 Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969: Report of Tribunal of Inquiry[Key_Events]Key_Issues][Conflict_Background]
Presented to Parliament by Command of His Excellency Published in Belfast by, SBN 337 10566 9 Copyright notice: Crown copyright material has been reproduced under licence from theController of Her Majesty's Stationary Office.
To His Excellency Baron Grey of Naunton, GCMG, KCVO Governor of Northern Ireland 1. On 27 August 1969 both Houses of Parliament of Northern Irelandresolved that it was expedient that a Tribunal be establishedfor inquiring into a definite matter of urgent public importance:that is to say, the acts of violence and civil disturbance whichoccurred
(2) during the month of April 1969 at Kilmore, Co Armagh; SilentValley, and Annalong, Co Down, and Clady, Co Antrim; (3) during the month of April 1969 at or near ten Post Officesin the City of Belfast; (4) during the months of July and August 1969 in the cities ofLondonderry and Belfast; (5) during the months of July and August 1969 in the town of Dungiven; (6) during the month of August 1969 in the City of Armagh andin the towns of Coalisland, Dungannon and Newry; and (7) during the 17, 18 August 1969 at Crossmaglen, Co Armagh; 2. By Warrant of Appointment, also dated 27 August 1969, YourExcellency , appointed the three signatories to this Report tobe a Tribunal for the purposes of the inquiry mentioned in theResolution of the two Houses of Parliament, and further appointedthe first signatory to this Report as chairman of the Tribunal. The Warrant provided that the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence)Act 1921 should apply to the Tribunal. 3. By a further Warrant given on the I I December 1970 Your Excellencyvaried the terms of the Warrant of Appointment of 27 August 1969by revoking the appointment of Mr Lavery and Mr Marshall in sofar as their appointment related to the acts of violence and civildisturbance which occurred-
(2) during the month of April 1969 at Kilmore, Co Armagh; SilentValley, and Annalong, Co Down, and Clady, Co Antrim; (3) during the month of April 1969 at or near ten Post Officesin the City of Belfast; (4) during the months of July and August 1969 in the town of Dungiven; (5) during the month of August 1969 in the towns of Coalisland,Dungannon and Newry; and (6) during the 17, 18 August 1969 at Crossmaglen, Co Armagh; 4. The effect of the Resolutions of the two Houses of Parliamentand the two Warrants of Appointment is, therefore, as follows.A Tribunal consisting of all three of us has been established to inquire into the actsof violence and the civil disturbance which occurred in 1969 duringthe months of July and August in the Cities of Londonderry andBelfast and during the month of August in the City of Armagh.Our Chairman, sitting alone, has been the Tribunal establishedfor inquiring into all the other acts of violence and civil disturbancelisted in the Resolutions of the two Houses of Parliament. 5. Accordingly, the inquiry into the disturbances in Londonderry,Belfast and Armagh has been conducted by all three signatoriesto this report. The inquiry into the other matters has been conductedby our Chairman alone. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity andcontinuity of exposition, we have incorporated the findings ofthese two inquiries into one report. In so far as the report dealswith the acts of violence and civil disturbance occurring in Londonderry,Belfast and Armagh, it is the report of all three of us and thefindings are those of the Tribunal of three. In so far as thereport deals with the Other matters, the report and its findingsare the responsibility of our Chairman. 