' such deaths are now less common,especially given that explosives like Semtex are apparently easierto handle. However, raw and inexperienced IRA recruits are stillvulnerable to 'own goals'.

Figure A3.11: Agents responsible for Deaths of Protestant Civilians , 1969-June 1989
Source: Drawn from IIPAgenda Database

Political violence in Northern Ireland has extended far beyondkillings or executions. Data are also available from the RUC oninjuries sustained due to the 'troubles', as well as the annualnumber of explosions, the number of bombs neutralized, the scaleof findings of explosives, the number of shooting incidents, thenumber of firearms finds, the number of armed robberies, and themoney taken in armed robberies. The graphics in Figures A3.13-19illustrate these indicators in turn.

They all show the same pattern as the death-toll data. Very highindicators of violent activity are evident in the years 1971-6with 'normalization' thereafter. The years 1976-7 were turning-pointsin the scale of all violence-not simply deaths-for three mainreasons. First, the security forces' improved knowledge and capabilitiesenabled them to dampen down the levels of violence. In particularthe ending of internment without trial appears to have helpedreduce nationalist militancy after 1976. Second, loyalist paramilitariesdramatically lowered their assassinations and attacks on Catholiccivilians. They did so because they believed that the unionistcommunity had beaten back the threat to the integrity of NorthernIreland posed by the civil rights demonstrations, the abolitionof Stormont, and the Sunningdale agreement. The opportunitiesfor easy killings had also been reduced by the very extensiveresettlement and segregation of Catholics and Protestants afterthe early years of the 'troubles'- in fact the largest forcedpopulation movements in Western Europe since the aftermath ofWorld War II. Finally, nationalist paramilitaries, especiallythe IRA, reorganized in 1976-7 and changed their strategy. Thenew cell structure reduced the scale of IRA activities. Combinedwith their shift from bombing civilian, shopping, and urban centresto attacking military targets the scale of the violence fell inconsequence. The propensity of this 'military' violence to causedeaths or injuries to civilians was much lower than the previouscombination of 'economic' and 'military' violence.

Over 20,000 people have suffered serious injuries since 1969.In a small population of one-and-a-half million people the socialimpact of such violence is easily imagined. The trends in injuries(Figure A3.13) apparently show that civilians have borne the bruntof the conflict over time. However, the RUC data are unhelpfulhere because they classify both sets of paramilitaries as civilians.Moreover, in the first three years (1968-70) the RUC data-setimplies that no civilians were injured at all (i.e. no data wascollected on the question). The data-set is also unhelpful becausethe RUC do not declare how they tabulate their figures. Originallythey referred to injuries caused by terrorism, whereas they nowrefer to injuries due to the 'security situation' (sic!).In other words it is unclear whether injuries caused by the securityforces are included in the figures. It appears that they are,although this would seem to imply that the RUC used to classifyinjuries caused by the security forces as due to terrorism!

The final RUC data on long-run trends in political violencetabulate armed robberies (Figure A3.18). Since Northern Irelandhad extraordinarily low rates of 'ordinary, decent' crime beforethe late 1960s almost all of the rise in armed robberies is attributableto the political climate of the 'troubles'. Armed robberies areone important source of finance for paramilitary organizations.Other sources include genuine voluntary donations, protectionrackets, 'legitimate' front enterprises, and, in the case of theIRA, funds from Irish-American organizations (Holland 1987). Unfortunatelythe RUC data-unsurprisingly-does not break down the agents responsiblefor armed robberies so we have no way of knowing the relativeproportion of nationalist to loyalist armed robberies. However,what is evident is that the trend in armed robberies displaysa similar pattern to the other indicators of violence. There alsoappears to have been a sharp increase in 1986, the year afterthe Anglo-lrish Agreement-much sharper than the increase in thedeath-rate. Having adjusted the RUC data we can also see in FigureA3.19 the annual real value of these armed robberies-after adjustingthe nominal values into 1985 prices.

Ultra-nationalists and unionists are both hostile to the Anglo-lrishAgreement. They also share a common interest, albeit for differentreasons, in demonstrating that the Anglo-lrish Agreement has notworked in one central respect: the promotion of peace, security,and stability. Consequently these critics of the AIA argue thatsince November 1985 violence, insecurity, and instability haveactually increased. They have some evidence to support their case.Table A3.3 shows that deaths, injuries, shooting incidents, explosionsand armed robberies have all gone up significantly in the threeyears after the AIA by comparison with the three years in therun-up to the Hillsborough accord. Injuries and shooting incidentshave gone up by over 50 per cent, armed robberies by 30 per centand deaths by just over 25 per cent.

However, it would be a mistake to attribute all the rise in violencein the three years after 1985 to the Agreement itself, just asit would be a mistake to assume that the decline in indicatorsof violence before November 1985 would have continued indefinitelyhad there been no change in the constitutional status quo. Themonthly death data in the years preceding and succeeding the AIAare shown in Table A3.4 (second column). They are also representedin the histogram Figure A3.20. Inspecting the data in its rawmonthly form makes the upward trend after the Agreement much lessevident than in the annual data. Moreover, as inspection of themonths for 1987 reveals, it is evident that the monthly death-tollwas raised considerably in several cases by episodes which arenot directly linked to the Agreement: the INLA feud in the spring,the deaths of an IRA unit in a stake-out at Loughall in earlysummer, and the (allegedly mistaken) IRA killing of Protestantcivilians at Enniskillen in November of the same year.

TABLE A3.4.(Cont.)

Source: (2nd col.) IIP,Agenda Database.
Calculated as in Hartwig and Dearing (1979: 36-9).


When the monthly death data are smoothed, using the standard techniquein exploratory data analysis of running medians and harming (Hartwigand Dearing 1979: 36-9), a pre-Agreement downward trend and apost-Agreement upward trend in deaths are much more apparent (seeFigure A3.21). However, the rise is not especially dramatic. Indeedmuch of the deterioration in the smoothed monthly figures comesafter the spring of 1986 - after the IRA received extensive reinforcementsofmatériel from Libya. Finally, one might evenargue that the impact of the AIA has been relatively low-key giventhe ferocity of unionist opposition to it. The predictions ofa loyalist backlash on the scale of the early 1970s have so farnot been fulfilled - even though loyalist paramilitary killingshave increased since November 1985.

[1] It is wholly unclear from the RUC data whether or not the weightof explosives finds are expressed in TNT impact-weight or simpleweight in pounds.