6. The application to our proceedings of the Tribunals of Inquiry(Evidence) Act 1921 meant that our inquiry was to be judicialin character. We were given thereby powers, rights and privilegesvested in the High Court in respect of the enforcing of the attendanceof witnesses, examining them on oath and the compelling of theproduction of documents. We came under an obligation not to refuseto allow the public to be present at our proceedings, unless inour opinion it was in the public interest expedient to sit inprivate for reasons connected with the subject-matter of the inquiryor the nature of the evidence. We were given power to authoriserepresentation by counsel, solicitor, or otherwise of personsappearing to be interested in our proceedings. Witnesses calledbefore us were entitled to the immunities and privileges of awitness before the High Court. 7. A number of procedural problems of varying importance had tobe resolved by the Tribunal and some of them are discussed inAppendix 1. But we would emphasise that throughout our inquirywe have borne in mind the judicial and public character conferredupon our proceedings by the application of the Act of 1921. Inparticular, we were concerned to ensure that persons, whose conductwas criticised in written statements furnished by those whom theTribunal proposed to call as witnesses, should be given noticeof the allegations against them and have a full opportunity, withthe aid of legal representation if necessary, of dealing withthem 8. The Parliamentary Resolutions do not in terms require us tomake any report, But Your Excellency's Warrant of Appointmentempowered us to make reports from time to time as we judge expedient. We have decided to make only one report. It will be observedthat on some, but not all, of the matters referred to us we havemade findings. We would emphasise that we have considered ourselvesentitled to make findings only in those instances in which wehave felt sure that we know the truth. We have been at painsto indicate those matters on which we have made positive findings. 9. We first sat in Belfast on 5 September 1969. We conductedhearings in Londonderry in the months of September to December1969. To hear witnesses concerned with the Armagh and Newry disturbances,and the Crossmaglen incident, we sat in Armagh. All other hearingswere conducted in the Royal Courts of Justice, Belfast, wherewe sat, though not continuously, from January 1970 to the endof June 1971. The Tribunal inspected the scene of each disturbancecovered by the report. The details of the hearings and the witnessescalled are set out in Appendix IV. 10. The Tribunal was greatly assisted in its work by both solicitorsand counsel instructed to appear before it. But for the skilledand sustained work of both counsel and solicitors instructed onbehalf of the Tribunal, an investigation as complex and detailedas this inquiry proved to be could never have been completed. We are equally indebted to counsel and solicitors who appearedfor those to whom we gave leave to be represented: their thoroughcross-examination of witnesses and well prepared final submissionsillumined much that was obscure, and ensured that a full hearingwas given to all persons affected by the inquiry. The list ofrepresentations is to be found in Appendix VII. 11. We wish to record the admiiration and appreciation that wefeel for the work of our Secretary, Mr. A. J. Green, our AssistantSecretary, Mr. W. T. McCrory, our legal assistant, Mr. J. A. W.Strachan of the English Bar, and the administrative and clericalstaff. Their dedicated work over a period exceeding two yearscalls for more than the personal thanks of the three of us: itneeds to be recognised as a public service of outstanding merit. The best tribute, however, is quite simply to place on publicrecord that our staff have consistently and often under severepressure devoted to the work of the Tribunal the zeal and intelligencethat we, citizens of the United Kingdom, have come to expect ofour civil service. 12. Copies of the record of our proceedings, which includes theevidence, the exhibits and the final submissions of counsel, togetherwith a detailed chronology prepared by the secretariat for theuse of the Tribunal, have been deposited with the British Museum,the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Queen's University,Belfast, New University of Ulster, and the Institute of AdvancedLegal Studies, University of London.
INTRODUCTORY Terms and abbreviations 1.1 A few remarks are needed about terms. We have not been ableto avoid describing groups as Catholic or Protestant. These termsare used only as labels indicating well understood community identifications. No more meaning should be given to the terms than that. Members of the RUC and USC are referred to in the report by theirtitles during the disturbances. At that time the basic RUC ranks were Constable, Sergeant, HeadConstable, District Inspector, and County Inspector. The RUCwas headed by the Inspector ,General, assisted by the Deputy InspectorGeneral. The Belfast force was controlled by the Commissionerfor Belfast, and a Deputy Commissioner. In the report we normallyabbreviate basic titles to Const, Sgt, HC, DI, and Cl. We sometimesrefer to the IG, DIG and D/Commissioner. The basic ranks in the USC were Special Constable, Special Sergeant,Sub-District Commandant, District Commandant and County Commandant. In the report we normally abbreviate these titles to S/Const,S/Sgt, SDC, DC and CC. There were also full-time Sergeant Instructors.These are normally described as Sgt/Instructors. CHAPTER 1 - THE COURSE OF EVENTS Antecedent events 1.2 An accurate assessment of the 1969 disturbances requires some knowledgeof events in the province since unrest developed in 1968. These initialevents have been described in the Report of the Cameron Commission[1],and we feel we can deal with them briefly. 1.3 In June 1968 the local Member of Parliainent (N1), exposed a caseof house allocation in Caledon in which there was discrimination in favourof an unmarried Protestant girl. The agitation which started over thiscase caught the imagination of the non-Unionist minority in the Provinceand greatly increased the standing and influence of the Northern IrelandCivil Rights Association.[2] Events elsewhere in the world, particularlyperhaps the student riots in France in the early summer of that year, encouragedthe belief that a policy of street demonstrations at critical places andtimes could achieve results, if only because they would attract the attentionof the mass media. The Government of Northern Ireland felt the pressuresthat NICRA and others were able to create, and responded first by outrightresistance, and then by concessions. Thus Mr Craig, the then Minister ofHome Affairs (NI), banned a demonstration scheduled to take place in Londonderryon 5 October. The ban was defied and a violent clash between police anddemonstrators occurred. Further unrest followed in Londonderry. Then areform programme was announced by the Government in November; but it wasregarded as inadequate by the minority, and did not efface or diminishtheir feeling that the police would be used as a partisan force to suppressthe political demonstrations of those opposed to the Northern Ireland Government. 1.4 Undoubtedly, the Government was faced with a familiar dilemma. Ifit stood firm it attracted violent opposition. Yet to promise reform afterthreats to law and order was a recipe to encourage further demonstrationsand counter demonstrations, and to increase rather than diminish the riskof confrontations between minority groups and the police. In 1969 thisdilemma of the Government became more pronounced. 1.6 The reform programme had left opposition activists dissatisfied,but at the same time it had evoked hostility from some Protestants. Oftheir counter-demonstrations the most notable was one organised by Dr Paisleyand others in Armagh on 30 November 1968. Later he and Major Bunting wereconvicted of unlawful assembly for their part in this affair and sentencedto three months' imprisonment. Their appeal was heard on 26 March 1969and dismissed. 1.8 While the Catholic minority was developing confidence in its power,a feeling of insecurity was affecting the Protestants. They became themore determined to hold their traditional summer parades, particularlythose in Londonderry and Belfast. In these circumstances sectarian conflictwas to be expected, unless the police were strong enough to prevent it. 1.10 Behind the police stood the Army. While in the last resort theArmy is available to support the civil power, its use creates as many problemsas it solves. Moreover, in Northern Ireland there is the added problemthat, while law and order are the responsibility of the Northern Irelandgovernment,[4] the operational control of the Army has always remainedwith the UK government. Outline of the disturbances 1.12 The "definite matter of urgent public importance" whichthe Tribunal was established to investigate might appear to include allthe acts of violence and civil disturbance occurring between March andAugust 1969. Any such interpretation of the two resolutions would be false.Serious disturbances did occur during this period which are not includedin the resolutions. To mention three instances, serious disturbances occurredin Londonderry during April, in Lurgan and Strabane during August, butare excluded from our inquiry. 1.15 Meanwhile, the Protestant community was determined, notwithstandingthe agitation of the minority groups, to hold its traditional summer ceremonies.The danger of the situation was that, as a result of recent events, theminority was not inclined to let the marches go by without protest. Thisfeeling was naturally more acute in certain areas where there was a difficultlocal situation. Thus, in June there were troubles associated with an Orangechurch parade and a ceremony of unfurling a new banner at the Orange Hallin Dungiven, a predominantly Catholic town. But the situation did not becomeserious in the Province as a whole until July, when the approach of thetraditional marches of the 12th heightened tension everywhere. Disturbanceswhich arose by way of minority response to Protestant marches occurredon 12 July in Londonderry, Dungiven, and in Belfast in the neighbourhoodof Unity Flats and in the Ardoyne. 1.16 The full consequences of these disturbances were not understoodat the time but only emerged in the course of evidence before the Tribunal.In Londonderry, where the disturbances had been particularly severe, theDerry Citizens' Action Committee,[5] which was associated with, but notpart of, NICRA, and had been the focal point of the expression of minorityviews and actions, was superseded by a more aggressive body known as theDerry Citizens' Defence Association. This body took over the function of"defence" of the Bogside. 1.17 Protestants too were becoming more turbulent. Angry Protestantcrowds had with difficulty been dissuaded from entering Dungiven on 12and 13 July to protect the Orange Hall. In Belfast there was high feeling,out of all proportion to the incident itself, as a result of a minor injuryto a boy in the procession that passed Unity Flats on 12 July. At the sametime the Shankill Defence Association, a body recently formed and previouslyof no great influence, began to emerge on the streets under the leadershipof Mr McKeague. This body was active in assisting Protestant families tomove out of Hooker Street and there is evidence which we accept that itencouraged Catholic families to move out of Protestant streets south ofthe Ardoyne. This movement constituted a retreat into their own areas byoutlying members of the two communities, for the sake of security. 1.18 There was serious rioting by Protestants on the Shankill Road nearUnity Flats in the early days of August. In the course of these riots,the Protestant mobs made a determined attempt to invade Unity Flats, andalso appeared in force on the Crumlin Road. They were successfully resistedby the sustained efforts of the police, who incurred the anger of somesections of Protestant opinion by their baton charges up the Shankill Road.It is significant that during these Protestant riots of early August twosenior policemen, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner for Belfast,concluded that the police were unable any longer to control serious disturbancesin the City of Belfast. Both these officers felt the time had come to callthe Army to the aid of the civil power. 1.20 It must be remembered that people were influenced not only by suchmajor events as the Londonderry riot, but also by their own local situations.For instance, the Civil Rights Association had been picketing the LocalAuthority Offices in Dungannon for many months. On 11 August they wereforestalled by the Protestants. Later that evening, after a meeting ofthe Civil Rights Association, a Catholic riot developed which was dispersedonly after baton charges by the police down Irish Street. There were allegationsof police brutality and there is no doubt that these allegations disturbednot only the Catholic population of Dungannon, but also the people livingin the neighbouring village of Coalisland. On 12 August there was a seriousriot in Coalisland, while on the 13th rioting again broke out in Dungannon. 1.24 By the morning of I5 August the police were exhausted. They failedto control the violence which broke out that day on the Crumlin Road andin the Clonard area of the city. Nor did they prevent the burning of factoriesby Catholics and public houses by Protestants. It has to be admitted thatthe police were no longer in control of the city. On the evening of the15th, the Army entered the Falls Road, but not the Crumlin Road, whichwas the scene of a serious confrontation between Protestants and Catholics.Two people - one Protestant and one Catholic-died by civilian shootingin Belfast on 15 August. Catholic houses were burnt that night by Protestantsat Bombay Street (Falls Road area) and Brookfield Street (Crumlin Road).On the evening of 16 August, the Army entered the Crumlin Road and thereafterthe disturbances died away. In some riot areas barricades remained. Defencecommittees began to exercisede factoauthority in several Catholicareas. So far as the Falls Road district is concerned we are satisfiedthat the disturbances produced the committees rather than the committeesthe disturbances. CHAPTER 2 - THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE DISTURBANCES 2.1 It is possible to reach some general conclusions as to the originand nature of the riots and other disorders which disturbed the Provincein the spring and summer of 1969. At the time both the Prime Minister (NI)and Cardinal Conway[6] issued public statements. On 14 August the PrimeMinister declared in the House of Commons:- "This is not the agitation of a minority seeking by lawful meansthe assertion of political rights. It is the conspiracy of forces seekingto overthrow a Government democratically elected by a large majority. Whatthe teenage hooligans seek beyond cheap kicks I do not know. But of thisI am quite certain - they are being manipulated and encouraged by thosewho seek to discredit and overthrow this Government".[7] On 23 August the Cardinal, together with the Bishops of Derry, Clogher,Dromore, Kilmore, and Down and Connor, issued a statement which includedthe following.- "The fact is that on Thursday and Friday of last week the Catholicdistricts of Falls and Ardoyne were invaded by mobs equipped with machine-gunsand other firearms. A community which was virtually defenceless was sweptby gunfire and streets of Catholic homes were systematically set on fire.
"No, quite the reverse. I am quite convinced that the events inAugust 1969 put back my ideals much further than they put back the UnionistGovernment's." But equally we accept Mr Gogarty's own assessment of his Association'sresponsibility for the Protestant backlash of 14 and 15 August: - "In this matter I am afraid that we all on the Executive under-estimatedthe strength of militant Unionism at this time, and had we foreseen theholocaust which did occur in mid-August we most certainly would not haveentered on such an enterprise as we did, but ... we underestimated theinfluence which possibly many right-wing Unionist politicians had whenthey slandered our Association as subversive. We did not really believethat this slander would have been believed as strongly by many Protestantsas it seems it was." In that sense NICRA bears a heavy, albeit indirect, responsibility forthe horrors that occurred on 14 August. Politicians of the opposition The Protestant invasion theory 2.16 Thus, a study of the Protestant side of the disturbances revealsthe same basic pattern as that of the Catholic - communal disturbanceserupting without plan or premeditation during a summer when the traditionalProtestant marches and ceremonies, following immediately after the massivelypublicized and vividly remembered events of the period August 1968 to April1969, provided a series of occasions for the eruption of violence whichneither the political leaders nor the forces available to the NI Governmentcould prevent or suppress. CHAPTER 3 - THE RUC AND THE USC The RUC 3.1 In a very real sense our inquiry was an investigation of policeconduct. Criticism was directed against the higher direction of the RUC,the manner of their employment on the streets during the disturbances,the use of CS gas, the use of guns, and the behaviour of individual policemen.We deal with these criticisms as they arise for consideration in our detaileddiscussion of the disturbances. At this stage we direct attention onlyto criticisms of general importance. 3.2 Undoubtedly mistakes were made and certain individual officers actedwrongly on occasions. But the general case of a partisan force co-operatingwith Protestant mobs to attack Catholic people is devoid of substance,and we reject it utterly. 3.3 We are satisfied that the great majority of the members of the RUCwas concerned to do its duty, which, so far as concerned the disturbances,was to maintain order on the streets, using no more force than was reasonablynecessary to suppress rioting and protect life and limb. Inevitably, however,this meant confrontation and on occasions conflict with disorderly mobs.Moreover, since most of the rioting developed from action on the streetsstarted by Catholic crowds, the RUC were more often than not facing Catholicswho, as a result, came to feel that the police were always going for thern,baton-charging them -never "the others". 3.4 In fact the RUC faced and, if necessary, charged those who appearedto them to be challenging, defying, or attacking them. We are satisfiedthat, though they did not expect to be attacked by Protestants, they wereready to deal with them in the same way, if it became necessary. The Shankillriots of the 2/4 August establish beyond doubt the readiness of the policeto do their duty against Protestant mobs, when they were the disturbersof the public peace. 3.5 But it is painfully clear from the evidence adduced before us thatby July the Catholic minority no longer believed that the RUC was impartialand that Catholic and civil rights activists were publicly asserting thisloss of confidence. Understandably these resentments affected the thinkingand feeling of the young and the irresponsible, and induced the jeeringand throwing of stones which were the small beginnings of most of the disturbances.The effect of this hostility on the RUC themselves was unfortunate. Theycame to treat as their enemies, and accordingly also as the enemies ofthe public peace, those who persisted in displaying hostility and distrusttowards them. 3.6 Thus there developed the fateful split between the Catholic communityand the police. Faced with the distrust of a substantial proportion ofthe whole population and short of numbers, the RUC had (as some seniorofficers appreciated) lost the capacity to control a major riot. Theirdifficulties naturally led them, when the emergency arose, to have recourseto methods such as baton-charges, CS gas and gunfire, which were sure ultimatelyto stoke even higher the fires of resentment and hatred. 3.7 There were, in our judgment, six occasions in the course of thesedisturbances when the police, by act or omission, were seriously at fault. (1) The lack of firm direction in handling the disturbances in Londonderryduring the early evening of 12 August. The "Rossville Street incursion"was undertaken as a tactical move by the Reserve Force commander withoutan understanding of the effect it would have on Bogside attitudes. TheCounty Inspector did understand, but did not prevent it. The incursionwas seen by the Bogsiders as a repetition of events in January and Apriland led many, including moderate men such as Father Mulvey, to think thatthe police must be resisted. (2) The decision by the County Inspector to put USC on riot controlduty in the streets of Dungannon on 13 August without disarming them andwithout ensuring that there was an experienced police officer present andin command. (3) The similar decision of the County Inspector in Armagh on 14 August (4) The use of Browning machine-guns in Belfast on 14 August and ISAugust. The weapon was a menace to the innocent as well as the guilty,being heavy and indiscriminate in its fire: and on one occasion (the firinginto St Brendan's block of flats where the boy Rooney was killed) its usewas wholly unjustifiable. (5) The failure to prevent Protestant mobs from burning down Catholichouses:- (6) The failure to take any effective action to restrain or dispersethe mobs or to protect lives and property in the riot areas on 15 Augustduring the hours of daylight and before the arrival of the Army. 3.8 The conduct which we have criticised was due very largely to thebelief held at the time by many of the police, including senior officers,that they were dealing with an armed uprising engineered by the IRA. Thiswas what all their experience would have led them to expect: and when,on 13 August, some firing occurred and a grenade was thrown in Leeson Street,Belfast, their expectation seemed to them to have materialised. In dealingwith an armed uprising, the usual restraints on police conduct would notbe so strong,while more attention would naturally be given to thesuppression of the insurgents than to the protection of people's livesand property. In fact, the police appreciation that they had on their handsan armed uprising led by the IRA was incorrect. Direct IRA participationwas slight; and there is no credible evidence that the IRA planned or organisedthe disturbances. 3.9 But there was a more fundamental cause for these failures. Policestrength was not sufficient to maintain the public peace but the Inspector-Generalacted in August as though it was. The Commissioner and Deputy Commissionerfor Belfast had learnt the lesson, at the time of the Protestant riotsin early August, when they reached the view that,without the aidof the Army, order could not be ensured on the streets of Belfast. Butit is clear from the advice given to the Minister of Home Affairs (NI)on the issue whether or not to ban the Apprentice Boys' parade and fromhis own evidence given to the Tribunal that the Inspector-General did notshare this view. It was not until he was confronted with the physical exhaustionof the police in Londonderry on the 14th and in Belfast on the 15th thathe was brought to the decision to call in the aid of the Army. Had he correctlyappreciated the situation before the outbreak of the mid-August disturbances,it is likely that the Apprentice Boys' parade would not have taken placeand the police would have been sufficiently reinforced to prevent disorderarising in the city. Had he correctly appreciated the threat to Belfastthat emerged on 13 August, he could have saved the city the tragedy ofthe 15th. We have no doubt that he was well aware of the existence of politicalpressures against calling in the Army; but their existence constitutedno excuse, as he himself recognised when in evidence he stoutly and honourablyasserted that they did not influence his decisions. 3.11 There were grave objections, well understood by those in authority,to the use of the USC in communal disturbances. In 1969 the USC containedno Catholics[14] but was a force drawn from the Protestant section of thecommunity. Totally distrusted by the Catholics, who saw them as the strongarm of the Protestant ascendancy, they could not show themselves in a Catholicarea without heightening tension. Moreover they were neither trained norequipped for riot control duty. 3.12 Nevertheless the USC was the only reserve[15] available to theNI Government if events should develop which over-extended the RUC. Accordingly,in July the Minister for Home Affairs (NI) had authorised their use inriot control without firearms, but with batons. After USC protest, he revisedthe instruction by allowing officers and NC0s to carry arms. 3.13 On 13 August the Prime Minister indicated in a broadcast that USCwould not be used for riot control but on the 14th an instruction was issuedto the effect that they could be so used, but equipped "where possible"with batons. It was not until the 15th that USC were expressly instructedto report for duty with their firearms. 3.14 The effect of the difficulties and the instructions set out abovewas that the USC were largely held in reserve in July and only hesitantlycommitted in August. They were not used at all during the July disturbancesin Londonderry but did appear on the streets of Dungiven on 13 July whena party of USC without provocation fired over the heads of a crowd emergingfrom the Castle ballroom. 3.15 When in early August the Shankill riots exposed the weakness ofthe police when threatened by Protestant as well as Catholic rioting, thedecision was taken to use the USC for patrol duties in the Shankill. Theywere successful in this predominantly Protestant area at a time when theRUC were not welcome -because of their firm action against the Protestantmobs at the beginning of the month. The USC performed their patrol dutiesunarmed. 3.16 Until14 August USC were also used in Belfast to protect licensedpremises which, being largely Catholic owned and managed, were at riskfrom Protestant hooligans when communal tension was high. Again, they didthe job well-as is evidenced by the destruction of so many public housesas soon as they were withdrawn. 3.17 On 14 August, the day that a broadcast call for their report toduty to their nearest police station went out,USC appeared on thestreets of Londonderry, Belfast, Dungannon, Armagh, and Newry. 3.18 In Londonderry they appeared in some numbers at Waterloo Placeand Bishop Street. They did not carry firearms. Their arrival in WaterlooPlace caused consternation among the Catholics: but, in fact, they didlittle or nothing. In Bishop Street they were used to restrain a Protestantcrowd in the Fountain. There is some evidence of special constables misbehavingthemselves in this area by participating in an exchange of petrol bombsand missiles with a Catholic crowd. There is however nothing to justifyany general criticism of the USC in the few hours that it performed riotduty on the streets of Londonderry. 3.19 On 13 August USC, who had arrived to assist the hard-pressed policein Coalisland, fired without orders into a riotous crowd but were immediatelyordered to stop, which they did. On the 14th in Dungannon and Armagh armedparties of USC opened fire on Catholic crowds, causing casualties, includingone death at Armagh. 3.20 In Coalisland there were extenuating circumstances, in as muchas the police party was under severe pressure from a riotous mob whichheavily out-numbered them. In Armagh, deprived of police leadership, USCpersonnel panicked, but there was no justification for firing into thecrowd. In Dungannon, the Tribunal has been at a loss to find any explanationfor the shooting, which it is satisfied was a reckless and irresponsiblething to do. As in Armagh, so also in Dungannon there was an absence ofpolice leadership at the critical time. 3.21 Their employment in Belfast on 14th revealed their helplessnessin a communal disturbance. Instructed to hold back Protestants who attemptedto penetrate down such streets as Dover and Percy streets into the Falls/Divisdistrict, they failed. Confronted with a small Catholic mob moving up theCatholic end of Dover Street, they fought it back. The scale of the fightingincreased, and became a sectarian riot, in which the USC had only an incidentalpart. In Percy Street some members of the USC and some Protestant civiliansco-operated in trying to drive a Catholic crowd back to Divis Street. Wheneventually Protestants erupted into Divis Street they stood about helplesslywhile their presence convinced the Catholics that "the Bs" werespearheading the assault. 3.22 There is no evidence that the USC, who were used to hold back Protestantsin the Disraeli Street area, participated in the rioting inside the Ardoyne. 3.23 In reviewing the conduct of the USCit is necessary to distinguishbetween Belfast and the rest of the Province. When USC were used for riotcontrol duty outside Belfast they showed on several occasions a lack ofproper discipline, particularly in the use of firearms. But in Belfaston 14 August their presence in Dover Street and Percy Street, while evokingthe hostility of the Catholics, was unable to restrain the aggression ofthe Protestants. 3.24 A little-publicised but important contribution made by the USCto the events under review was by way of the mobilisation of some 300 ofthem into the RUC. About 80 of them had been mobilized for duty as membersof the Reserve Force several months earlier. The Reserve Force led the"Rossville Street incursion" into the Bogside on 12 August andprovided the armed Shorlands which were used in the Belfast riots. Butthere are no grounds for singling out mobilised USC as being guilty ofmisconduct. The incursion into the Bogside and the use of Browning machine-gunsin Belfast were RUC, not USC, responsibilities. Notes: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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